It is now 40 years since the 1973 October War, yet the latter is still the subject of discussion and study, a fact which emphasises its importance. The initial victories achieved by the Egyptian Armed Forces were the result of good planning and efficient cooperation. It is true that the assault on the Suez Canal, the destruction of the Bar Lev Line and the fierce battles that took place in repulsing Israeli counter-attacks constituted the more spectacular aspects of the war, but we should not underestimate the efforts brought to bear by other services besides the army and the air force. In fact, naval activities also had a profound strategic effect on the results of the war. The Egyptian navy started combat actions several days before the rest of the Armed Forces, and it continued its operations well into January 1974. The following article reviews the naval aspects of the October War. THE OCTOBER WAR: The 1973 October War, referred to by Israel as the Yom Kippur War, was by no means the first round of hostilities between Egypt and Israel, but it was the first time that the Egyptian side had planned for an offensive war, and it was the first time that there had been real coordination between the political leadership and the military command, a situation hardly followed in the previous rounds. It was also the first time that the capabilities of Israel had been estimated realistically and the first time that the choice of combat missions had been limited to those that were within the capabilities of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Long gone were the overly optimistic plans to liberate the whole of Palestine in just a few days of combat. Now the main objective was to change the military situation by assaulting the Suez Canal, destroying the Bar Lev Line and establishing bridgeheads on the eastern bank. This was considered sufficient to create a substantial change in the military situation and hence result in a negotiated resolution of the conflict. For once, the Egyptian Armed Forces were able to secure the element of surprise, and it was also the first time that the Israelis had to face combat on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts at the same time. Furthermore, quite a marked improvement was made in Egypt's relations with the other Arab states, a fact that resulted in the Egyptian navy being able to extend its combat activities into the strategic depths of the Arab world both in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. PREPARING FOR WAR: Preparations for the 1973 War stretched back a number of years, and since the humiliating defeat in June 1967 the Egyptian Armed Forces had been striving hard to achieve a high standard of combat readiness. The Egyptian navy was in a much better state than the rest of the Armed Forces before the October War, having not been subjected to defeat in 1967. The standard of combat training, military discipline and the will to fight was quite high. A comparison of the forces available in 1967 was clearly in favour of the Egyptian navy, which possessed large numbers of submarines, destroyers and even more importantly a number of Soviet-built missile-launching boats of which Israel had none. The effectiveness of the Egyptian navy was proven very soon after the June 1967 War when on 21 October 1967 Egyptian boats successfully launched a surface-to-surface missile attack against the Israeli flagship, the destroyer Eilat, which was hit by two missiles and sank on the outer limits of Egyptian territorial waters northeast of Port Said. Nevertheless, there was still much to be done towards improving the defensive plans and security measures of the navy. The War of Attrition that began towards the end of 1969 provided a very useful chance to try out new tactical procedures and to test the effectiveness of the newly available Styx surface-to-surface missiles, especially against small targets. On the strategic level, talks were held with various Arab nations to explore the possibility of alternative stationing points in the Red Sea, positions that would enable the Egyptian navy to carry out naval tasks at long distances from home bases. PLANNING THE OCTOBER OFFENSIVE: Serious planning for the October operations started from January 1972 onwards. The naval combat plan for the war, codenamed Granite, was adjusted and altered a number of times to ensure that all combat missions assigned were within the capability of the navy's forces. This was also the first time that special attention had been given to deception, which was recognised as a very important factor in ensuring the success of the operations, bearing in mind that the Israeli forces required only 48 to 72 hours to achieve full readiness. A fairly accurate and unbiased estimate of enemy combat capabilities and distribution was worked out, and on the basis of that the plan of action was drawn up. All these actions were quite the opposite of what had happened in 1967, when no proper planning had been carried out. Nearly all the combat missions that were likely to be assigned to the naval forces were specified in the operational directives to the navy. This document stated the various combat tasks that were likely to be executed in general terms, with the details being left to naval operations to work out. The only missions that were clearly specified were those to be carried out in support of the army offensive, such as participating in the preparations for the assault on the Suez Canal and the provision of military support from seaside flanks on particular enemy ground defensive positions. Also specified was the assistance to be provided in the form of some small tactical landing operations using light craft east of Port Said and across the Gulf of Suez. PROBLEMS FACING THE NAVAL STAFF: During the preparatory period, studies were carried out at naval headquarters in order to determine the possible combat missions that could be carried out successfully and at the same time assist in achieving the general strategic objectives of the Armed Forces. Although a successful tactical landing on the northern coast of Sinai behind the Bar Lev Line would have been of great value to the 2nd field army, the navy insisted that it was not practical to attempt such a complex mission unless sufficient air cover and air support were available, something not then possible for the Egyptian air force. It was therefore decided not to attempt ambitious landings, but instead to carry on with training and demonstrative actions in this regard as a tactic intended to deceive Israel. Small commando-type operations would be attempted using light craft and rubber boats instead. In November 1969 during the War of Attrition, Egyptian destroyers carried out an artillery bombardment of an Israeli logistics area east of Port Said. The attack was carried out successfully, but the destroyers taking part were subjected to heavy air strikes and it was only with a degree of luck that they managed to beat off the attack and return to harbour unscathed. The Israeli response was quick and effective enough to convince the naval staff that such destroyer action without air cover would be very risky even during the night, even though some Israeli planes had been hit. In order to provide an alternative method, a number of torpedo boats were equipped with unguided surface-to-surface multiple missile launchers, and these proved quite quick and effective in delivering harassing fire against coastal targets. High accuracy was not really required since the missiles were meant to attack large area targets from the seaward side and the attacking boats were much more difficult to locate and attack than destroyers. When the Styx missiles were first used against the Eilat in 1967, they achieved remarkable success, but as the years went by these missiles became obsolete and could no longer be depended upon. The missiles were also intended to be fired against medium and larger naval targets but were quite inaccurate against small targets. Furthermore, it had to be assumed that Israel had become quite familiar with the system's capabilities and had worked out suitable counter-measures. Attempts to improve the sensitivity of the homing system were not successful, and all that could be done was to accept the superiority of Israeli missile boats and to avoid missile boat clashes as much as possible. In case of Israeli penetration to close proximity to naval bases, heavy dependence was to be placed on coastal artillery, with missile boats firing a larger number of missiles per salvo to allow for any inaccuracies. The superiority of Israel in aerial warfare was recognised at all levels. At general headquarters in Cairo, it was decided that whatever effort could be mounted by the Egyptian Air Forces should give priority to ensuring the successful assault on the Suez Canal and the support of the 2nd and the 3rd field armies in their offensive actions. Thus, the navy had to plan its combat activities without depending on air cover or air support. The only protection would be provided within the established air defence zones. In order to deal with this situation, a lot of dependence was placed on submarine warfare, mine warfare and special forces actions. At the same time, it was decided to extend destroyer operations well outside the reach of Israeli aviation. This factor restricted naval activities, especially since ship-borne air defence capabilities were somewhat outdated. Very early in the planning stage, the weakness of the Israeli navy in the Red Sea was recognised. There were no Israeli missile boats, no mine sweepers and no anti-submarine ships in the area at the time, and the configuration of the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea provided an ideal stage to mount combat actions directed at disrupting enemy lines of communication. The dependence of Israel on oil from the Gulf passing through the Straits of Bab Al-Mandab and oil from the Gulf of Suez passing through the Straits of Jubal at the entrance of the Gulf of Suez made it clear that intensive pressure could be brought to bear on Israel if these were cut off. Referring to the Mediterranean side of operations, it was recognised that Israel did not have an effective anti-submarine defence force, and therefore it was decided that the employment of submarines in this direction would be very effective in hindering maritime traffic. OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT: Since the October War was an offensive operation, sufficient time could be provided for the navy to deploy its forces even though some of the operational areas lay at very long distances from the home bases. In order to ensure the secrecy of the intentions behind the operations, it was decided that the deployment would be reduced to a minimum, with the distribution of forces being achieved beforehand. As a result, the deployment of forces took place smoothly and quickly, making full use of deceptive measures. The basic principle of the operational deployment plan was to provide sufficient organic forces in all the naval bases so that each naval base could carry out its combat missions without reinforcement. As for formations and units taking part in combat against maritime lines of transport, the concept was to have these forces placed as close as possible to their combat area, making use of stationing facilities in Arab countries like Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. NAVAL OPERATIONS CONCEPT: The overall concept of the naval operations was to employ the full force of the navy on three levels: - In the tactical zone: to concentrate operations in support of the army offensive; - On the operational level: to ensure naval security in the operational zone of the naval bases by carrying out all types of defence, directing activities at preventing enemy naval penetration and repulsing such enemy action; - On a strategic level: the naval effort was concentrated against enemy lines of maritime communication both in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. The objective here was to prevent the transport of oil to the Israeli port of Eilat in the Gulf of Aqaba, achieved through two main activities. The first of these was to control the passage of ships especially tankers though the Bab Al-Mandab Straits, using destroyers with submarines deployed further north in the Red Sea as back-up to engage ships proceeding to Eilat. The second was to prevent the supply of oil from Israeli-held Egyptian oil wells inside the Gulf of Suez mainly by using mine warfare to block the entrance of the Gulf of Suez. In the Mediterranean, the objective was to reduce and hinder traffic to Israeli ports by using submarines south of Cyprus and by the employment of destroyers south of Malta. These destroyers were instructed to make themselves noticed by all shipping proceeding eastwards towards Israeli ports, with the idea that their activity would certainly be reported back to Israel and consequently would reduce traffic along with wasting Israeli efforts in a secondary direction. Naval activities directed at the support of the army offensive consisted of participating in preparations for the assault on the Suez Canal, mainly by using naval coastal artillery in the direction east of Port Fouad on the Mediterranean side and in the direction of Suez-Uyoun Moussa on the Red Sea side. A number of rocket assaults were also carried out against coastal targets at the request of the army command. Many of these raids were concentrated during critical stages, mainly to divert Israeli attention and to draw Israeli efforts, especially aviation efforts, away from the main direction of the 2nd and 3rd field army assaults. Furthermore, naval assistance was provided for small tactical raiding operations by commando forces from the 2nd field army behind enemy defensive positions east of Port Said and across the Gulf of Suez by special forces from the Red Sea military command. Naval activities in securing the operational zone consisted of carrying out defensive procedures against submarines, mines and frogmen using the organic forces of the naval bases. Penetrations by Israeli missile boats were repelled by coastal artillery, coastal missile defence batteries, and in some cases by missile boats. In this type of combat the Israeli navy had the upper hand since it had more modern boats and had effective support from the Israeli air force, especially helicopters. DISRUPTION OF ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS: This mission was given major attention by the Egyptian navy, which foresaw the success such action would have and its strategic effect on Israel, especially since intelligence reports had indicated that oil reserves in Israel were limited. In its actions to secure results in this field, the Egyptian navy surprised Israel with a new method of combat. The usual artillery strikes on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast were no longer the theme of the action; now, operations were carried out more than 1,000 miles away from Israeli bases in the Bab Al-Mandab Straits, south of Malta, and so on. For once, the Israelis found themselves outwitted and without any capability to retaliate. As a result, this mission achieved spectacular results. First and foremost was that it showed Israel that the occupation of Sharm El-Sheikh would not necessarily guarantee the safety of supplies to the port of Eilat. The flow of oil that was badly needed in Israel, since it depended almost entirely on the oil wells captured in 1967, was no longer reaching Eilat. Attempts to force a passage through the Straits of Jubal only resulted in further losses due to mines. It should be noted that the Egyptian navy succeeded in carrying out this mission mainly by declaring areas unsafe for maritime navigation due to the outbreak of hostilities and avoiding the declaration of any blockade of the international straits. It is interesting to note that these operations continued long after the cessation of hostilities on the Suez Canal front. The navy continued its control of traffic in the Bab Al-Mandab Straits, warning all ships not to proceed northwards into the area declared dangerous to navigation. This continued well into January 1974, and the effect of this on the negotiations that took place after the ceasefire was declared was very prominent. Lifting the blockade off Bab Al-Mandab was one of the first Israeli requests, indicating very clearly the effectiveness of Egyptian naval action in that area. OPERATIONAL EVALUATION: Although the Egyptian navy had to fight without air support and using outdated missile boats and ineffective missiles, it managed to achieve some spectacular successes, especially at the strategic level. Israel was caught unawares by new and effective operational planning for combat actions that took place many miles away from Israeli bases, thus out of reach of its missile boats and its aviation. In closer areas, the Egyptian navy made full use of mine warfare, which also put the Israeli navy in a very weak position, since it was unequipped with any mine counter-measures. The strategic deployment of the Israeli navy left the Red Sea direction very poorly equipped to handle this new type of warfare. In the Mediterranean it was found impossible to provide maritime transport to carry the needed strategic supplies from western European ports, thus forcing Israel to depend on a United States air bridge. It is true that the Israeli navy managed to achieve some success in combats between missile boats, but these actions did not secure any operational or strategic benefits. Israeli frogmen managed to penetrate the defences of some forward bases and inflict some minor losses, but this was at the cost of the lives of some of their number. On many occasions Egyptian fishing boats and villages were shelled by Israeli boats on the pretext that they were Egyptian naval bases. On the whole, the Egyptian navy managed to accomplish most of its missions successfully. These successes can be attributed to sound operational planning and the proper employment of all the available forces. Even ships of World War II vintage participated and achieved results. The vital importance of achieving the element of surprise and delivering the first blows was amply demonstrated in the October War. Surprise must be achieved on a strategic and operational level, bearing in mind that secrecy and deception can be very valuable in this respect. This was one of the main factors which ensured an Egyptian victory in the 1973 October War. The writer is a former commander-in-chief of the Egyptian navy and was chief of naval operations during the 1973 October War.
