The resumption of direct flights between Egypt and Iran this week for the first time in 34 years is long overdue. Relations were severed between the two countries when Cairo hosted the ousted Shah following Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution, and when Egypt signed the controversial peace agreement with Israel under Anwar Al-Sadat. The latter's assassination in 1981 didn't thaw ties, because his successor, Hosni Mubarak, sided with Iraq in its eight-year war with Iran that had just started. But even when that war ended, Egypt's Mubarak showed no interest in restoring diplomatic ties, save for chargé d'affaires representation. As a reliable US ally, Mubarak's foreign policy was beyond doubt in line with Washington's; his hostility towards Iran was unwavering, at the expense of much needed political, economic and strategic interests. Tehran, on the other hand, continued its unwavering support for resistance movements Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the occupied Palestinian West Bank. While Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for the end of Israel, Mubarak was viewed as Israel's strategic asset. The gap between the region's strategic poles was colossal and it took a revolution, this time in Egypt, to change that. Mohamed Morsi's visit to Tehran last August to attend the Non-Aligned Movement summit was a clear shift from the past. But it also captured the discretion of the present. The visit initially raised alarm bells in Washington, Tel Aviv and many Gulf states, but Morsi's carefully worded speech in the Iranian capital, which supported Syria's uprising against Bashar Al-Assad, indirectly endorsed Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, asserted Egypt's Sunni affiliation (in a reassuring nod to the Gulf) wasn't exactly out of the pre-revolution line. Until Ahmadinejad's visit to Cairo in February, little, if anything was done to move Egypt-Iran relations beyond the significance of Morsi's Tehran appearance six months earlier. Despite its troubled relations with the West and internal political turmoil, the Iranian regime enjoys enough stability to allow it to take bold steps towards improving ties with Egypt. In less than a month since Ahmadinejad's visit, an agreement to resume flights between the two countries was in place. An Egyptian flight landed in Tehran and more than 50 Iranian tourists arrived in Aswan for the first time in 34 years. On Sunday, the Iranian government moved another step ahead by lifting visa restrictions on Egyptian tourists. Cairo has yet to reciprocate the move. An Iranian official visiting Cairo this week said that it's up to Egypt to decide on the next step. Clearly Tehran is eager to restore full diplomatic relations with post-revolution Egypt, but Cairo's reluctance echoes Morsi's cautiousness regarding Mubarak's foreign policy legacy. He might be correcting his predecessor's path, but not rewriting it. Tehran accepted limitations placed by the Egyptians on the Iranian tourists' movements here, including a practical ban on Cairo and its Fatimid mosques and shrines, which are revered by the Muslim Shia, including Iranians, to placate hardline Salafis. Meanwhile, there are no limitations for Egyptians willing to visit Iran. But this isn't about tourism; it's about the compelling strategic necessity of allying the region's two most powerful nations where their interests meet. Egypt's collapsing economy and desperate fuel shortages need Iran, not least because supposedly friendly Arab states — who enjoy full diplomatic relations with Tehran — have reneged on their aid promises. While Cairo is still slowly calculating the risks this involves with regard to relations with Gulf States and the US, Tehran isn't wasting time waiting. Morsi is right to weigh his options. Mubarak's foreign policy legacy is a heavy one, but embracing it following a revolution that overthrew him for what he stood for, including questionable national independence, isn't in Egypt or Morsi's interests.
