The circumstances surrounding the Muslim Brotherhood's nomination of Mohamed Morsi as its candidate in this year's presidential elections certainly added some degree of uncertainty about his readiness for the job when compared to the group's original choice, and the exigencies of the competitive presidential contest further intensified uncertainties surrounding Morsi as a presidential candidate. The last rally before the elections saw such exigencies reaching their peak, with the Morsi and Shafik camps, the latter representing the defeated candidate Ahmed Shafik, exchanging negative statements and speeches. Morsi was not spared such negativity, and his narrow, almost mercurial, electoral majority further documented uncertainties about the Brotherhood and its political party the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Such uncertainties have since cast doubt on Morsi as the president of Egypt. It can be argued that they have not been limited to the Brotherhood's opponents, but have also meant that some of the Islamists, including certain elements inside the group, have had concerns about Morsi as its choice as president. Some contextual factors have further amplified the ambiguities around Morsi first as an Islamist and second as the first elected president in the aftermath of the 25 January Revolution. Regarding Morsi as an Islamist, the first factor has been the accumulated historical experience of the Political Islam trend in the many countries where it has not been able to maintain power despite its initial electoral success. In Egypt, the troika formed of Morsi, the Brotherhood and the FJP has become subject to a growing sense of insecurity, particularly after incidents in Tunis and Libya where the Islamists have started to face rising opposition from other social forces. The second contextual factor has been the peculiar political landscape. For Morsi or for any other president, the transition period has for a plethora of reasons yielded on the one hand a difficult-to-govern polity with its endless economic, political and societal conflicts and on the other a set of defective quasi-state institutions. The different social, political, and, more seriously, economic challenges have been daunting for any chief executive and the gap between the situation as it is and what it should be, let alone what we might in future desire it to be, has been widening. It is fair to say that the landscape before Morsi could hardly be worse, and such uncertainties have impacted the performance of the new president. In this cloudy, if not stormy, atmosphere, Morsi has had to make his debut as the first president of post-revolutionary Egypt. He has had no visible alternative but to rely on his stronghold of the Brotherhood and its ready-made agenda and the group's political cadres. Paradoxically, Morsi's inevitable dependence on the Brotherhood and its party has further magnified the uncertainties around him. Moreover, the catholic marriage between the president, the Brotherhood and the FJP has resulted in the development of an unprecedented ruling stratum in the form of the troika with its blurred boundaries between the personal and the impersonal, the partisan and the non-partisan, the formal and the informal, and the private and the public. On the other hand, the new de facto power arrangements, though both words are misleading, have almost excluded all other political trends, including the troika's electoral partners in the Salafi and jihadi trends. In this new ruling stratum, Morsi has been seen as part of a poorly defined whole that has been described as an institution. It can be said that the troika's rule has detrimentally impacted the institutional work of the presidency, a development that has added further ambiguities about Morsi and his role and performance. Sensing such rising uncertainties around him about his readiness to manage the still under-established state, Morsi's major thrust has been so far directed to proving otherwise, showing himself as a man of action with enough competence to run the state and to lead a highly fragmented society at this critical juncture in Egypt's history. Morsi has been eager to present himself as a strong, power-holding president and not, as some had predicted or hoped or even worked for, as the opposite. The other two elements of the troika have shared the same motive of reflecting a stronger public image for Morsi that might help clear up the ambiguities surrounding his nomination and then his election. This endeavour has been emphasised by various moves that the troika may have thought would build Morsi's public image as the strong man of Egypt. Manufactured charisma has been endorsed by the troika, while propaganda and psychology have been exploited in the pursuit of proving the president's credentials. What the troika has thought would serve in such an endeavour has been to identify Morsi with certain decisions that could be hailed by rallies of supporters, as well as some in the media, as historic ones. Many of Morsi's decisions, speeches and moves have reflected this need to prove himself. Yet, Morsi was ill-advised to flex the muscles of the presidency against the only two genuinely functioning institutions in the country, namely the military and judiciary. Four decisions have been indicative of Morsi's perception of the need to act powerfully, or, in other words, to project a strong presidential image. The first was his call to the dissolved People's Assembly, the lower house of Egypt's parliament, to reconvene despite the final verdict of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) that ruled against the constitutionality of the law governing the legislative elections. Perhaps the dissolved assembly was among the few worldwide that saw people mourn its dissolution, but even if this was not the case, despite the popular indifference towards the dissolved assembly the troika has not spared any effort to resurrect it. Within the same context came the president's decision to move the prosecutor-general from his current post to a new ambassadorial role against the procedural and legal guarantees against such a move. The third decision was the retirement of the country's senior military leaders in the aftermath of the incident in Rafah. Morsi's apologetic approach here, manifested in his honouring of the ex-leaders and in his extensive visits to army units, eventually diluted a move that the troika had marketed as a historic decision ending the “dualism” of power. The last decision regarding the amendment to the constitutional declaration has been the most serious in terms of its content and its timing. Morsi obviously overestimated the praise he received from the US on the occasion of the ceasefire in Gaza and its enhancing his image as an emergent statesman on a regional level. As a result, the troika miscalculated and even exceeded its declining social capital in its failed attempt to monopolise the state institutions. The fact remains that this decision will not hold against the rising popular rejection of it. The subjects as well as the timing of some of Morsi's decision have reflected a faulty reading of the political landscape, which in turn has revealed a highly defective decision-making process at the top of the Egyptian state. Under any circumstances and regardless of what may come out of the present crisis, Morsi has now made a historic mistake that will never be erased from his record as president of Egypt. Apart from what Morsi rightfully felt and what he has erroneously addressed his focus on proving otherwise, he has distorted his national priorities as chief executive and the nation's sole legislator. Instead of focusing on the national priorities reflected in the slogans of the revolution, the troika's main concern has been to prove itself. This has been one of the most serious manifestations of Morsi's first 100 days, and the Brotherhood's current approach has reflected the grim fact that it has come to power with no truly workable political or economic programme that can address the status quo with all its starkly conflicting elements. As such, the real dilemma goes beyond the 100 days of Morsi. When the demonstrators shout against the regime, President Morsi should ponder their message that the current presidential set-up should change. He should remember that change was one of the slogans of the 25 January Revolution. The writer is a political commentator.
