Ghuayiat Al-Solta(The Temptation of Power) by Mounir Sherif and Ahmed Omar, Dar Al-Ain, Cairo, 2014. pp.282 Perhaps the book's significance is first and foremost in adopting the viewpoint of the security institution. When it criticises, if it criticises at all, it does so from within the organisation, while its defence for the institution is fundamental. The authors belong to the old generation of security personnel. The first is Mounir Sherif, a graduate of the Faculty of Law, Ain Shams University and Police Sciences from the Police Academy 1961. The second is Ahmed Omar, also a graduate of the Faculty of Law, Ain Shams University and Police Sciences from the Police Academy, but he does not specify his year of graduation, albeit he mentions that he was born in 1951. Anyway, the authors assert that the formulation of the security creed after the July 2013 revolution took place within a new relationship. The two parties in this relationship are the police and the armed forces on one side and the state's authority on the other. Both of them were subordinate to the state's leadership, which originally had a political, military leadership. Moreover, all the early security chiefs came from the army ranks: Gamal Abdel-Nasser was the first to occupy the position of interior minister, followed by Abbas Radwan, Zakaria Mohieddin and Sharawi Gomaa. Crystallising the security creed occurred with the establishment of Nasser's presidency, under totalitarian rule where the meaning of patriotism and the fundamentals of the political regime were embodied in the president's persona, orientations and standpoints. During the Nasserist era, every political opponent became a challenger to the general order. The security measures were adapted to fit with the maneuvers and the requisites of the political regime, whether it was against the communists or the Muslim Brotherhood. The 1967 defeat was decisive and effective. In the seventies, the security creed was altered from monitoring and encircling violent and terrorist religious groups to lukewarmness and retreat. Afterwards, Anwar Sadat opened the doors wide open for the Brotherhood and jihadist groups. All this culminated in the president's assassination. The study acknowledges that the security institution wasn't well acquainted with the modern map of religious extremism and terrorism which permeated through most of Egypt's governorates until Sadat's assassination. When Sadat decided to open the door for the Islamist groups to address "the Nasserist and communist ideology and cadres" this had a negative political impact and caused security repercussions. This in its turn generated "confusion in the constituents of the security creed, thought and strategy throughout the police apparatus. This confusion was accompanied by the beginning of substantial changes to Egyptian society and its value system as a result of economic openness and the Arab Gulf's wealth." Since the nineties, the study adds, social problems started to be aggravated, represented in the cancerous growth of slums, labour unrest, sit-ins and political opposition. Moreover, the plan for Gamal Mubarak's succession began to rear its head prominently. Amid all these transformations and contradictions since the July revolution, the security service got confused and suffered a gradual loss of direction and the relationship between the police and the masses vanished. While religious extremism remained the responsibility of the security apparatus alone. Throughout the last forty years, the state did not perform its duty except on rare occasions and without this role reaching an effective depth within the masses. The first chapter of the study's four chapters presents a quick historical tour of security from the Pharaonic age until the January 2011 revolution. The second chapter is devoted to the January revolution. It refused - in this respect - to assign the downfall of the regime to the mistakes of the police and its use of excessive force. Titled 'Exponential duties for the police in a failed state', the third chapter is significant because it tackles the formulation of the security creed for the police apparatus, as mentioned before. 'Foreseeing the future', the fourth and final chapter, discusses the ideas and viewpoints regarding reforming the police force and restructuring it. It is noticeable that the study defends, with all its might, much of what research centres consider mistakes or even sins. For instance, the study deemed torture was only committed by certain persons and not a doctrine adopted systematically by the security services and practiced against both those accused of opinion crimes or criminal offenses. The study also regards the corruption, bribery and favouritism as ills that all classes and professions, including the police, suffer from. It ignores that such evils have catastrophic consequences on any society because it is presumed that the one who commits it is trusted by the nation. The study almost neglects – for example – the role played by the police in election rigging or the interference of the state security apparatus in every state institution, syndicate, civil society organisation and party. Finally, however, this study is fit for discussing the role of the security services in the near future, not only because it expresses the viewpoint of these services but because the future of the police, its practices, persuasions, reformation and restructuring will contribute to establishing a future that is more hopeful, just and respectful for all citizens. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/98094.aspx
