Many chapters in Egypt's history came to a close in the 25 January Revolution, with the nation now looking ahead to a still uncertain future, writes Ahmed El-Tonsi* Though the year 2011 has now come to an end, 2012 is the mere continuation of that past year, being pregnant with the events and their consequences that have cast shadows on the entire Egyptian political scene. The January 2011 Revolution was neither just a case of regime change and nor was it a popular revolution that sought to redeem Egyptians' rights and establish a new state that could fulfil their dreams and ambitions. Instead, the revolution represents a watershed in Egypt's modern history, as a result of which Egyptians will now be solely responsible for shaping their state and its role in the world. For centuries, Egyptians have for a variety of reasons been prevented from deciding on their destinies. As part of a larger Islamic state under the Islamic caliphate, the Egyptians, though willingly for most of the time, did not have their own nation-state. Even before the advent of Islam, Egypt for a great part of its long history was a province of a foreign empire, whether Ptolemaic, Roman or Byzantine. Last year's revolution was thus a unique event in terms of the Egyptians gaining for the first time in centuries the right to choose their leaders, draft their own social contract, and have their own state and institutions. The January Revolution came as an abrupt end to a long tradition of foreign and/or fait accompli rulers. As a result, there has been some confusion among observers, who, failing to recognise this fact, have limited the period of Egyptians having no say in the selection of their rulers to the last 60 years, in other words from 1952 onwards. For some commentators, the period from 1922 to 1952 was different from the preceding Ottoman era, which ended with Egypt's becoming a British protectorate in 1914, and from that which followed it after the July 1952 Revolution. Such commentators have focussed on the July Revolution, arguing that it put an end to a period in which Egypt and Egyptians arguably had the right to decide their own affairs. However, this is to forget that Egypt was a British possession from 1882 to 1954 and the occupying power had the upper hand in the administration of an only nominally independent country. Moreover, the historical facts contradict such simplifications and selective readings of the past. The so-called liberal age was a continuation of the same pattern of Egyptians having a limited, if any, say in the choice of political system or political leaders. One can point to the case of the Wafd Party, which, despite its dominance of the political scene during the liberal age, only ruled for fewer than six years during this period's whole 30-year time-span. During the same liberal age, only the parliament of 1945, out of whole period's (1923-1952) 10 legislatures, completed its constitutional term, all the rest having been dissolved prematurely. Ironically, the 1945 parliament also witnessed the worst-ever falsification of elections and was boycotted by the Wafd. Another famous example for this trend of parliaments being dissolved prematurely came in 1925, when the assembly lasted fewer than 10 hours, making it one of the shortest parliaments in world history. The same can be said of the much- mourned 1923 constitution, which, put into effect for only 10 years, was suspended during most of the liberal age. Problems of this kind have not only been the case for the 60 plus years of post-monarchical Egypt. Rather, they have been pervasive throughout Egyptian history, and the "post-Ottoman period" (1914-2011), if thus it can be called, has just been the most recent phase in this history. The 25 January Revolution was a negation of the long-held theory of Egyptian society being habituated to obedience and submission to governmental power. This theory has now become obsolete, or at best an interpretation of a past that now looks increasingly out of step with the radical change that has affected the collective consciousness of Egyptians. Many Egyptians, particularly members of the new "Generation Y", have departed from the old model of governance that has prevailed for centuries. The Egyptian revolution contradicted the generalisations of many scholars, like the late P J Vatikiotis, who once stated that "nowhere in the Middle East has any change in the economic basis of society or its structure led to revolutionary uprisings. Any drastic change has come about through administrative, or state, action, which in many of these countries has been dominated by the military." Today, a stark contradiction to such an arbitrary historical judgment has been seen in Egypt and in many other Arab countries. In other words, the Egyptians have become the agents of their own history. Change has come about from below and not from above as was previously the case in Egypt's history. As a result, it might look pedantic to question the absence of leadership or ideology in the revolution, or to focus on the present chaos. The revolution promoted change as its cardinal goal. The demands of the revolutionaries may have been vague, but it is becoming clearer by the day that the masses have started to experience ongoing change, with all the positive and negative qualities this brings. The question now arises of whether the present changes are real ones? Do they represent a paradigm shift in Egyptian collective consciousness? Nations do not change their attitudes overnight, particularly when these are deeply rooted and reinforced by historical, religious and societal inputs. Massive change cannot take place in "press-button mode" in a society that reveres authority and hierarchy, including the authority of the head of the family ( rab al-usra ) and the businessman ( rab al-aml ). It is hard to answer such questions in a straightforward way, at least for the time being when the dust is still settling. What can be conclusively said is that young people under 30 years of age, who make up more than 60 per cent of the population, have undergone a fully-fledged transformation process and have shifted away from their apathetic state prior to the revolution, rejecting the lead of the older generations. This phenomenon, related to that of a "youth bulge" in the country's demographic profile and the causal relation of this to the revolution, should be thought of as a manifestation of the transformation process. Yet, it is also important to emphasise that the change was fermenting for years before the January Revolution, as was seen in the escalation of contentious politics and disruptive forms of protest, such as sit- ins, demonstrations and strikes during the last decade of former president Hosni Mubarak's rule. Over the decade previous to Mubarak's ouster, there were strikes that involved millions of workers. Moreover, there was surprisingly widespread support for democracy in Egypt, according to the surveys undertaken in 1999-2001 for the US World Values Survey. Inevitably, the new generations of Egyptians will take the lead in establishing a new state. Such was the fundamental historical transformation that took place as a result of the revolution, in which Egyptians, for the first time in centuries, have been able to decide not just on their rulers and state, but also on their destiny. This transformation is irreversible, in as much as the ruling institutions -- the presidency, the army and the police -- have been irrevocably disrupted. It was this triad of state institutions, not just the ruling regime, that failed with the ousting of Mubarak, even as some were warning of the danger of a "failed state." It can be said that the revolution toppled the "secure-cratic" state devised by Mubarak, with the presidency being the first institution to undergo change as a result of the president being forced out of office. The result of this change has been the trial of the ousted president, signifying the shift in perceptions of Egypt's ruler from someone with quasi-sacred status to someone merely holding office or a job. The Egyptians enforced this shift on their rulers, who have become earth-bound creatures only accountable to their people. This change in the collective consciousness of the Egyptian people will be further entrenched with the ongoing institutionalisation of the state, which will eliminate the guardianship role of the police and exclude any possibility of the army being abused by any future ruler or government. Both institutions will now cease to perform their erstwhile functions as rocks on which successive regimes have rested. The army was the first institution to identify this change and to join the revolution. It is important to mention that the army is a republican, and not presidential, guard, and it was this difference that prevented Mubarak from embroiling the army in the defense of his regime. Unfortunately, the police have been devastated by the revolution, and the police as an institution has not been able to amend its path and join the revolutionary camp. However, the newly emergent state should have the time to enforce change on the police within the fabric of the new state. The present trials of police leaders are on charges of their having ordered the killing of peaceful demonstrators. Talk of a "safe exit" for the army as a result of similar charges in the aftermath of the revolution shows how far these two formidable powers have become subject to the rule of law, a development that reflects the magnitude of the change that has swept Egypt. Herein lies the importance of integrating these two institutions within the nascent state at a time when they enjoy no special status based upon their roles in the old power structure that collapsed with Mubarak. Henceforth, there will be no more levers of power that the country's rulers can rely on to maintain themselves in office. The revolution exposed the inadequacy of the police as a tool to control the masses. This role has become outdated, and the police will inevitably be transformed into a law-enforcing institution that performs its duty by safeguarding the state and the society and not the ruling regime. The issue of the army is more complex than that of the police in as much as the army was not part of the former regime. Only Mubarak thought it was, and the army proved him wrong. Yet, stereotyping the army's role in the aftermath of the revolution has been conducive to the current debacle, in which mistrust is the very least that can be said to describe the relationship between the army and the younger generations. This is not to say that the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has not made mistakes in managing the transition period. But the army should not be thought of as a power-holder, or aspirant, or adventurer. The army has its own form of legitimacy, as was recognised by the masses during the revolution. Mistakes since have come from the fact that the army is not a political institution, even as it has been adamant in the political transition process on going it alone. The army has been depoliticised since the June 1967 War, becoming a professional body as it is in many other states. In his pioneering work on former president Anwar El-Sadat, Raymond Hinnebusch says that "this depoliticisation of the military was a watershed in Egypt's evolution away from 'praetorianism,'[since Gamal Abdel-] Nasser had, it appears substantially, if partially, routinised his charismatic authority in a legal institution." Such depoliticisation was manifested in 1971 during Sadat's battle against what he called "centres of power", when the military refrained from king-making and chose instead to express its loyalty to the presidency. In May 1971, commander-in-chief and minister of defence Mohamed Fawzi, an ardent opponent of Sadat, did not move his troops to stage a coup. Similar conclusions have been reached by Imad Harb in his study of the role of the Egyptian army in politics, where he says that the army since 1967 has accepted a subordinate role in a presidential system that both safeguards its interests and limits its direct influence. What remains an issue for further deliberation is the current privileges enjoyed by the military and how to address the continuation or discontinuation of such privileges in the new era. Such privileges do not consist of profitable business or land deals, as was argued by Martini and Taylor in their article in the US journal Foreign Affairs in September/October year. In an army of more than half a million members, it is unimaginable to think that loyalty could be bought by lavish kickbacks from the authorities. Economic enterprises and activities owned by the army will eventually come under civilian scrutiny, as will its budget, and the necessary security considerations will also be met. Whatever estimates of the size of the military economy may be, the fact remains that it is a legal as well as a formal economy, according to a recent study by the Carnegie Foundation. Another thorny issue that has been raised since the revolution is the question of the immunity from criminal prosecution of military servicemen involved in the violent events that have been recurring since the military came to power last year. It should be obvious that viewing the army as the ultimate power-holder or power-broker is historically incorrect. Even if some think that the army is seeking to remain in power, it cannot stay on for a single day after June 30, 2012. The reasons for this are many. One straightforward one is that the army cannot by any measure or under any circumstances contain the radicalisation that is taking place among the masses. The current state of Egyptian society is beyond the control of any single power, hard or soft. The SCAF's management of the transition period has not met the expectations of broad sections of Egyptian society, and the army's failure to impose law and order has diluted long-held beliefs in the institution's competency and its abilities. Ultimately, this unexpectedly sub- standard performance has eroded part of the army's soft power, diminishing its historically high social capital. Regrettable though this is, it has been exploited by many for various reasons in order to achieve their own objectives at the expense of a nationally admired institution. The fact remains that the Egyptian army is a patriotic institution that should be kept within the collective frame of reference as the backbone of the state and with its own identity and acting as a republican safeguard. The army's past, current and future roles should be respected, whether or not we disagree with or criticise some of the steps taken by the SCAF. It would be a serious matter were the army to be forced from office with a feeling of frustration at ongoing events. The new state is in massive need of the guardianship role played by the army, particularly in its formative years. It is for the sake of this new state that inappropriate slogans against military rule should be reconsidered, since the SCAF's rule is legitimate, despite its mistakes. Military rule will remain legitimate as long as it is transient, and here is the crux of the matter that all Egyptians, particularly the elites, should bear in mind. The recent change has been so tremendous in its scope and magnitude that its repercussions will long be felt throughout Egypt. US political scientist Samuel Huntington says somewhere that all societies have "marginal groups" that do not participate in politics, and he identifies "blacks" as one such group that has become politically active, posing a "danger of overloading the political system with its demands." In the case of Egypt, which has proved the futility of Huntington's premises on Islamic societies, one can see that the youth, with its different social and ideological backgrounds, has become politically active in one way or another. Being a majority of the Egyptian population, young people have long been a silent majority, a condition that has now ended. Regrettably, the incidents in Mohamed Mahmoud Street and off Qasr Al-Aini have been part of the revolutionary scene. It is a fact that since January Egypt has been going through a popular revolution that has shared some of the features of others throughout history. Revolutions have not always been pleasant events that everybody celebrates or benefits from. Anarchy, chaos, political assassinations and even terrorism take place in even the most liberal revolutions, and at the other extreme history witnessed the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, with its history of violence and counter-violence. The mob has been present in nearly every great revolution, with highly destructive mobs shaping the path of the French revolution and even certain eras in the political history of France during the 18th and 19th centuries. In addition to its citing the role of the Parisian mob during the revolution, Charles Dickens's great novel A Tale of Two Cities describes the prevalent atmosphere during such turbulent years. Bloody scenes such as these have been seen during the Egyptian revolution, and regrettably they may recur. As long as there is no positive change in the socio-economic conditions of the vast majority of the people who supported the revolution, Egypt will remain vulnerable to such mob activities and impulsive crowds. The sub-standard security situation and the appalling economic situation are so interwoven that it is an arcane debate to decide which is the cause and which the effect. In January 2011, many chapters in Egypt's history were closed, particularly the idea that Egyptians would not be able to exercise the right of self-determination. From now on, Egypt is an Egyptian affair that all Egyptians, whether ready or not, will have the right to shape. Today, the nation is at a critical juncture. We all witnessed the start of the current events, but no one can yet foresee their fulfillment. * The writer is a political commentator.
