The Iraqi elections and Iraq s one-day-democracy are over. The positive aspect was the big turnout. According to official statistics, 63 percent of those who had the right to vote used that right. The negative aspects are more numerous. There was the violence that preceded and accompanied the elections, the liquidation of some candidates, the barring of a significant number of others on the pretext that they were Baathists, the huge demonstrations that overwhelmed some cities, like Baghdad and Basra, demanding the evacuation of all old members of the Baath party from these cities, and the interference of the pro-government militia to force people to vote for certain lists. Vote rigging aside, in the end Iraqis have made the mistake of electing the same lists and personalities that in the past proved to be corrupt, inefficient, sectarian and unable to improve life, security and services in Iraq. Of course such an outcome was clear from the beginning as there was no real national or technocrat list to vote for. The coming weeks, if not months, will now witness a struggle between the lead lists to form the new government. Incumbent Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, of the State of Law coalition list, and former PM Iyad Allawi, head of Al-Iraqia, have gained an almost identical number of seats in the new parliament. Maliki has already got the support of the third list, the Iraqi National Alliance headed by Ammar Al-Hakim. If he gets the backing of the Kurdish Alliance of Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, he could easily form a new government. However he has to give several concessions to the other lists - the allocation of sovereign ministries, the nomination of the head of the parliament, the relationship between the Kurdish Federal Region and the central government, etc. - and a new government led by Al-Maliki looks likely to be run mainly on sectarian and ethnic lines. This could take the country back to the era of sectarian violence. Meanwhile, Allawi is likely to do his best to woo the Kurds to switch their allegiances. This will not be easy as most leading members of his list, such as Tariq Al-Hashimi, insist that Iraq is an Arab republic and on having an Arab Sunni nominated as president of the republic. Such a move will surely alienate the Kurdish lists. It would appear difficult for Allawi to get the support of the third list, that of Al-Hakim, which accuses Allawi s list of containing too many Sunnis and old Baathists. The American reaction was demonstrated by the speech of US President Barack Obama, who congratulated Iraqis on their successful elections. It is obvious the outcome of the vote, apart from coinciding with US plans to carry out a massive withdrawal of its forces in Iraq, satisfies Washington as the winners and losers are both people friendly, if not obedient, to American policy. Although the US would have preferred to see a secular Iraq rather than a religiously ruled one, this objective could be sacrificed as long as whoever rules in Baghdad follows US orders. As for the US withdrawal, this will be decided by the security situation in Iraq in the coming months and the issue of Iran s nuclear file. US forces and influence will of course not be withdrawn completely from Iraq. Indeed, the SOFA agreement, the oil deals, the many military bases, the biggest embassy in the region if not the world, as well as the strong influence the US exerts on Iraqi politicians, ensure that the American presence in Iraq will be an almost permanent one. The major US concern is the future of Iraqi-Iranian relations, or, more precisely, Iranian influence in Iraq. How Iran uses that influence, meanwhile, will be decided by how the US and Israel react to Iran s continuing defiance over its nuclear program. The new Iraqi government will also have to grapple with the nature of Iraq s relations with the region. If the same sort of government as the last one is formed, then those relations will follow the same pattern: close ties with Iran, tense relations with Saudi Arabia and Syria (as the former is strictly against the Shia domination of Iraq and the latter is home to the vast majority of the candidates who were barred from standing), neutral with Turkey and Jordan. Iran s President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, in anticipating the formation of a loyal new Iraqi government and to show his confidence that it will not change its good relations with Iran, firmly assured his allies in Syria that Iraq is part of the crescent that opposes and resists US policy in the region. As for relations with Kuwait, those will be decided by the latter s position on the never-ending reparations Iraq pays the country. This picture will, however, change in two cases: if Allawi s secular list forms a new government and an Arab Sunni president is elected instead of Talabani; or in the case of a power-sharing deal between Maliki and Allawi, in which case the Kurdish coalition would lose out, something that would also please Turkey. What is certain after two elections and seven years of occupation is that Iraq has turned into a country built on a sectarian, ethnic and quota basis. No Sunni is challenging for the post of prime minister and the only question about the post of president is whether an Arab or a Kurd will fill it. Such sectarianism will almost certainly ensure that Iraq s major cities yet again witness an increase in the level of violence between supporters of different lists. Dr. Sawsan Al-Assaf is a lecturer and researcher at the Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, and visiting fellow at SOAS, University of London. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org
