History reminds us that Afghanistan long ago acquired the label of tomb of empires . US President Barack Obama at least admits that the US is not winning there and cannot win unless some fundamental changes in strategy are made, and that is what he has begun. The concept appears to be to craft a political victory under the umbrella of a military surge and intensified offensive operations in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, then hand over the insurgency to the Kabul government. This is a near repeat of the Soviet model of the late 1980s. On the face of it, there are many questions that reflect little confidence in the success of the new strategy. We recall that the Soviets stabilized Afghanistan in their mold with a fully functioning state and a robust military force that held out against vicious attacks from Pakistan. Yet jihad erupted from the Balkans to the Philippines on the assumption that the mujahideen had defeated a superpower. And now multiple versions of mujahideen are battling the sole remaining superpower, which admits that it is not winning after more than seven years. Hence its exit policy, defined as operative in 2011 by the US and its allies, is as important as its current strategy. Obama has promised to enhance aid to the Pakistani military in the hope of greater cooperation. But it would be naive to believe that with nearly 23 percent Pathan/Pashtun troops in that army it could or would undertake major military operations in the Afghan context, especially when, for the first time in six decades, the army does not enjoy the confidence of the people of Pakistan. The center of gravity of jihad in the region is Pakistan s Inter-Services Intelligence, which even top US military commanders are now publicly identifying as linked to militant jihadi groups. ISI is an integral department of the army and plans, organizes and directs the strategy of covert war and radical jihad across the world. Unless this is targeted or at least reformed, there can be little confidence in significant change any time soon. Pakistan s elected government tried to restrict the role of ISI but had to back off under pressure from the army leadership. Another aspect is that the goalposts of strategy are being shifted. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been reported as saying that the aim of a new US strategy would be to ensure that terrorist attacks are not launched against North America. Does this mean that Obama will abandon the global war on terrorism? Only time will tell; but at this stage it appears that while Pakistan s deals with the jihadi outfits in Swat, Bajaur, etc., appear a positive step, there is a risk that these will free up fighters to provide the militants version of a spring fighting surge. Indians have to evolve their policies to deal with the emerging issues. While India is the only regional power to establish strong links with Afghanistan because of its economic potential, it would need space to either access land-locked Afghanistan where our aid people and diplomatic missions are being targeted by jihadis or pull out its existing diplomatic and economic reconstruction personnel. Any failure of the current Obama strategy could lead to India being sucked in more (mission creep) to provide protection to its aid workers; this has already begun with paramilitary units to guard the embassy and selected areas. One solution could be a corridor through Baluchistan to Afghanistan for international assistance and supplies mandated by the UN to alleviate Islamabad s concerns. Here the Obama strategy is repeating a fundamental mistake so often made by Washington: bringing India-Pakistan tensions into its Afghan-Pakistan strategy. This is certain to complicate things, especially now that China has also joined this bandwagon. Pakistan will insist on solving the core issue of Kashmir in its favor, while India will at the very minimum remind Washington of the 26/11 terrorist massacre at Mumbai. The pragmatists will point out that the only way to reduce tensions is to stop trans-national Islamist terrorism and convert the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir into an international border (building on the 1972 agreement), thereby allowing Pakistan to legalize its illegal occupation. Air Commodore (ret.) Jasjit Singh is director of the Centre for Air Power Studies, a New Delhi based independent think tank.This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org
