The Muslim Brotherhood's confident façade may conceal hidden anxieties, driving the adoption of a now-or-never attempt to take power, writes Ahmed El-Tonsi* Some Egyptians have been claiming that the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) intends to name one of its own as a prospective candidate in the forthcoming elections for a new pope of Egypt's Coptic Church following the demise of the late Pope Shenouda III. The joke's implications are straightforward -- that the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party are perceived by many people as wanting to dominate all the country's elections and in every field, whether political, social or religious. Traditionally, Egyptian jokes are indicative of popular attitudes towards an issue or a personality. Scholar Afaf Lutfi has stated that "jokes betray the state of mind that arises at the least or slightest provocation, whether of a private or a public nature." In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, this state of mind has been carrying negative connotations, pointing to people's belief that the organisation is lusting after power. Even more worrying has been the fact that it has only been a few months since the group emerged at the forefront of the political scene, and the popular apprehension now is that this is only the beginning of the Brotherhood's ascension to power. Political jokes have long served as safety valves for feelings of repression, even though it would be hard to describe the current political environment as repressive. However, for many Egyptians the current domination of the political landscape by the Brotherhood could indeed be seen as repressive, in the sense that it is reminiscent of the hegemony formerly exercised by the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) during the Mubarak era. Some people have started to feel the same bitterness towards the Brotherhood that they formerly felt towards the NDP with its history of control over Egypt's state and society. It can be argued that today there are widespread feelings of apprehension among Egyptians, though these are difficult to gauge in the absence of unbiased statistical data, regarding the rise of Political Islam to power and its practices following its recent electoral victory. The media coverage, particularly the live broadcasts from the People's Assembly, the lower house of Egypt's parliament, has only intensified such feelings, even as it has rightfully introduced the new political stars of the victorious trend to a wider public. Many of these have been shockingly disappointing, though many older politicians, whether belonging to the country's other political forces or to the remaining revolutionaries, have also deepened feelings of unease among growing sectors of the population. There has also been a palpable feeling of popular disenchantment that has been spreading throughout society, including among some of the Brotherhood's traditional strongholds. Such disenchantment has emerged because of the still substandard security conditions in the country and the shortage of politically sensitive commodities, such as oil. Many people have not been able to accept these things, and they have shifted the blame from the caretaker government to the Muslim Brotherhood. In sum, the latter's image has started to become tarnished for a growing number of Egyptians. Decisive in this sense of apprehension have been the moves made by the Brotherhood itself to deepen such impressions, making people feel that the Brotherhood and its party are only interested in pursuing power. For instance, the uncompromising attitude adopted by the Brotherhood on the drafting of the country's new constitution and in the related constituent assembly has illustrated its tendency to monopolise power, while excluding other trends from having a legitimate say in the new social contract. Similar to the former ruling NDP in its recalcitrant attitudes towards the opposition, the Brotherhood has only accepted that other parties have rights by being reminded of this fact by court rulings. Not unrelated to this has been the new bill proposed by some elements in the Islamist trend that would bar the nomination of political figures associated with the ousted regime, mainly former vice-president and head of intelligence Omar Suleiman, from standing in the forthcoming presidential elections. In both cases, the Brotherhood has asserted itself regardless of any impediment, whether legal, political or constitutional. Moreover, the political discourse of the group, if not that of the whole Islamist trend, has reflected an exaggerated sense of overconfidence if not arrogance. Describing non-Islamist parties or political forces as "minority groups" that have only limited support in society has been part of this, and such charges have been repeated by many leaders of the group. The Brotherhood has shown little interest in consensus building or even partnerships, and instead it has seemed determined to demonstrate its unjustifiable sense of power. This façade of overconfidence should be seen as a protective or compensatory mechanism that hides growing anxieties about the future, however. Some members of the Brotherhood have been behaving as if the group's recent sweeping electoral victory was too good to be true, and therefore some leaders of the group have urged that its ordinarily gradualist approach towards furthering its Islamist project be rescinded in favour of immediate action. Mohamed Habib, the Brotherhood's deputy leader from 2004 to 2010, highlighted this now-or-never strategy when he said that the Brotherhood had been telling its followers that the ongoing confrontations represented "an existential battle and a historical moment that might not be repeated. If we fail now, it could spell the end of the Brotherhood." As a result of such feelings of insecurity the Brotherhood has been endeavouring to attain and /or maintain a strong grip on nearly every form of power open to it. Its retreat from its previous decision not to field a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections, putting forward Khairat El-Shater and alternative Mohamed Badie as its nominees, is an example of the group's current efforts to keep a hold over all the branches of state power, whether legislative or executive. Much the same thing can be seen in the Brotherhood's hold over nearly all the professional syndicates. The Brotherhood's campaign against Suleiman, using attempts to have him excluded politically and trying to intimidate him through its Friday demonstrations, have also been geared to such a now-or-never approach, something that reached an apogee in El-Shater's ultimatum that "if Omar Suleiman wins, Egyptians will take to the streets in protest." The ongoing confrontation over the constituent assembly, even after the historic verdict of the State Council, should also be seen as a major battle engaged in by the Islamist trend in order to ensure that it alone is able to draft a document reflecting its orientation and objective of Islamising the state and society. Across the political scene, the Brotherhood and the Islamist trend as a whole has been attempting to carry out a "soft coup" against the revolution with the latter's consensus-building slogans and unifying spirit transcending different religions, social classes or backgrounds. Such moves on the part of the Brotherhood have not passed unnoticed by a growing number of people, and not just the group's traditional opponents among the country's political elites. This conflict is now well on the way towards polarising society, with two competing camps proposing diametrically opposed visions of the state and society. These two camps consist, on the one hand, of an Islamist project, advocated by Political Islamic forces and particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and put into effect through the latter's control of the legislature, and a multitude of political and societal forces and institutions, on the other, that have major concerns about the Islamist project and its bearers. Important questions that remain to be answered about this Islamist project include: Why now? And if not now, when? Why now is the easier question to answer. The Muslim Brotherhood, along with the whole Islamist trend, is now the most formidable force in the political landscape, and there is no other political force or trend able to match it. It has a large majority of the seats in the newly elected parliament and the strongest presence in the streets. Meanwhile, the forces that oppose it, what could be called the civic trend, evidently have not been able to act as a unified bloc that could act as a counterweight to the Islamist trend. The civic front has been fragmented, and it is destined to fail if such atomisation of its political actors continues. No less serious has been the impact of such disarray among the political elites, or the revolutionaries, who have become further fragmented and disillusioned. For a while the revolutionaries, despite their multiple divisions, were able to offer a relatively powerful alternative to the Brotherhood, though this has now lost much of its original allure. The mass of the population has become more and more dislocated from the political elites, as well as the revolutionaries, and accordingly the critical mass needed for either institutional or contentious politics has been gradually shrinking. As a result, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has become the only force that can counter-balance the powerful Islamist trend. Conflict between the army and the Brotherhood thus seems inevitable, and the nomination of Suleiman as a candidate in the presidential elections has been one scene, if not one act, in such a conflict. Suleiman has been positioned as a non-Islamist and étatiste alternative to the Brotherhood, someone who could reach the decisive run-offs in the elections. As such, Suleiman represents a challenge to the group's project of now or never, particularly as there has been no objection to him by the SCAF. Yet, the Brotherhood still has a large majority in parliament, and the fragmented nature of the opposition to it means that it is still relatively unchallenged in its project of laying the foundations for power by drafting a new constitution that will consecrate the premises of its project. Regionally and globally, the environment looks at least non-hostile to the group's taking power, and it has been comfortable with the impacts of its knocking on doors missions to the US and EU. In fact, the foreign sphere has been one of the rare places where the Brotherhood has done its best not to stir up animosities. According to one commentator, "at this point, the movement [the Muslim Brotherhood] seems to have picked a fight with everybody except the US department of state and senator John McCain." In answer to the second question of why an opportunity to realise the Brotherhood's Islamist project may not come round again, it should be stated that this is another question that reflects the growing uncertainties in the group regarding its future on the political scene. It could be argued that there have been many voices in the Brotherhood who have raised concerns regarding the impatient and exclusionist approach endorsed by some powerful elements inside the leadership. Such opposing views can be illustrated by the group's voting to field El-Shater as its presidential candidate by a very narrow majority. In other words, there have been many inside the Brotherhood who have wanted to maintain the group's traditionally gradualist approach. The latter have feared that the experiences of Islamist groups in other countries have shown that such groups, following their initial success, have lost out to other trends. Al-Shatter, on the other hand, has made clear his belief that Islamist experiments in other countries have been quite different and that the Egyptian case is unique because the Islamist trend came to power amid a popular revolution to which it also contributed. Those adopting the now-or-never strategy may think that they can avoid the fate of Islamist groups in other countries by acting quickly before competing trends have crystallised to form political currents capable of challenging the group and its party. There have been numerous causes for anxiety regarding the sustainability of the Brotherhood's currently leading position in the legislature and on the whole political scene. In the short term, the Brotherhood and its political party have been experiencing a high degree of uncertainty regarding the expected verdict of the Supreme Constitutional Court, voiding the law on the legislative elections, an event that would require the dissolution of the People's Assembly and new elections. The Brotherhood is uncertain about repeating the results of the last elections, and these may in fact have represented the peak of the efficiency of the group's electoral machine, something that cannot easily be achieved again. Moreover, the Brotherhood's electoral victory was the outcome of various intrinsic as well as contextual factors and not just a function of its unparalleled capacity for mobilisation. Haziness about the group as a power-holder has added further uncertainties to the Brotherhood's fortunes in any upcoming legislative or presidential elections. Accordingly, the group has become more aware of the true volatility of the Egyptian political scene, and it may be thinking that its presently leading position may not easily be repeated. Such uncertainties have driven the group's decision not to wait for a future that may be less promising. Within the present context of political polarisation between two uneven camps, the resurrection of Suleiman should not be considered as a surprise or be thought of as an attempt to block the revolution. Rather, the present counter-revolution has been emerging out of the absence of any consensus among the political elites, who have spared no efforts in damaging the revolution by riding on it to achieve parochial political goals. The resurfacing of Suleiman has emanated from the presently cloudy political scene, which reflects the political elites' conflicting ends. Suleiman re-emerged as a result of sweeping dissatisfaction, as well as broadening apprehension, among the population. He has taken his opportunity, and this has at least been tacitly accepted, since if it had not been it would have been blocked by a parliamentary majority. Only an insecure and unconfident leadership would resort to such fast-food legislation, if it did not also re- examine its own performance that has led to the resurfacing of Suleiman. The fact that Suleiman has reappeared should be considered as an indictment of the transitional period, as well as of its actors and leading figures. First through the SCAF, with its mismanagement of the transitional period, and then through the Brotherhood, with its moves to achieve control of Egypt's state and society, the political scene has reached a dreadful state. The ongoing polarisation may be sliding into unavoidable confrontation between contenders from the two camps and between the Brotherhood and the SCAF. With its current majority, the Brotherhood should ponder the steps it now takes. The feeling that things are too good to be true should drive the group to bring about changes within its own strategy in order to match its currently leading status. In a democracy, there is no lasting victory. However, there is always a last victory. Only the Brotherhood itself can decide which of the two it will be. * The writer is a political analyst.
