Ahmed Eleiba discusses Moscow's exact role in the Syrian crisis From cooperation to strategic alliance, Russian-Syrian relations have progressed in a straight line since 1946, when the Soviet veto acknowledged the independence of Damascus against British-French claims. Russian support for Syria in the Israeli conflict later proved unproductive, however. It bore fruit only in the last few months when the veto was used against Western and Arab attempts to end the crisis in October and again in January. Military cooperation has been even more significant, however: in 1963 Tartus became a Soviet naval base; Russian arms were sold to Syria in large amounts (with the Syrian debt to Russia reaching $13 billion in 1992); through an agreement undertaken between 2005 and 2008, 73 per cent of the value of that debt was dropped, with the remainder dedicated to Russian investments. A year after the outbreak of the revolution, a conflict has emerged between Arab arms support for the Free Syrian Army and Russian military support for the Al-Assad regime. A deal involving the export of 36 Russian Yak-30 fighter planes to Syria has been exposed, facing criticism from within Russia on the grounds that a deal worth $4 billion was signed with Gaddafi towards the end of his regime to no avail. According to the renegade Syrian MP Mamoun Al-Homsi there is now no doubt that the weapons with which the Syrian people is being killed are modern Russian arms -- whether their transfer to Syria took place in the open or secretly. In an armament race recalling the Cold War over the last three years, the Tartus base was also developed, increasingly becoming a symbol of Russian influence in the region. With the spread of news of military movements opposite the Syrian coast with a view to providing the Al-Assad regime with marine infantry this week there is an increasingly public escalation against Russia, especially on the part of Arab states, with Russian-Gulf sparring more and more evident on satellite television. In conversation with a number of Egyptian politicians including the former UN envoy to Iraq Ibrahim Anwar, who spoke to Al-Ahram Weekly, the Russian ambassador to Cairo Sergey Radchenko explained that any military intervention in Syria would create a pretext for international intervention which is contrary to Russian policy; he added that Russia will be speaking with the Syrian opposition soon. Yet international observers have confirmed that there really are military manoeuvres along the Syrian coast distinct from the usual movement in the vicinity of the Tartus base. According to Al-Homsi it was the Russian officers themselves who leaked this information to the Free Syrian Army; likewise the Russian news agency Interfax reported that the tanker Iman had already docked in Tartus, having sailed from Sevastopol 10 days ago; Russian defence officials dismissed the news, indicating that the tanker was a civilian vessel with provisions to Tartus. Yet further leaks suggest that this is not true, especially after the appearance in the Mediterranean of the reconnaissance ship Akvator. Still, many observers and analysts agree that Russia is securing the Tartus base against possible attack by the Free Army. The implication for Safwat El-Zayyat, a military expert speaking to the Weekly is that, while Russia has no intention of engaging in combat, it does plan on establishing its presence as a negotiation party with particular influence deriving from the fact that it has deployments on the ground. The head of the Egyptian intelligence Murad Muwafi's visit to Russia has been described as successful but very little information about it is forthcoming. That Muwafi moved straight onto Saudi Arabia suggests that Cairo is now playing a role in mediating between the Gulf and Russia; just what that role might be is as yet unclear, however. According to El-Zayyat, it is Turkey that will play the major role in supporting the Free Army -- with the result that Aleppo and Idlib will be liberated first -- while Russia plays a role in securing the coast to block provisions to the Free Army and impose an air embargo on it. For this reason and because of the time factor, Al-Homsi is not as optimistic as he might be. Turkey is currently anticipating the second conference of the Friends of Syria, after the first was held in Tunisia, leaving the Gulf states unconvinced of a diplomatic solution to the crisis. After that second meeting, many feel, the trajectory will be much clearer. (see pp. 8-9)
