The death of Muammar Gaddafi calls for a reappraisal of U.S. president Barack Obama's foreign policy. Despite many missteps—the fecklessness of his troop “surge” in Afghanistan, his failure to halt the expansion of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories and earn the confidence of the Muslim world and his inability to disrupt cooperation between Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency and militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan—recent successes in the international arena figure prominently among the major accomplishments of his first term and undoubtedly will be employed during the 2012 US presidential campaign as Obama attempts to assuage public frustration over a weak economy. More importantly, however, Obama's approach represents a dramatic shift from the disastrous neoconservatism of the George W. Bush administration. The foreign policy of the Bush administration was rooted in unilateralism and a sharp disdain for international institutions; an overwhelming reliance on “hard power” which resulted in a robust military presence abroad with large ground forces deployed in multiple countries throughout the Middle East; a “freedom agenda,” which focused on the export of democratic governments and free market economic systems around the world; the deployment of missile defense networks to guard against supposed threats from Russia and Iran; and a simplistic, Manichean ideology ostensibly necessary to win the “War on Terror.” Bush's approach was the product of a fundamentally flawed world view, a reactionary and militaristic response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and a misguided hubris that derived from the large relative power advantage possessed by the US during the first decade of the 21st century, the confidence inspired by victories in both the Cold War and the Gulf War and successful participation in NATO military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s. This calamitous policy resulted in the two longest continual military engagements in US history, the deaths of more than 5,000 US soldiers and 100,000 Iraqis, fractured alliances, the overextension of the US military, the expansion of Iranian influence throughout the Middle East, the current dire fiscal situation of the US and the erosion of American power, prestige and moral authority. Aware of a decline in American power and hamstrung by major domestic problems, Obama implemented a restrained dual track policy of both engagement and disengagement: he engaged multilateral institutions, allies and rivals such as China, Russia and Iran and simultaneously disengaged from costly military adventures around the world. He welcomed democratic transitions in the Middle East but exercised restraint to ensure the organic nature of the Arab Spring. In addition to multilateral institutions and alliances, the Obama approach rests on the use of unmanned drones and targeted economic sanctions, aggressive intelligence collection, the select deployment of US Special Forces and military advisors around the world and an appreciation for “smart power” which uses all levers—diplomacy, development and defense—to address global issues. This policy has resulted in the deaths of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki, the disruption of Al-Qaeda terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the imminent withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, a strategic “pivot” to Asia, the ratification of the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia, skillful management of the effects of the Arab Spring, the marginalization of Iran, free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea and the restoration of frayed alliances—most apparent in the recent successful NATO intervention in Libya. Obama has reorganized the foreign priorities of the US to fit domestic fiscal constraints and spread the burden of maintaining global stability, which has resulted in a lighter and more cost effective American “footprint” in the world. Obama's pragmatic foreign policy bears a striking similarity to the approach of former US president George H.W. Bush. The elder Bush possessed extensive experience in international affairs—prior to his presidency, he served as US ambassador to the UN, US envoy to China and director of the CIA—and maintained a nuanced, non-ideological view of the world. Like Obama, he adroitly managed the consequences of a major paradigm shift in geopolitics—the fall of the Soviet Union and the opening of Eastern Europe—engaged multilateral institutions, built an international coalition to prosecute the Gulf War and challenged Israel to halt settlement construction. However, this erudite Republican foreign policy is now a relic of a bygone era. The Republican candidates currently vying to challenge Obama in the 2012 US presidential campaign display a shocking ignorance of international issues and an alarmingly neoconservative bent. The foreign policy shop of frontrunner Mitt Romney is stocked with veterans of the George W. Bush administration; his chief rival, Texas governor Rick Perry doesn't support the creation of an independent Palestinian state and takes advice from the architects of the Iraq War; the Islamophobia of Herman Cain, a former CEO who recently surged to the top tier of the Republican field, is only exceeded by the bigotry of fellow candidate Newt Gingrich. The sole Republican candidate with an intelligent, coherent foreign policy, former US Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, is currently in last place with two percent of the vote. Unfortunately, the future of American foreign policy appears contingent on the domestic economic environment. Absent a dramatic economic recovery, Obama faces an uphill battle for re-election and probable defeat. Like George H.W. Bush, Obama's international successes may be overshadowed by a recession and widespread unemployment. One of the most ominous trends in contemporary US politics is that due to economic woes, the school of neoconservatism so recently and thoroughly discredited in US and world public opinion may return to prominence only four years after its most famous practitioner left office. BM
