By Ashraf Rifaat * Thirty-one years ago, in June 1967, Israel occupied Sinai. At around nine in the morning on 5 June 1967, without any declaration of war, a sudden, massive air attack was launched. The attack resulted in the destruction of over 85 per cent of the country's air force. Following this, a state of panic and utter disorientation seems to have affected the High Command in Cairo, which resulted in catastrophic blunders. Without any air cover, in an open desert theatre of operations, Egyptian army formations deployed in Sinai were ordered to withdraw as quickly as possible west of the Suez Canal, although almost all army formations were intact and still fully operational when the order was given early in the afternoon of 6 June. This uncalculated decision to retreat from Sinai without any previous planning resulted in the Israeli army's ability to advance almost unhindered in Sinai, while Israeli warplanes commenced the systematic destruction of the retreating forces. Thus the momentous tragedy of 1967 took place. A feeling of shock, sorrow, and despair ensued, not only in Egypt, but in the Arab world as a whole. The Israeli propaganda machine wasted no time in formulating the legend of the "invincible Israeli army". The reasons for this disaster are almost incomprehensible. Why was Egypt intentionally brought to the brink of war by deliberate political moves that can only be described as rash beyond reason? With the army involved in the war in Yemen, its resources badly overstretched, Egypt was by no means able to undertake a major war against Israel. It is well known that the US's strategic policy has long been to keep Israel well armed and in a position of military superiority over the combined armies of the Arab world. In 1967, Israel enjoyed a marked superiority in air power over the Egyptian air force. When reserves were called up, the Israeli Defence Force could amass a superior land force; only in the naval theatre did Egypt possess a margin of superiority. In 1967, some of the vital principles of war, such as surprise or concealment, were all disregarded by Egypt, which gave the Israelis ample warning and plain indication of hostile intentions, but at the same time voluntarily decided not to initiate an attack itself. It is only logical to assume that the Egyptian High Command at the time did not believe that war could break out, and gambled on the idea that a military buildup in Sinai and a crude show of force would prevent Israel from launching an attack while allowing Egypt to achieve some political and strategic advantages. Solid facts about the situation at the time are not readily available; but it has generally been recognised that the intention was for Egypt to regain control of Sharm Al-Sheikh after getting rid of the UN presence there. Additionally, one can safely assume that there must have been considerable international plotting to bring about the downfall of then President Nasser, and to destroy the weapons amassed by Egypt through its arms deal with the Soviet Union. Thus, through a series of wrong deductions and bungled decisions, did the military defeat of 1967 take place. The defeat, in all honesty, cannot be placed squarely on the shoulders of the military commanders, since their advice not to precipitate hostilities at the time was simply ignored, and, when war broke out, they were not given a chance to fight. War records show that most Egyptian forward formations that were not ordered to retreat put up quite a brave and persistent resistance to the Israeli advance, which, in many cases, failed to break through their lines. Starting in mid-May, at around the same time that army detachments were being paraded through the streets of Cairo on their way to the Sinai front, in a rather naive show of force, the Egyptian navy was ordered to deploy a large portion of its fighting units to the Red Sea theatre. A strong naval force of destroyers, submarines, missile and torpedo boats were soon assembled in Hurghada and Safaga on the Red Sea coast opposite Sharm Al-Sheikh, but, strange as it may seem, these units had been sent without any clear mission or any proper estimation of the situation. On the Israeli side, there was hardly any sea power to contend with; just a few obsolete torpedo boats and a number of light craft of various types, as well as two or three small landing ships. Needless to say, all this did not present a threat to the navy. On the other hand, the Israeli air force was close by, stationed in various strategic air-bases, thus presenting a formidable threat to any surface naval units in the vicinity of Sharm Al-Sheikh. All these military movements were carried out on the understanding that war was not being contemplated. The preparations were presented as simply a political move, and thus no concern of the military commanders who, although expressing their dissent, were compelled to comply with orders. This state of affairs lasted until 23 May 1967, when all of a sudden a decision was taken to block traffic through the Straits of Tiran, leading into the Gulf of Aqaba. From then on, the outbreak of hostilities became imminent, and the situation deteriorated rapidly. Through intense political pressure from various sources combined with catastrophic misjudgement, it was decided at the highest level that Egypt would not strike the first blow. On 5 June 1967, combat readiness in the navy had been increased to maximum alert, all units were taking defence measures with the dispersal of units and the manning of 50 per cent of anti-aircraft armament on a 24-hour basis. A detachment of three destroyers, one frigate, two submarines, and a large number of missile and torpedo boats were already stationed in the Red Sea theatre. A naval patrol was maintained off the Straits of Tiran, with a 130mm coastal artillery battery stationed at Sharm Al-Sheikh. The rules of engagement regarding ships passing through the waterway were very complicated, and seem to have been tailored to prevent any outbreak of action against anything except unescorted ships flying the Israeli flag. In all the other naval bases, routine patrols were maintained on the outer limits of territorial waters. But on the whole, there was no offensive operational plan to follow: no instructions had been received from general headquarters in Cairo. Thus the superiority of force available to the Egyptian navy since the 1956 arms deal with the Soviet Union was not exploited. The deal had provided the navy with about a dozen submarines and various surface ships, including heavily armed destroyers, landing ships, mine sweepers, and submarine chasers. Most important were the new missile boats armed with the powerful surface-to-surface guided STYX missile, which were soon to prove their worth when the Israeli destroyer Eilat was sunk off Port Said on 21 October. Unfortunately, the large submarine force available to the navy was not exploited, and the units were sent out hurriedly to sea, to put them out of the way of any possible Israeli air raids on Alexandria. The Egyptian destroyer Al-Fateh, a Z-class British-made destroyer of World War II vintage on patrol off Sharm Al-Sheikh, was the first to detect the beginning of the massive Israeli air strike, opening fire on the Israeli planes and giving warning to the small military air field at Hurghada. It was thus that the Egyptian navy found itself at war on the morning of 5 June 1967. In spite of the massing of naval forces in the Red Sea area, there was no set plan for the combat employment of these forces, and as soon as war broke out it became obvious that the naval blockade of the Straits of Tiran was not practical, given Israel's overwhelming air power. Alternative plans to cut maritime lines of communication by deploying destroyers further south, outside the range of Israeli aircraft, were not accepted, since they were considered insufficiently "demonstrative". Following the outbreak of hostilities, urgent offensive action was being considered at naval headquarters in Ras Al-Tin, and a destroyer strike against Eilat that very night was planned. In spite of the lack of previous planning and the shortage of information, Al-Qaher and Al-Fateh, both Z-class destroyers supported by a number of torpedo boats, proceeded at high speed toward Eilat just after sunset. Contrary to expectations, this detachment was neither detected nor intercepted by the Israelis, and was soon within about 20 miles of Eilat, and approaching the deployment point for carrying out the bombardment. It was then that a signal was received by the flagship instructing the formation to abort the mission and return to base. This signal was questioned twice by the senior officer in command, who had doubts as to its authenticity, but in both cases the answer was to stop the attack and return to harbour. It seems that, when informed about the projected attack, GHQ at Cairo had ordered its cancellation, possibly fearing that the destroyers would be subjected to heavy air attacks at daybreak. Although the attack was not completed, it does show a serious lapse in Israeli naval security measures. On the night of 5 June, at about the same time the navy was launching its attack against Eilat, an Israeli submarine was approaching Alexandria, penetrating the anti-submarine patrols, and launching a frogman attack aimed at destroying the main naval units in the port. That evening, at destroyer brigade headquarters, established on the Skory-class destroyer Suez, the combat information centre reported the sudden appearance of a small target close to the Great Pass Beacon that was closing in at a very slow speed, and its equally sudden disappearance. When the target appeared once again, at an even closer range, it was classified as a possible submarine and reported to headquarters. No decision was taken to launch an attack on the submarine, as the situation was not clear regarding Egyptian submarines clearing the harbour to disperse westward at sea. As a routine precaution, destroyers stationed in Alexandria had changed their berth after twilight every day after full readiness was declared on 14 May. Thus, two destroyers tied to buoys opposite the break-water had shifted berth to the inner quays of Alexandria harbour, and some auxiliary vessels were tied in their place. Later it became apparent that enemy frogmen had penetrated into Alexandria harbour after explosions were heard in the vicinity of an old dredger which had been mined by frogmen; too late, it became clear to naval headquarters that the target picked up on radar must have been an Israeli submarine. Anti-frogman activities were rapidly increased and the whole area subjected to intensive anti-submarine measures. Soon after daybreak on 6 June, one of the destroyer brigade units, the frigate Tarek, was out on patrol off Alexandria. It had assumed routine action stations when suddenly the tracks of approaching torpedoes were detected visually. The sea was dead calm, and the torpedoes had been set to run at a very shallow depth, leaving a clear track in their wake. They were successfully avoided by timely manoeuvring. Four torpedoes had been fired in two salvoes; all missed. Increasing to full speed, which was not much, the Tarek carried out a counter-attack against the submarine using depth charges. The Israeli submarine Tanin, which had launched the frogman attack earlier, was seriously damaged, but not destroyed. Actually, the Tarek had no operational sonar at the time and could not press the anti-submarine attack any further. The whole situation was cleared up when Israeli frogmen were discovered hiding near the break-water in the vicinity of Qait Bey Fort in the Eastern Harbour, and others were caught on the Corniche attempting to escape. Later, it was discovered that the Israeli submarine, after being attacked was unable to collect the frogmen, who were all arrested and subject to intensive interrogation. So the Israeli frogman attack on Alexandria resulted only in minor damage to a dredger, a supply barge and a floating dock. Meanwhile, units of the Destroyer Brigade in the Red Sea had regrouped in the Port Tawfiq-Suez-Sadat area, and taken up air defence positions from where they continued for several days to provide effective fire to protect the retreating army units against enemy air craft. At the same time, the presence of these destroyers prevented Israeli army formations from approaching Suez and Port Tawfiq, and they kept well out of the range of the 130mm batteries available on the Egyptian Skory-class destroyers. Back in Alexandria, maritime defence measures were increased to a maximum, with constant patrols operated by destroyers, mine-sweepers, sub-chasers, and missile boats further out to sea. After the almost total destruction of the air force, and the debacle of the army, there were fears of an Israeli naval strike against the main naval base in Alexandria. Late at night on 5 June, a search and destroy mission was assigned to the destroyer brigade in a daylight sweep eastward as far as Damietta. This mission was carried out by the destroyers Dumyat and Port Said (a hunt-class destroyer), supported by three torpedo boats. The mission was hazardous due to the complete lack of air cover and the presence of enemy submarines, and the formation was therefore commanded by the chief officer of the destroyer brigade. East of Port Said, similar sweeps were carried out by missile boats during night hours. In all these sorties, which were repeated several times during combat, no Israeli units were intercepted. In conclusion, one must admit that, although the Egyptian navy enjoyed marked superiority over the Israeli navy, this advantage was not exploited due to lack of effective operational planning and the general loss of control at General Headquarters. Nevertheless, the Egyptian navy was able to preserve its fighting capabilities suffered no losses during the war. Discipline and morale were high, the standard of training excellent. The Egyptian navy's performance in the 1967 War, taking into account the lack of coordination between the political leadership and the military, must be considered satisfactory, for although it did not achieve any major victories, the navy was not defeated. Missile-boats in the Egyptian navy deterred any Israeli surface naval action, even though the Egyptian navy carried out a number of search and destroy sorties east of Port Said in the hope of making contact with the enemy. Various Israeli claims to the sinking of Egyptian destroyers and submarines off the Israeli coast were quite untrue, simply because no Egyptian naval units were anywhere near that coast. On the other hand, a fair evaluation of Israeli naval activities during the 1967 War will show that action was limited to the attack carried out by the submarine Tanin, which cannot be termed successful; the frogman attack did not achieve its purpose and the participants were arrested; the torpedo attack on the Tarek failed and the Tanin was seriously damaged. In the Red Sea, the Egyptian destroyer heading toward Eilat was neither detected nor intercepted and an attack could have inflicted serious damage. Besides the failed submarine attack on Alexandria, the only Israeli naval action was a totally unwarranted air/sea attack against an American electronic reconnaissance ship, the USS Liberty, which took place in the afternoon of 8 June, causing loss of life and many casualties besides heavy damage. The reasons for this serious incident have yet to be exposed. *The writer is former commander-in-chief of the Egyptian naval forces.
