The Muslim Brotherhood's recurrent mistakes

Among the chronic ailments of the Muslim Brotherhood are misperception and repetition of mistakes, especially during times of crisis

Since the 3 July coup, the Muslim Brotherhood has not altered its mindset or rethought its strategy of how to deal with the new environment ensuing losing power. It was sufficient to only hold demonstrations, mobilise and attempt to thwart the coup at any cost.
Four months later, the Brotherhood leadership appears to be paralysed and unbalanced with the lack of an ability to adopt a more realistic vision that can gain support from the wider society. This is not only because of the arrest and pursuit of its members, but also because of the group's lack of political imagination. For example, since Morsi's ouster, the Brotherhood has yet to launch any political initiatives or plans for resolution -- not only to avoid additional victims but at least as a manoeuvre to return the ball to the court of the government and military.
While it is true that the state adopts a heavy-handed policy in dealing with the Brotherhood and insists on using security suppression instead of dialogue and negotiations, still, the Brotherhood should have adopted a rational initiative that could undercut the junta who are trying to eradicate them.
Since Morsi's downfall, the Brotherhood has committed three strategic mistakes, which are continuously being repeated. First, relying on mobilisation and protests while playing the victim, whereby demonstrations have become a goal per se. Protests are effective when they are built on a vision and strategy that reap gains for the Brotherhood. Instead, what the movement has so far reaped are human and organisational losses.
The group believes that putting pressure will increase the burdens of the current government and make its life difficult. This is true, but the cost the Brotherhood is paying seems too high. A violent response by the security apparatus against protesters resulting in many victims might mean that the Brotherhood does not care about the well-being of its followers. There is also a large sector of society that rejects demonstrations by the Brotherhood, whether because they support the military or because they believe demonstrations only disrupt their livelihoods and create problems.
The Brotherhood's second mistake is self-isolation. Since July 3, the Brotherhood has not attempted to expand its outreach beyond its core social base. Although the group partially succeeded in shifting its discourse and slogans from defending Morsi to defending democracy, these slogans are less credible given the fact that the gap between the Brotherhood and revolutionary forces is significantly deep. Thus, any attempts by the Brotherhood to gain the sympathy of these forces will fail because the latter believe the Brotherhood is only serving its own interests, not those of the 25 January Revolution.
The third mistake is the Brotherhood's insistence on infusing religion in the current political game and portraying the battle as if for Islam not power. This was one of the reasons why the Brotherhood was toppled from power in the first place as it divided society according to religion and ideology. Many in Brotherhood protests still believe they are demonstrating for the sake of Islam not for a return to power. In this manner, the Brotherhood is trying to increase its popularity among the low and lower-middle classes after losing a significant part of the upper-middle class during its one-year in power.
Moreover, after countless arrests of leaders from the first and second levels, the Brotherhood is trying to rely on less known members in the third and fourth tiers, namely the youth at universities and secondary schools. It is clear the movement still has a stronghold in Egypt's universities, including Al-Azhar. Historically the Brotherhood student wing is considered one of its strongest echelons that used to operate without a direct connection with the Guidance Bureau.
The Brotherhood's problem today lies in the lack of vision on how to end the current crisis except through demonstrations that feed off the incumbent government's weakness and failure to resolve economic and social issues.
Meanwhile, resentment is rising among the Egyptian public because of lack of security and public services such as water and electricity. Therefore, the important question today is: Can the Brotherhood reach a deal with the state to stop demonstrations in return for ending arrests? I don't believe that is possible because there are concerns Brotherhood youth would reject such a deal, especially after the violent dispersal of the Rabaa Al-Adawiya and Al-Nahda protest camps and the large number of victims resulting from police and army brutality against protesters.
The dilemma now is not about the Brotherhood leaders who are known for their pragmatism, but the youth who refuse to stand down until the crimes committed against their friends and families are investigated. Accordingly, the Brotherhood is worried that a deal with the state would trigger internal splits; this means protests are the sole means to maintain the group's cohesion.
The Brotherhood problem is not confined to their persecution by the state, but also the large divide between the group and the street. Thus, the challenge facing the Brotherhood is not only how to stop the brutality of the security forces but also how to gain support among the masses, which will not happen without the Brotherhood adopting a different strategy. It is ironic that the Brotherhood recently issued a statement about what it believes were the triggers for the coup, without making mention of any share of the responsibility – as if nothing had changed.
It appears that today, more than at any other time, the Brotherhood is in dire need of adopting a bold strategy to save itself, its youth and its organisation. Perhaps the first step in this strategy would be to admit their mistakes since they came to power and until today, before it is too late.
The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute, Washington DC
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