The Bush administration may live in a bubble of "unreality, regarding its foreign policy in Iraq, but neoconservatives inhabit a parallel universe on Iran. Unbelievably, despite the fact that the American quagmire in Iraq has greatly weakened the United States' position vis-à-vis Iran, the neocons are pushing for military action against that theocratic regime. According to The New York Times, David Wurmser, one of Vice President Dick Cheney's principal advisors, has told conservative groups of Cheney's assertion that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's diplomatic effort to shut down Iran's nuclear program was faltering. Cheney further asserted that by the spring of 2008 President George W. Bush might have to decide whether to use military force against Tehran. Fortunately, however, the Times also reported that Rice's friends and associates say she believes a military strike against Iran would be "disastrous. She is winning the internal administration debate so far. Even more encouraging is that Bush, in late 2002 and early 2003, decided not to attack North Korea or issue an ultimatum over its ejection of international nuclear inspectors and its plans to create more weapons-grade plutonium that could be made into nuclear bombs. North Korea followed through on its plans, is now believed to have enough fuel for eight or more weapons, and exploded a nuclear device in fall 2006. Yet during the time of Bush's decision, North Korea already had enough fissile material to make some nuclear weapons, whereas Iran doesn't. That is, the reality of going to war with a nuclear nation is much more sobering than going to war with a nation that is still three to eight years away from generating the fissionable material needed to make an atomic weapon. Even if the US launched air strikes against Iran, they would probably only delay the inevitable. Such strikes would be unlikely to eliminate all of Iran's nuclear facilities, because Washington doesn't know where all of them are located. In addition, some have been deeply buried, and still others are in densely populated areas. Air strikes would likely rally the young Iranian population, thirsting for change, around the autocratic and theocratic fossils now running Iran's government. This would eliminate all hope that regime change would terminate the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed, such US belligerence, or even saber-rattling, is one of the prime factors motivating Iran to obtain the weapons. If one doubts this effect, in late 2002 and early 2003, North Korea redoubled its nuclear efforts, a move that coincided with the North Koreans' conclusion about what was going to happen to a non-nuclear Iraq. As a result, North Korea's more recent agreement to readmit international weapons inspectors and stop its nuclear program, in exchange for aid and the unfreezing of its assets, should be taken with a grain of salt. North Korea cheated on the last such agreement it made with the Clinton administration. More importantly, the agreement did not oblige Pyongyang to give up the fissionable material already generated. Therefore, unless the United States is ready to launch ground invasions in both of these nations in order to neutralize all their nuclear facilities, fissionable material, or weapons, Iran and North Korea will probably get or retain nuclear weapons. Nor can we forget that such attacks would make the invasion and occupation of Iraq look like a day at the beach. This reality should not prevent the US from trying to negotiate a "grand bargain with these nations: to get them to give up their nuclear weapons in exchange for a full normalization of relations; to integrate them into the world economy by lifting economic sanctions; and to guarantee that the US will not attack them. However, in the wake of the American invasion of Iraq and the existence of regional rivals - some with nuclear weapons or weapons potential - it is unlikely that either Iran or North Korea will negotiate away their nuclear programs. Thus, Washington will probably have to deter an Iranian or North Korean nuclear attack, or prevent their giving or selling of nuclear weapons to terrorists, by using the most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world. Such deterrence was effectively carried out against larger states - Maoist China and the Soviet Union - until they either moderated their behavior or disintegrated. In the case of China, the US deterred a radical nation that indirectly threatened nuclear war with the West. If the US deterred such large powers, it should certainly be able to deter the smaller and poorer Iran and North Korea. It is also a good bet that both unpopular, autocratic governments will collapse at some time in the future. In addition, the US could offer these two nuclear powers limited assistance in safeguarding their nuclear weapons against theft and tips on controlling of them so as to avoid an accidental or unauthorized launch. Acceptance, deterrence, and limited technical assistance are smarter policies than counterproductive US saber-rattling and belligerence, which would merely prompt more countries to start or accelerate secret nuclear programs and obtain the ultimate weapon to keep the US at bay. Ivan Elandis director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, a libertarian think tank based in Oakland, California. This commentary is published by permission
