CAIRO: Norman Finkelstein knows his audience, as he revealed Monday night in his lecture at the American University in Cairo (AUC). His references to Israel's sense of rationality dripped with sarcasm. He got laughs when he joked that the number of cockroaches in his New York apartment pales in comparison to the number of pesky footnotes found in Israel's official report investigating its assault on the 2010 Gaza Freedom Flotilla. To the delight of the audience, he mocked Israel's stereotype of Arab activists as “CIJ”s, short for “Crazy Islamic Jihadists.” He rallied students' sense of pride in the Egyptian revolution and stirred their emotions by claiming that Israel has always operated under the assumption that “Arabs don't know how to fight.” Finkelstein won his audience over so convincingly that when he made an Arabs-can't-read joke, the auditorium erupted into laughter. Despite the joviality of exchange between Finkelstein and his student audience, the positive vibes that electrified Bassily Auditorium may eventually have serious implications in the regional policy arena. In terms of content, Finkelstein delineated three key developments that have shaped the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years: the Gaza War of 2008-2009, Israel's assault on the Gaza-bound Freedom Flotilla in 2010, and the Egyptian revolution. His criticism of Israel throughout the ninety minute speech was characteristically unrelenting. He used familiar language in discussing the first two events in particular, describing Israel as a “lunatic” state that uses “insane” levels force against its enemies and intentionally commits acts of “hooliganism” with its self-proclaimed moral army. Switching gears, Finkelstein provided insightful commentary on why Israel fears the Egyptian revolution and its aftermath. Israeli officials are alarmed not because Egypt's incoming civilian government will attack the isolated state or renege on their 1979 peace treaty together, but because Egypt has become a force to reckon with rather than a pawn to be played. The biggest threat to Israel, Finkelstein said, is that Egyptians will enter the modern world, continue to reclaim their dignity, and demand a central role in the region. But the most revealing element of the speech was that Finkelstein, simply put, was preaching to the choir. The controversy and contention that follow him notoriously in most academic circles were checked at the doors of the auditorium. His most radical statements were the ones celebrated by the crowd. Students logged onto Twitter fawned over him, praising him as a bold orator, champion of their own views, and impeccable source of information. In a sense, this fan club mentality was disappointing. Judging from audience reaction, the AUC community came to hear one thing- that Israel lies. Finkelstein delivered, turning the event into more of a political rally than an academic lecture. What should have been running commentary on Twitter was instead regurgitation. The question and answer session following the lecture served as an opportunity for remaining students in the room to reaffirm their own opinions vis-à-vis Finkelstein. One student even messaged to her peers that there was no need to stay for the ensuing forum, as the “most important issues”- meaning those that they wanted to hear flow from Finkelstein's mouth- had already been tackled. The enthusiasm that Finkelstein's presence and message generated is nevertheless meaningful. He is a novelty- a Western (and Jewish) academic who has not only provided a platform for the Arab world's grievances in relation to Israel, but has actually staked his career on it. His human rights approach to criticism of Israel provides Egyptians with an alternative to Islamist and nationalist narratives. Finkelstein optimistically proclaimed at AUC that thanks to the spread of real democracy in the Arab world, “the prospects have never been better for a just and lasting peace for the Israel-Palestinian conflict.” Such a figure, boosted by celebrity status, may have the potential to forge consensus among Egyptians and enable them to do what Israel fears the most- to assert themselves regionally. For now, such a prospect is remote. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces seems determined to stabilize and preserve the cold peace between Egypt and Israel. Apart from partial appeasement of anti-Israeli sentiment, for example through the warming of relations with Hamas and the ending of Israel's blockade of Gaza via an open Rafah border crossing, the SCAF will eschew any major shift in Egypt's regional policy in the short term. Yet today's generation of youth who gave Finkelstein such a spirited reception is the one that will shape Egypt's longer-term foreign policy. And despite the fact that they are the generation with the least direct contact with Israel- as the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars were before their time- they have witnessed enough humiliation of fellow Arabs at the hands of Israeli military force to form an uncompromising outlook. Unless tempered by a softened Israeli approached towards regional politics, “Finkelsteinism” in a post-Mubarak Egypt where anything seems possible will likely continue to woo the Egyptian public with dramatic consequences for the country's future foreign policy. ** Sarah Grebowski is a freelance journalist based in Cairo. BM
