Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's popularity has been rapidly declining due to a combination of economic and political factors, according to a recently leaked US diplomatic cable. "Shortages of basic foodstuffs, external political pressures and crackdowns on political adversaries," are the main reasons behind Mubarak's diminishing popularity, said the cable, published on Monday by online whistleblower WikiLeaks. "Mubarak's street credibility, like [that of late Egyptian president Anwar] Sadat, is very low," said the cable, dated September, 2007. The cable goes on to point out that Egypt's deteriorating domestic situation could "haunt Mubarak's successor." "This lack of faith by the people of Egypt in their political leaders could well come back to haunt Mubarak's successor, whomever he may be," the cable notes. "Will it make the transition more difficult? Yes. Will it matter in the end? Probably not, as long as the successor enjoys the support of the elite and the security apparatus, including the military." The document analyzes Egypt's political situation through the writings of several prominent commentators who draw comparisons between Egypt's relative domestic situations in 2007 and 1981--the latter being a time when the Sadat regime was facing a profound crisis of legitimacy. "Egypt faces uncertainty as it moves towards a post-Mubarak future. It has been almost exactly 26 years since Egypt last faced such a transition," the cable notes. "Although one could argue that some of the elements that led to the dramatic events of September and October 1981 are back in place--shortages of basic foodstuffs, external political pressures and crackdowns on political adversaries--tensions now are different, and not on the same scale." In September 1981, Sadat took several measures aimed at silencing growing internal opposition to his economic and foreign policies. For one, he ordered the arrest of at least 1500 of the most influential opposition figures from across the political spectrum. Sadat also withdrew his "recognition" of Coptic Pope Shenouda III and banished him to a desert monastery. However, the cable also predicted that, "While President Mubarak clearly faces significant challenges, and has reacted with at least some measure of Sadat's paranoia, we do not foresee September 2007 leading to another October 1981." The political crisis of September 1981 eventually led to the assassination of Sadat one month later, allegedly at the hands of Islamic militants. "Mubarak relishes his self-image as a benign, paternal leader, tough but fair," said the document. "Still, he has shown signs of moving toward Sadat's modus operandi in dealing with political opponents." In September 2005, Mubarak swept Egypt's first-ever multi-candidate presidential election, winning some 88 percent of total votes cast. His main rival, liberal opposition leader Ayman Nour, claimed the election had been marred by fraud. Many observers, however, believe Mubarak's victory was genuine since he had become a symbol of stability and development. Two years before the cable was written, the banned-but-tolerated Muslim Brotherhood opposition movement had managed to capture roughly 20 percent of the People's Assembly in 2005 parliamentary elections--a move that some experts believe prompted the regime to crack down on the group's leadership. "At the end of the day, and the end of their reigns, Sadat faced and Mubarak faces similar situations," the document reads. "Mubarak seems to have managed the dilemma better in at least one key area: he has systematically and 'legally' eliminated virtually all political opposition, leaving only the MB standing, having foresworn violence and politically emasculated." "Mubarak's internal security apparatus, an estimated 1.4 million strong, is at least twice the size it was under Sadat," the cable goes on. "Its ubiquitous presence and monopoly of the legitimate use of armed power makes any kind of violent change of leader unlikely."
