The pattern of policymaking in the Middle East, as it was defined since President Bush's "axis if evil speech of January 2002, is undergoing a momentous change of direction. Bush's foreign-policy paradigm of an alliance of "moderates to defeat the "extremists - a model too enthusiastically seconded by an unimaginative Israeli leadership and by those Arabs (led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia) who dread the forces of radical change - has collapsed. The "extremists, whom Bush expected to be defeated through economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military action, have prevailed. It is the "moderates who must now adapt their policies. Israel and the United States failed resoundingly in their attempt to dislodge Hamas from Gaza, or in forcing it to accept conditions for an end to the international boycott. Fearing the costs of an invasion of Gaza's urban alleys, Israel handed a strategic victory to Hamas. It accepted a truce, brokered by an Egyptian government fearful of Iran's influence in neighboring Gaza, that not only gave Hamas political legitimacy and undermined the international community's policy of not negotiating with this fundamentalist group, but that also allowed it to continue rearming. Indeed, Hamas now poses a strategic threat to Israel's urban centers and military facilities. Israel's war in 2006 in Lebanon against Hezbollah, supported by the US and the entire Arab "moderate camp, was no more successful. In fact, Hezbollah is now not only militarily stronger than ever - Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for its disarmament, has proven to be an utter failure - but also more politically robust than before the war. Admirably adept at weaving together all of Lebanon's political, religious, and nationalists threads, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nazrallah, is today the undisputed master of Lebanon. The Syrian patron of Hezbollah, President Bashar al-Assad, another member of the "axis of evil, is also doing well, thank you. Not only Israel and the US, but also Egypt and Saudi Arabia have hoped for the political demise of this friend of every radical regional cause - from Hamas and Iran to the anti-Western forces in Lebanon - that they oppose. But Assad managed to emerge from Syria's forced withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 to become the broker without whom a Lebanese government could not be created and a president could not be elected. This, and the indirect negotiations with Israel that are now underway in Turkey - which Assad knows cannot produce major results, given Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's political weakness and Bush's lame-duck status - have helped to open for Syria the gates of Europe, where he had also once been a pariah. Moreover, desperate to recover its relevance in Middle East politics, the US has now radically changed its attitude and agreed to a meeting between US Undersecretary of State for Near East Affairs David Welch and Riad Daoudi, Syria's chief negotiator with Israel. America's drive to force Iran to stop its nuclear program through an ineffective sanctions regime has been no more successful than any of its other schemes to isolate the region's extremists. Indeed, the US has now completely reversed its position of not negotiating with Iran until it stops uranium enrichment. The participation of Under Secretary of State William Burns in the European dialogue with Iran, together with plans to station American diplomats in Teheran for the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, represents a momentous shift in America's policy, and also an indication to Israel to refrain from a military strike. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, America is in no mood to open a third front against the Islamic world. The consequences of an Israeli attack on Iran "would be extremely stressful for us, warned Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Michael Mullen. With the defeat of his ideologically inspired foreign policy, Bush has finally decided not to remain blind to the benefits of engaging Syria and Iran. However isolated within the Arab family the Syrians may be, and however embattled their Iranian allies are, the two countries hold the keys to Middle East stability. They are crucial players in Lebanon, they have a role to play in pacifying Iraq, they can influence a change of attitude of powerful and extremely destabilizing non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah, and their leverage on Hamas is vital for the stability of the Palestinian front. Engaging Iran is also the only way to stave off a nuclear apocalypse in the region. Of course, the overall cooling of political tensions reflects the collapse of another misconception of the Bush administration - that the "axis of evil is an irrational coalition interested only in spreading evil. Pursuing radical goals does not necessarily mean that a country will act irrationally. Neither Syria nor Iran - in fact, not even North Korea - has an interest in being the pariahs of the world community, and they fully understand the economic consequences of isolation. Their policies are about more than spreading terror and revolution; they are about promoting negotiable interests. They are both mindful of the limits of the politics of destabilization, and they are clearly looking forward to a more dialogue-oriented American administration willing to address their political and strategic concerns. Shlomo Ben-Ami a former Israeli foreign minister, is the vice-president of the Toledo International Centre for Peace. He is the author of Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with Project Syndicate.
