When spring comes, people expect flowers and green shoots and optimism prevails. Alas, things in the Middle East are quite different. With every spring that comes, people recall the outbreak of the first spark of the current Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in 2011 and then swept the other Arab countries. They wonder what will come afterwards and where it will hit next. After being caught by surprise, numerous scholars and observers have been writing extensively about the Arab Spring, trying to uncover its wellsprings and link it to other incidents in an attempt to read the portents of the rough and tumble of the Middle East. Yet, this pursuit is often a vain one, especially given that the available literature is not yet adequate to explain the various aspects of what has happened. This article aims to reveal a number of the missing contours and dynamics in order to further examine the term “Arab Spring”. In the same vein, it will also try to analyse the current political and geopolitical conditions in the Middle East in an effort to draw some relevant conclusions and provide a working prognosis of the future course of events in the region. It can be said that the events of the current Arab Spring are moulded between two composite layers, each with its own features, characteristics and hypotheses. The first layer comes within a global nexus. Arguably, the current spate of revolts in the Middle East might be considered as the fourth wave of democratisation, with reference to the concept developed by the American academic Samuel M. Huntington in his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century published in 1991. According to Huntington, each of the waves mentioned in the title of his book was followed by a reverse one. Huntington argues that the first wave occurred between 1828 and 1926 and had its roots in the French and American Revolutions. This wave swept Europe and Latin America and was marked by military coups. It lost momentum in the interwar period between World War I and World War II, when a number of dictators rose to power, leading to a shift away from democracy toward traditional authoritarian or new ideologically-driven, mass-based totalitarian regimes. The second wave took place between 1943 and 1962 and featured coups and the establishment of authoritarian rule across Latin America and South and East Asia. Huntington proposed in his book that the beginning of the end of western colonial rule after World War II produced a number of new states with democratic tendencies. Yet, he also argued that political development, especially in Latin America, had taken on an authoritarian cast, and that the decolonisation of Africa had led to the largest multiplication of authoritarian governments in history. Accordingly, one third of the working democracies in 1958 had become authoritarian by the 1970s. The third wave that took place between the 1970s and 1980s manifested itself in the collapse of the former Soviet Union and swept Southern Europe, South America and Africa. In effect, a number of scholars have opted to insert the current Arab revolts within this framework. They opine that with the onset of the current Arab Spring, the fourth wave of transformation, or the democratisation of the Communist and Islamic regimes, has began, as per the fact that it has had an impact on other regions and has inspired revolts and demonstrations in Europe, Asia, Latin and North America, gaining global contours. The second layer of the Arab Spring operates within a regional setting. Within this framework, it has proved to have its own characteristics and features that require further analysis. It can be argued that the current round of revolts now termed the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening does not constitute the first manifestation of the Arab mass protests that have led to changes in the social and political structure of Arab societies. In fact, it comes as the third wave of Arab mass revolts, each possessing its own grounds, circumstances, ideologies, slogans and outcomes. The first wave of the Arab revolts took place in 1914 and was called the Great Arab Revolution. What characterises this wave is that it had a leader, Sherif Hussein, who led the revolution, the main target being ending Ottoman rule in Arabia. This wave coincided with two major events, one global and the other regional. World War I was the major global event, while the waning and final collapse of the former Ottoman Empire was the major regional event. The old adage of “the road to hell is paved with good intentions” was also conspicuously manifested in the course of the events of the first wave of revolts in the Arab region. It can be said that this myopic wave was externally driven, as the revolution was supported by the British who were aiming to end and replace the Ottoman presence in the region. For all that, the effect of the revolts associated with the Revolution was ephemeral, as they were bereft of their main goal of independence. This fact has been referred to by Mehmet Sahin of Turkey's Gazi University in his article “The 1950-1960 Arab Revolutions and the 2011 Arab Spring: Similarities and Differences,” in which he points out that the final result of the Great Arab Revolution “was only a change of master. Instead of Muslims (Turks), the new masters were Christians (British and French).” In this context, a number of slogans and ideologies were endorsed, the main one being nationalism. This slogan was deemed important in order to encourage the Arabs to get rid of any other form of subordination, mainly Islamism, which inevitably meant ending any connection to the Ottoman sultan and the warding off of any yearnings for the Ottoman heritage. The second wave of the Arab revolts took place in the 1950s and 1960s and was in fact called the Arab Spring by a French writer, Jacques Benoist-Méchin, in his 1959 book Un printemps arabe. In this book, Benoist-Méchin describes the Arab revolts that had taken place in the Arab Middle East and tried to link them to the European Revolutions of 1848, known as the “Spring of Nations”, or “Springtime of Peoples.” These revolts inspired new revolutions in the former Czechoslovakia and led to what was best known as the Prague Spring. The Arab Spring of the 1950s and 1960s came after two major events, one regional and the other global. The latter event was World War II, which had a great impact on the revolts and caused them to be driven by external factors. In other words, foreign powers and forces encouraged and even stimulated these revolts, as the Communist powers wanted to fight the Western presence in the Middle East. For that reason, fighting imperialism and progressivism were among the key slogans and themes of the period. Yet, the major regional event was the establishment of the State of Israel in the centre of the Arab Middle East. This led to the emergence of another slogan, which afterwards became an ideology — that of Arabism. This was coined and adeptly promoted by the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, his combined notion of Arabism and socialism being called Nasserism. Nasser's name was aligned with this second wave of Arab revolts, and his ideology struck a chord with and inspired other leaders who steered revolts in other countries in the Middle East. Arabism gained popularity in the Arab streets as it developed as a natural ideology and movement to counter the Zionism that attended the establishment of the State of Israel. The revolts targeted not just Israel, but also the other colonial presences in the Middle East that were deemed to be the real instigators and creators of Zionism and hence of the state of Israel itself. In this regard, a number of Arab kingdoms, condemned by their alliance or reliance on the western imperialist powers, were toppled in Libya, Iraq, and Egypt. The current wave of Arab revolts, which erupted in Tunisia in 2011, has its own characteristics. First and foremost, and unlike the previous two waves, the current revolts have neither a well-known leader, nor an external provenance. They were stimulated solely by internal dynamics, as was proposed by Nadia Mustafa of Cairo University at the Second Annual Conference of Insight Turkey in January 2012. This view was also put forward by Ziya Onis at a workshop entitled “Working Together for Democracy in the Arab World” held in Ankara in October 2011. Onis believes that the current Arab revolts are internally driven, with social and economic considerations, together with the youth bulge and the remarkable evolution of the means of communication, being among the many crucial factors that led to the eruption of the current wave of revolts. They were not instigated by a specific country or model. In a way similar to the previous revolts, the current wave came in the aftermath of global and regional transformations. On the global level, the collapse of the former Soviet Union produced important repercussions, as most Arab regimes could not adapt themselves to such massive changes. Against this emergent dynamism, they remained static, failing to sense the seriousness of these reverberations, and they could not adjust their policies, practices and affiliations to the new reality. On the regional level, the major transformation was manifested in the US occupation of Iraq and the collapse of the first dictatorship in the region. One of the important ramifications of the latter was the fading of the praxis of Arabism. To elaborate, former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was one of the staunchest supporters and believers in Arabism, and when he was attacked by the US in 2003 other Arab countries either watched or supported the US-led invasion. This led to a great shock for those who still believed in Arabism, and it significantly helped to strengthen the two main ideologies in the region of Islamism and liberal modernism. In addition to strengthening these ideologies, the revolts produced social demands including for human rights, democracy and independence from foreign influences that helped fuel the revolts against corrupt regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria that were deemed responsible for these countries' stagnant social and economic conditions and were known for their alliances with the West. Inter alia, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the fading of Arabism, the toppling of a number of Arab regimes and the waning of historical Arab leader-states led to a power vacuum in the region, and the intervention of foreign powers, either regional or global, therefore became inevitable. The global powers are still seeking a bigger and newer role in the Middle East in response to these changes. The US, Russia, China and Europe are now competing with each other in order to guarantee a larger leverage and a wider foothold in the region, at times using soft power and at others their historical influence and not forgetting economic incentives. In an article in the Russian Odanko magazine entitled “Obama et Poutine: vont-ils se partager le Proche-Orient?” (Obama and Putin: are they going to divide up the Middle East?), the French writer Thierry Meyssan underscores this hypothesis and suggests a new scenario for the division of the Middle East between the US and Russia. Turkey, Iran and Israel, on the other hand, are the most favoured regional powers with this end in view. However, Israel's chances hinge on a peace agreement with the Palestinians, not to mention the obvious fact that Israel is culturally different from the rest of the countries in the region. History, culture and religion give Iran greater chances over Israel, as it has also succeeded in building a network of allies within the region. However, Iran does not seem to be an appealing model for many Arabs, especially when it comes to freedom, human rights, the economy and relations with the rest of the world, especially the West. Turkey, which is part of the culture, history and religion of the region, appears to have the best odds in its favour. It presents an appealing model because of its democracy, freedom and modernity, its human rights, its booming economy and its relations with the West, along with the presence of Islamist elites in power. Yet, the Turkish model has been overplayed and has put Turkey's popularity on the line. In other words, and among other challenges, Turkey's potential in the Middle East has been marred by its explicit zeal and its overt use of soft power, which may lead to untoward effects. The path into the Middle East should be charted carefully. It is well known for being one of the most volatile regions in the world, and its complexity is often described as being like quicksand. At this juncture, it is not difficult to fathom the feeling of frustration that permeates nearly every Arab citizen, who believes that the Arabs' destiny should not hinge on others, but should remain in their own hands. Lamentably, this desired outcome will not materialise until historical Arab leaders rise up and shake the dust of weakness and reluctance from their shoulders. The writer is a counsellor at the Embassy of Palestine in Turkey.
