There is no doubt that the victory achieved by the Egyptian Armed Forces in the October 1973 War was an outstanding military achievement accentuated by its occurring after the military debacle suffered in the previous conflict with Israel. In this article it will be shown that in spite of the defeat, the Egyptian navy performed professionally in the 1967 War and in fact aborted the only attempted attack by the Israeli navy. On 5 June 1967, Egypt suffered a major military defeat in Sinai in its long-standing conflict with Israel. Amidst the details of the battle for Sinai and the massive Israeli propaganda machine that proclaimed the existence of the “undefeatable Israeli army”, the accomplishments of the Egyptian navy have been obscured. In spite of the chaos in the Armed Forces in June 1967, the Egyptian navy came out of this conflict unscathed with none of its units sunk or damaged. At the same time, it managed to score some victories, while the Israeli navy hardly achieved anything except for its treacherous attack on the US naval ship Liberty. In 1967, the author of this article was the commanding officer of the destroyer brigade, the main striking force of the Egyptian navy, and he was deeply involved in the naval activities that occurred during the war. Details of this will be presented in the article that follows.
ISRAELI ATTACK: At around 9am on the morning of 5 June 1967, without any declaration of war, a sudden and massive Israeli air attack was launched against the Egyptian air force, resulting in the destruction of nearly 85 per cent of the country's air power. Following this, a state of panic and disorientation seems to have affected the military high command in Cairo, resulting in some catastrophic blunders. Early in the afternoon of 6 June, without any air cover and in an open desert theatre of operations, Egyptian army formations deployed in Sinai were ordered to withdraw as quickly as possible west of the Suez Canal. This uncalculated decision to retreat from Sinai without any proper planning resulted in the Israeli army being able to advance almost unhindered into Sinai, while Israeli warplanes commenced the systematic destruction of the retreating forces. In this way, the momentous tragedy of 1967 took place, leaving Egypt in a state of shock and despair. The reasons behind this disastrous state of affairs are almost incomprehensible. Why was Egypt brought to the brink of war by deliberate political moves that can only be described as rash beyond reason? With the Egyptian army deeply involved in the war in Yemen and its resources badly stretched, Egypt was not in a fit state to undertake a major war against Israel. In 1967, Israel enjoyed a marked superiority in air power over the Egyptian air force, and the Israeli Defence Force, when reserves were called up, could amass superior land forces. Only in the naval theatre did Egypt possess a margin of superiority. Moreover, in 1967 some of the main and vital principles of war, such as surprise, concealment, concentration of forces, etc, were discarded by Egypt, which gave the Israelis ample warning and a plain indication of hostile intentions. At the same time, the decision was made not to commence an attack against Israel. It is only logical to assume that the Egyptian high command at the time did not believe that war could break out and gambled on the idea that a military build-up in Sinai, and a crude show of force, would prevent Israel from launching a war and at the same time allow Egypt to achieve certain political and strategic advantages. The full facts of the situation at the time are not readily available, but it has generally been recognised that the intention was for Egypt to regain control of Sharm El-Sheikh, after getting rid of the UN presence in this area. Additionally, one can safely assume that there must have been considerable international covert plotting and machinations to bring about the downfall of the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, and at the same time to destroy the weapons amassed by Egypt through its arms deal with the Soviet Union. Thus, through a series of wrong deductions and bungled decisions the military defeat of 1967 took place. This was a defeat which in all honesty cannot be placed squarely on the shoulders of the country's military commanders, since their advice not to precipitate hostilities at that time was simply ignored, and when war broke out they were not given a chance to fight. The records of the time show that most Egyptian formations that were not ordered to retreat put up brave resistance to the Israeli advance, which in many cases failed to break through their lines.
EGYPT'S NAVAL BUILD-UP: Starting in the middle of May at around the same time as army detachments were being paraded through the streets of Cairo on their way to the Sinai front in rather a naive show of force, the Egyptian navy was ordered to deploy a force of destroyers, submarines, and missile and torpedo boats in Hurghada and Safaga on the Red Sea coast opposite Sharm El-Sheikh. On the Israeli side there was hardly any sea power to contend with, just a few obsolescent torpedo boats and a number of light craft of various types, plus two or three small landing ships. Needless to say, all this did not present a threat to the Egyptian navy. On the other hand, the Israeli air force presented a formidable threat to any surface naval units in the vicinity of Sharm El-Sheikh. One must point out that these military movements were carried out on the understanding that war was not being contemplated and that what was taking place was simply a political move. As a result, it was not a concern of the military commanders of the different services, who, though expressing a different opinion, were compelled to comply. This state of affairs lasted until 23 May, 1967, when a sudden decision was taken to block traffic through the Straits of Tiran leading into the Gulf of Aqaba. From this moment on, the outbreak of hostilities became imminent, and the situation deteriorated rapidly. Yet, in spite of this there was no decision taken to commence combat actions against Israel, and through intense political pressure from various sources on the one hand, and catastrophic misjudgement on the other, it was decided at the highest level that Egypt would not strike the first blow. Combat readiness had been increased to maximum alert, and all naval units were taking defensive measures with the dispersal of units and the manning of 50 per cent of the anti-aircraft armaments on a 24-hour basis. A detachment of three destroyers, one frigate, two submarines, and a large number of missile and torpedo boats, was already stationed in the Red Sea theatre. A naval patrol was maintained off the Straits of Tiran, with a 130mm coastal artillery battery stationed at Sharm El-Sheikh. The rules of engagement regarding shipping passing through the waterway were very complicated and seemed to have been tailored to prevent any outbreak of action against anything except unescorted ships flying the Israeli flag. In all the naval bases routine sea patrols were maintained on the outer limits of Egypt's territorial waters. But on the whole there was no offensive operational plan to follow, and no instructions were received from headquarters in Cairo. Thus, the superiority of the forces available to the Egyptian navy since the arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1956 was not exploited. This had provided the Egyptian navy with about a dozen submarines and various surface ships, including the heavily armed Skory class destroyers, landing ships, mine-sweepers, submarine chasers, and so on. But what was most important were the new missile boats armed with powerful surface-to-surface guided Styx missiles, which were soon to prove their worth. The Egyptian destroyer Al-Fateh, a Z-class British-made destroyer of World War II vintage on patrol off Sharm El-Sheikh, was the first to detect the beginnings of the massive Israeli air attack. Opening fire on the Israeli planes, this ship gave the alarm. It was thus that the Egyptian navy found itself at war on the morning of 5 June 1967. Following the outbreak of hostilities, urgent offensive action was being considered at naval headquarters in Ras Al-Teen, and it was decided to mount a destroyer strike against the Israeli port of Eilat that very night. In spite of the lack of previous planning and a shortage of information, two destroyers led by Al-Fateh of the British Z-class type supported by a number of torpedo boats proceeded at high speed towards Eilat just after sunset. Contrary to expectations, this detachment was neither detected nor intercepted by the Israelis and was soon within about 20 miles of Eilat and approaching the deployment point for carrying out the bombardment. It was then that a signal was received by the flagship instructing the formation to abort the mission and return to base. This signal was questioned twice by the officer in command, who had doubts about the authenticity of the message, but in each case the answer was to stop the attack and return to base. It seems that on being informed about the projected attack headquarters in Cairo had ordered its cancellation, possibly fearing that the destroyers would be subjected to heavy air attack as soon as daylight came. Although the attack was not completed, it does show a serious lapse in Israeli naval security measures.
FOILING THE ISRAELI ATTACK: During the 1967 aggression against Egypt, the Israeli armed forces were given specific tasks. The air force was given the mission to destroy the Egyptian air force and support the Israeli advance towards the Suez Canal. As for the ground forces, their mission was to occupy Sinai. It is strange that the main mission of the Israeli navy was never mentioned by Israel, a fact that indicates that the Israeli navy failed to accomplish it. It is certain that the main mission of the Israeli navy was to deliver a main blow against the port of Alexandria with the objective of destroying the Egyptian naval units stationed there, thus crippling the superiority of the Egyptian navy. An operational evaluation of the situation ruled out the use of Israeli surface ships for this attack, because of the threat from the coastal defence missile batteries and coastal artillery, as well as the presence of a flotilla of guided missile boats. In the light of this situation, the only solution available to the Israeli navy was to use submarines to launch a frogmen attack against the port of Alexandria. How the Israeli attack was anticipated and foiled by the Egyptian navy is presented below. On the night of 5 June and at about the same time that the Egyptian navy was launching its attack against Eilat, an Israeli submarine approached the port of Alexandria, penetrated the anti-submarine patrols, and launched a frogmen attack aimed at destroying the main naval units in the port. That evening on destroyer brigade headquarters, located on the Soviet Skory class destroyer Suez, the combat information centre reported the sudden appearance of a small target that was closing in at very slow speed. This was classified as a possible submarine and reported to headquarters. Anti-frogmen activities were rapidly increased and the whole area subjected to intensive anti-submarine measures. As a routine precaution, destroyers stationed in Alexandria had been changing their berths after twilight every day and ever since full readiness was declared on 14 May. Thus, instead of two destroyers being tied to buoys opposite the breakwater, these had shifted their berths to the inner quays of the Alexandria harbour, and some auxiliary vessels were tied in their place. Later it became apparent that enemy frogmen had penetrated Alexandria harbour after explosions were heard in the vicinity of an old dredger that had been mined by frogmen. Soon after daybreak on 6 June, one of the destroyer brigade units, the frigate Tarek, was out on patrol off Alexandria. It had assumed routine action stations when suddenly the tracks of approaching torpedoes were detected visually, for the sea was dead calm and the torpedoes had been set to run at a very shallow depth leaving a clear track behind them. The torpedoes were successfully avoided by the timely manoeuvring of Tarek. Four torpedoes had been fired in two salvoes, and all missed. Increasing to full speed, Tarek carried out a counter-attack against the submarine using depth charges. The Israeli submarine Tanin, which had launched the earlier frogmen attack, was seriously damaged, but not destroyed. The whole situation was cleared up when Israeli frogmen were discovered hiding near the breakwater in the vicinity of Qait Bey Fort in the eastern harbour and others were arrested on the Corniche attempting to make a getaway. Later, it came to be known that the Israeli submarine had been unable to make a rendez-vous with the frogmen group, who were arrested and subjected to intensive interrogation. In this way, the Israeli frogmen attack on Alexandria failed and resulted in only minor damage to a dredger and a supply barge. Meanwhile, units of the destroyer brigade in the Red Sea had regrouped in the Port Tawfik-Suez-Sadat area and taken up air defence positions, continuing for several days to provide effective fire for the benefit of the retreating Egyptian army units against enemy aircraft. At the same time, the presence of these destroyers prevented Israeli army formations from approaching the area of Suez and Port Tawfik, and they kept well out of the range of the 130mm batteries available on the Egyptian Skory class destroyers. Back in Alexandria, seaward defence measures were increased to a maximum, with constant patrols being operated by destroyers, mine-sweepers, sub-chasers, and missile boats further out at sea. After the almost total destruction of the Egyptian air force, and the debacle of the army, there were fears of an Israeli naval strike against the main naval base in Alexandria. Thus, late at night on 5 June a search-and-destroy mission was assigned to the destroyer brigade in a daylight sweep eastwards as far as Damietta. This mission was carried out by the destroyers Domiat and Port Said, a Hunt class destroyer, supported by three torpedo boats. In view of the hazardous nature of the mission and due to the complete lack of air cover and the presence of enemy submarines, the formation was commanded by the commander of the destroyer brigade. Similar sweeps were carried out east of Port Said by missile boats during night hours. In all these sorties, which were repeated several times during the period of combat, no Israeli units were intercepted. It seems that fear of the Egyptian missile boats had kept the Israeli navy helplessly confined to port. When Israeli destroyers finally ventured close to Port Said, it took the Egyptian navy only a few minutes to sink the Israeli flagship, the destroyer Eilat, off the city just before dusk on 21 October 1967. This was the first combat use of guided surface-to-surface missiles in naval warfare and an outstanding achievement to the credit of the Egyptian navy
THE PERFORMANCE OF EGYPT'S NAVY: One must admit that although the Egyptian navy enjoyed marked superiority over the Israeli navy in the 1967 War, this advantage was not made use of due to the lack of effective operational planning and the general loss of control at general headquarters. Nevertheless, the Egyptian navy was able to preserve its fighting capabilities and did not suffer any losses during the war. Discipline and morale were high, and the standard of training was excellent. Various Israeli claims of the sinking of Egyptian destroyers, submarines, and so on off the Israeli coast were quite untrue, simply because no Egyptian naval units were anywhere near the vicinity. A fair evaluation of Israeli naval activities during the 1967 War shows that action was limited to the attack carried out by the submarine Tanin, which cannot be termed a success. The frogmen attack did not achieve its purpose, and the participants were arrested. The torpedo attack on the Tarek failed, and the Tanin was seriously damaged. In the Red Sea direction, the Egyptian destroyer attack against the port of Eilat was neither detected nor intercepted, and could have had damaging results. Besides the failed submarine attack on Alexandria, the only Israeli naval action in the war was a totally unwarranted and callous air and sea attack against the American electronic reconnaissance ship the USS Liberty, which took place in the afternoon of 8 June, causing loss of life and many casualties as well as heavy damage. The reasons for this deplorable incident have still to be exposed, taking into account the fact that the attack took place in good visibility. In conclusion, one can say that the Egyptian navy stood up to the rigours of war in 1967, acting with valour and determination and making its performance a silver lining to the dark clouds of the 1967 War.
The writer is a former commander-in-chief of the Egyptian navy.
