WASHINGTON: In recent months the Obama administration and foreign policy makers have been confronted with determining new policies concerning the Arab Spring. Additionally, the academic community has been increasingly active in considering the burgeoning political landscapes in the Arab World. In Washington, think tanks, NGOs, and government branches have sponsored vigorous debates and dialogues on new regional questions and uncertainties in scholarship and foreign policy. Some major themes have materialized in recent discussions. One major recurring point is that prevalent taboos regarding the Arab World have finally been broken, particularly “Arab exceptionalism,” the idea that Arab nations are resistant to democratization and modernization. Tamara Wittes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs stated, “We see that the circle of democracy is much wider than ‘the West.' The Arab Spring has disproved old myths that Arabs don't care about democracy and the idea that states that rest on repression are strong.” Another myth has been confronted: idea that Muslim nations desire the Iranian model. Radwan Masmoudi, President of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, has been a leading voice in denying this claim: “These revolutions are going to have a religious aspect as religion is a major force in the country and Islam is an important component in history, culture, and identity… but nobody wants a theocratic state.” Masmoudi elaborated on new debates regarding religion and democratization: “This is a challenge the Muslim World faces: balancing, making a trade off, and compromising between Islamic religious values and democracy/freedom.” Masmoudi felt that many Arab states, most notably Tunisia, were “well placed for that challenge.” Scholars have additionally been active in giving credit to the active opposition movements that they have studied over the past decades over more fashionable explanations for the fall of regimes. For example, Emad El-Din Shahin, professor at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana, avoided classifying events in Egypt as “Twitter revolutions”. He declared, “The Egyptian revolution was cumulative. First, there was a clear articulation of dissent, official mobilization, and aggregation of demands for the regime, and then the catalyst was the reform agenda. Tunisia just showed the way.” Saad Eddin Ibrahim, long-time democracy advocate and professor at Drew University, supported Shahin's assertion by adding, “This was beyond a ‘Facebook revolution'. It was much more than that.” Many activists have asserted that the meaning and spirit of the revolutions cannot fit into an analytical framework. After the long-awaited Arab Spring, many thinkers have embraced the protests' successes and noted the satisfying irony of the sudden turn of events. Ibrahim drew on his own experiences under the former regime. He commented, “There is an element of historical justice. The cell block in Tura Farm Prison where I was imprisoned is now where the former Egyptian regime resides.” In painting a picture of the picturesque nature of the events in Tahrir Square, Ibrahim also noted that the Egyptian revolution was demand based, not class based, with high discipline for non-violence, recalling the chanting “salmiya, salmiya” meaning peaceful in Arabic. He added that despite the known apprehension of the Muslim Brotherhood's involvement in politics, he did not fear their participation, “When the MB finally came to the protests, the elders did not raise religious slogans and there was nothing divisive about their participation.” In this way, many scholars are looking toward the ethical involvement of all actors in a new political environment. Other scholars were not convinced that the worst was over for the struggle for democracy in the region. Larry Diamond, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute and professor at Stanford University affirmed, “The truth is nobody has a clue how Egyptians will vote in a free and fair election. The military has imposed a timeline that is highly majoritarian that will serve local power brokers.” Diamond was not ready to trust that the Muslim Brotherhood and other political actors would use restraint, “If the Muslim Brotherhood does as well as they might, why would they dilute their power?” Nathan Brown, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment and professor at The George Washington University, insisted he had many legitimate concerns, but that they were not grounds for pessimism. He noted, “The fears of Islamists rushing to elections is serious but exaggerated. The Brotherhood will probably do decently in September but also their leadership has said that a more pluralistic Egypt serves the Brotherhood.” He added, “Conversion to a democratic order will not be easy and the most divisive debates within are key organizational questions.” Marc Lynch, Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at The George Washington University also was cautious in his analysis, “It is far too soon to make judgments. It has seemed that the Arab authoritarian state has found its second wind. It's not obvious to me that the Arab publics will win this round in Syria, Yemen, or Bahrain.” Notably, the topic of the Arab Springs has begged the question of what the American response should be. On this point, Lynch commented, “The US will require a great deal of restraint while Arab states confront what it really means to be a messy democracy.” Shadi Hamid, the Research Director of the Brookings Doha Center took a more critical stance on U.S. Foreign Policy, “Let's be clear. The past five decades of U.S. foreign policy has proven a failure. The stability paradigm has failed and the U.S. has not been ahead of the curve.” Softening the critical blow that has surrounded the U.S. foreign policy debate for decades, he pointed out, “On the other side, the U.S. is still looked at for global moral authority. Arabs want to the U.S. to be better, they want the U.S. to succeed but hate it for failing.” Hamid concluded with a challenge to the U.S. administration, “With this in mind, will we rise to the occasion or continue to be behind the curve?” With many challenges ahead, U.S. public diplomacy will have much to consider in formulating new approaches to revolutionary states in the Arab World. *This article is based on panel dialogues that took place at the CSID Conference in Foggy Bottom, on April 15, 2011. Scholars, students, and employees of think tanks and non-government organizations joined at the George Washington University's Jack Morton Auditorium to answer questions such as “What are the impacts of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolution on the Arab World?” and “What lessons can we learn?” ** Danielle Feinstein is a Senior at the Elliot School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, DC. BM
