Many have laid blame on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) for failing to join the protesters in Tahrir Square following the eruption of the recent clashes with security forces. Worthy to mention, it was one of the most critical moments the MB has ever faced over the past two decades. The most popular movement in Egypt was trapped between two bitter options: whether to join Tahrir's saga to appease protesters, however with the possibility of confronting the military and security forces and postponing if not abandoning the parliamentary elections, or to defy the calls for joining the protests, however discredits its public image as an egalitarian rather than elitist movement. Clearly, the MB has chosen the latter to avoid the former. However, to grasp the MB's decision not to join Tahrir Square protests, we must put it in the larger context which can reveal the rationale behind taking such decision. Over the past few weeks, the relationship between the MB, as well as other Islamists, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has deteriorated due to the dispute over passing the “supra-constitutional principles” document, which puts the Egyptian military above politics. This means, if the MB did join the protests, the relationship with SCAF will become more tense and might lead to serious consequences the MB can not tolerate. In addition, joining Tahrir protests would stamp it by Islamic color which liberal and secular forces will employ against the MB as power display reflects its self-inflation as they typically did with the MB protest in November 18th. More importantly, the ambiguity and uncertainty of how Tahrir gory clashes have been erupted makes any decision by joining the protests precarious, at least according to the MB reading of the events. In such situation, it was tremendously problematic for MB to make any decision that might satisfy the protesters, however, damage the movement in the long term. Not surprisingly, the MB perceived Tahrir protests as an entrapment to implicate it in a confrontation with SCAF as its leaders have repeatedly claimed a conspiracy behind the curtain. As a shrewd and blatantly pragmatic movement, the MB made its decision according to benefits vs. losses calculations. If the MB would have chosen the option of sit-in, it would have satisfied the masses in Tahrir square and affirmed the popular character of the MB as an egalitarian rather than elitist movement. However, such decision would have entailed an unavoidable confrontation with police forces as a response to provocations whether from the angry protesters or as a response to the brutality of police forces. In other words, in either case the MB would find itself in a pickle. If they do not defend the protesters as they did in what is known as "Camel Battle" during the first round of the revolution last February, they will be accused of cowardice and abandonment, while if they do engage they will be accused of using violence and the MB's violent history during the 1940s will be invoked by its adversaries. Moreover, such decision by sit-in Tahrir would be suicidal for the MB not only will it lead to the most explicit confrontation with the Egyptian state since 1954, but will also mean losing all the significant gains the MB has achieved since the downfall of Mubarak. Most importantly, if the MB had joined the sit-in and clashed with security forces, this would have meant the disruption of the elections and giving the SCAF a pretext to suspend the whole process of handing over power to an elected civilian government. Something, if it would have happened will take the country into the path of Algerian scenario in the beginning of 1990s whereby elections were suspended and revolution was aborted. For the MB, electionsare fundamental not only because its chances to get the majority of parliament seats, but most importantly because it will be the only tool to de-legitimize SCAF's rule afterwards. As for the decision not to join Tahrir protests, the gains of the MB as perceived by its leadership are as the following: first, avoiding the inevitable confrontation with the police and the military junta. Second, not providing any excuse for postponing the elections. Third, not providing any pretext for the cancellation of the transfer of power to civilians. Fourth, preventing any increased division between the MB and the political elite. Fifth, avoiding further bloodshed, in light of the potential for a chaotic and uncontrolled situation. In light of such complicated calculations, the MB leadership decided not to join Tahrir protests as the best choice due to the logic of the lesser of two evils. According to them, the damageresulted from such decision can be compensated in the short term, however, the losses incurred by joining the sit-in could be catastrophic and could possibly bring the group back to its pre- 25 January position.However, the big lossof the MB will be if its candidates could not win the elections at the time the movement has already lostmuch of its credibility. And herelies the Brotherhood's quandary. In short, history will tell if the MB's decision not to join Tahrir square was the right one.
