Last week witnessed a spike in weather temperatures that took a toll on Egyptians, especially the majority that neither enjoys the privilege of living in an air conditioned home nor has the financial resources necessary to travel to a coastal resort to escape the unbearable heat. Yet 30 June promises to be even hotter — hopefully only politically. The day marks the first anniversary of the inauguration of Mohamed Morsi, which is precisely why Tamarod, or Rebel, chose it to launch a series of demonstrations across the country demanding early presidential elections. While Morsi has had a quite rocky first year, Tamarod, a political campaign organised for the declared goal of collecting 15 million signatures in favour of early elections, is in many respects the most serious challenge he has faced so far. This is mainly the case since he is facing it without the support of his former liberal allies who remained on his side in the past and chose to look the other way when he repeatedly violated the constitutional declarations he had sworn to abide by and respect. Moreover, they defended him and justified his actions as revolutionary. Their support was vital in securing Morsi's triumph in the confrontations with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the former attorney general. This time, however, they are on the side of his opponents. Capitalising on widespread discontent with Morsi's policies and performance, a group of young activists started Tamarod almost two months ago. Last week they announced that they had achieved their target number of signatures. Tamarod's success in accomplishing its main goal (ie forcing Morsi to step down thereby paving the road to early elections) would not only terminate Morsi's presidential term, but most importantly signal a major shift in Egypt's political history. Egyptian politics, whether ancient or modern, has always revolved around the ruler. The ruled have always been at the margins; the few times they moved to centre stage were brief and usually ended with them entrusting their fate to individual leaders. This was the case in 1919 when Egyptians signed a national petition empowering Saad Zaghloul to represent them at the Peace Conference in Versailles. From 1952 to 1970 Egyptians placed their trust in Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Even when the charismatic Nasser resigned in the wake of the military defeat in June 1967 the masses filled the streets calling upon him to stay in office. Many expected that Mubarak's removal from power would usher the country into a new type of politics centred on the will of the ruled. Morsi's dictatorial tendencies, expressed most clearly in his attempt last November to shield his decisions from judicial scrutiny, impeded this transition. While he eventually rescinded his infamous November decree, many of Morsi's statements since have reflected the same logic that underpinned that decree. For instance, he repeatedly accused his political opponents of conspiring against the country and has constantly ridiculed his opponents' call for early elections, which he claimed was illegal and undemocratic. Needless to say, his supporters' remarks and comments have exhibited the same sentiment. Morsi's position on the opposition's call for early elections is quite absurd. Early elections are common both in emerging and consolidated democracies. Ironically, this position even flies against the new Egyptian constitution drafted by Morsi's own party and supporters. Articles 152 and 153 specify a number of cases in which early presidential elections should be held. These include the impeachment of the president, his/her death, his/her resignation and his/her permanent inability to exercise his/her functions. Most interestingly, Article 153 states that early elections should be held if the president's position becomes vacant for “any other reason” different than the ones mentioned previously, a phrase that in principle leaves the door open to removing the president from power through popular protests as the ones Tamarod is planning. As mentioned, Tamarod's success can constitute a major turn in Egyptian politics. However, in order to actualise this potential more needs to be done than just forcing Morsi to accept the call for early presidential elections. For starters, there is an urgent need to either amend the current constitution to rid it of its strong sectarian character or to draft a new one that does not reek of sectarianism. But most importantly, it is crucial to allow the majority of the Egyptians, who have for the greater part of the country's history suffered from economic and political marginalisation, to actively participate in public affairs, for instance through social movements, independent unions and peasant cooperatives. Additionally, new electoral laws should restrict electoral funding in order to allow the parties of the poor a fair chance to compete for office. Without breaking the middle class's monopoly over public affairs, any new emerging political system in Egypt will not be anything but a game of musical chairs among middle class parties that claim to represent and speak in the name of everyone else, not a genuine democracy. Such an outcome will be a betrayal of the hopes and aspirations ignited by the anti-Mubarak uprising.
