Ismailia Appeals Court, currently reviewing evidence relating to mass prison escapes during the 25 January Revolution, holds one of its most significant sessions so far on Sunday. Presiding judge Khaled Mahgoub has asked officials from three intelligence agencies (General Intelligence, Military Intelligence and the former State Security apparatus) to testify on 26 May whether or not they made recordings of telephone calls between Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood officials during the early days of the revolution. Lawyers defending some of the escapees claim Hamas and Brotherhood officials conspired to exploit peaceful protests planned on 25 January 2011 for their own ends. “To achieve this objective,” says lawyer Amir Salem, “Hamas and Brotherhood officials were in regular telephone contact as they discussed how to ride the wave of protests.” Egyptian intelligence agencies, Salem claims, have evidence that 33 senior Brotherhood officials — including now President Mohamed Morsi — were in contact with Hamas before and during the first three days of the revolution. “The recordings demonstrate that they planned to exploit the first wave of peaceful protests on 25 January. When these attracted growing numbers of participants they agreed to throw their weight behind the second wave of protests to break Mubarak's central security forces and accelerate the downfall of his regime.” In a television interview Salem said “former spy chief Omar Suleiman, who was appointed Mubarak's vice president on 29 January, testified before the court which tried Mubarak last year that intelligence agencies secured several recordings between Hamas and Brotherhood officials”. “Suleiman also accused Hamas of infiltrating Egypt's borders to spread chaos, storm prisons and torch police stations.” “On the basis of the recordings between Hamas and Brotherhood officials, police moved to arrest 33 Brotherhood officials, including Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie and Mohamed Morsi, then a member of the group's Guidance Bureau and the official in charge of political affairs.” “Morsi and 32 other Brotherhood officials were arrested on 27 January and transferred to Wadi Al-Natroun prison near Alexandria. They faced charges of spying and coordinating with foreign elements seeking to topple the regime.” Ahmed Abdel-Fattah Al-Wakil, the police officer responsible for securing Wadi Al-Natroun prison during the revolution, told the court on 12 May that “in the early morning of 28 January 33 Brotherhood officials arrived at the prison after being detained by the former state security apparatus”. They were, he added, divided between several cells. Al-Wakil continued: “Late on 29 January and in the early hours of 30 January armed groups, accompanied by heavy building machinery, began storming Wadi Al-Natroun prison. They arrived in more than 30 microbuses, armed with grenades and shotguns. They wore face masks, spoke with Palestinian accents, and seemed completely aware of the whereabouts of the detained Brotherhood officials.” The decision to cut Internet and telephone connections, claims Salem, was prompted by the recordings made of calls between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. “At the time,” he says, “people mistakenly assumed the cut was intended to prevent young protesters from gathering again in Tahrir Square.” “When telephones were cut and Brotherhood officials arrested Hamas moved quickly. They infiltrated Egypt's borders on 28 January, killed secret police officers at the Rafah crossing and then moved in two directions, towards Abu Zaabal prison east of Cairo where Hamas and Hizbullah prisoners were detained, and to Wadi Al-Natroun prison on the Cairo-Alexandria desert road where Brotherhood officials were held.” Released by Hamas militias on the morning of 29 January 2011, Morsi, says Salem, made telephone contact with the Qatari-based Al-Jazeera Channel using a satellite mobile. “He told them ordinary Egyptians living in Wadi Al-Natroun were the ones who stormed the prison and set them free.” Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim told CBC channel two weeks ago that “the ministry has no documentary records of Morsi being jailed at Al-Natroun.” “There is no doubt that President Morsi and other activists were detained during the revolution though we have no documents to show this,” said Ibrahim. “The paperwork could easily have been burned or lost when the prison was attacked.” Ayman Fattouh, leader of the battalion defending Wadi Al-Natroun prison, told the court on 12 May that the attackers were clearly organised and well trained, carrying sophisticated grenades and other weaponry. “Speaking Palestinian Arabic, they clearly knew their way around and they did their best to isolate security forces and block the arrival of any reinforcements.” “We fought them for three hours but in the end we ran out of ammunition,” says Fattouh. “Then they stormed the prison, stole weapons, set prisoners free and torched buildings.” Ayoub Othman, a truck driver, told the court on 12 May that while driving on the Cairo-Alexandria Desert Road in the early hours of 29 January 2011 he saw “around 30 microbuses coming from the direction of Wadi Al-Natroun”. On Sunday, the court heard the testimony of Atef Al-Sherif, former deputy interior minister for prison affairs. “On the evening of 29 January 2011,” said Al-Sherif, “several prisons housing political prisoners were stormed. Prisons in Cairo and other major cities that did not hold political detainees were left intact.” “Well armed attackers fought forces defending the Al-Natroun prison for four hours,” he added, “at the end of which they were able to storm the building.” “They clearly aimed to release political prisoners and then forced other prisoners to flee.” Former military police chief Hamdi Badin, appointed by Morsi as military attaché at Egypt's embassy in Beijing, was also expected to testify though he failed to appear in court. Last year Badin told television channels that “military police were able to arrest armed Hamas militias during the revolution.”
