Between late July and early August of 1789, peasants in France initiated revolts that marked the end of feudalism. This involved a number of anti-aristocratic riots leading first to outbursts of violence in rural areas. The other outcome was the immediate renunciation of privilege among noble members of the National Assembly on August 4th of the same year. The revolts in the countryside were motivated by fear of famine and the increase in the number of brigands. But the panic was also aggrandized by rumors of a foreign invasion that would end the French Revolution. The peasant revolts, known as The Great Fear, were first and foremost the product of rumor. In the absence of mediums that would carry news from Paris to the outskirts of France, news traveled mainly through oral transmission. Rumor, moreover, played the significant role of instigating fear in the peasants. Vague news was transformed through transmission into tales of aristocratic plots to overthrow the National Assembly and reinforce the state of deprivation of the peasants. Whereas rumors in the French revolution spread as the outcome of necessity, the institutionalized use of rumor in the Arab uprisings marked the appearance of a potent alternative for encouraging revolt. Al-Jazeera's role in diagnostic framing in the Arab revolts has been the subject of discussion for a few years now. Such discussions still overlook, however, its use of rumor-like strategies for the purpose of reinforcing the zeal and fear of revolutionaries. For instance, throughout the consecutive ousting of dictators, appealing to anonymous eyewitnesses in news coverage suggested the absence of objectivity; nevertheless, the content of the news gripped the gullible populace. Such instances frequently referred to witnessing excessive acts of violence by the regime, thus bolstering the panicked state and motivating political action. Al-Jazeera's substitution of objective standards for predetermined ends, in addition to its treatment of news coverage merely as means for political goals, did not stop with the toppling of dictatorships. Dispensing rumors was afterwards geared towards forming new regimes ruled by allies. Nevertheless, the transition from the side of the opposition to the side of the rulers carried with it transformations in strategy. The approach became more complex after the collapse of the dictator, and was further convoluted by the appearance of new difficulties. This becomes clearest in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood's seizure of power was followed by a military overthrow of Qatari-backed president Mohammed Morsi. The strategy in Egypt underwent two consecutive changes. First, with the election of Morsi and the initiation of opposition protests against the Muslim Brotherhood's monopoly, Al-Jazeera's coverage sought to maintain the legitimacy of the president while turning a blind eye to the dissenters. The media blackout aimed at stifling the opposition through rendering its presence invisible. If Al-Jazeera had been vital for the mobilization of the public during the ousting of Mubarak, its support for the government this time will maintain the Muslim Brotherhood's control. A year later, however, former Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's assumption of power forced a second change. The emerging new regime in Egypt did not take heed of the consequences of its oppression, and thus inadvertently gave Al-Jazeera the opportunity to pursue its tactics. The sentencing of hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood members to death in addition to the rampant acts of violence against protestors and civilians allowed for reintroducing the revolutionary rhetoric. The goals were this time twofold. On the one hand, there was a necessity to maintain Morsi's status as a legitimate president. Under this perspective, the new regime was the product of a "coup" that established a "military state". It has also brought about a stagnant political life through the elimination of all opposition, while merely allowing minor groups to voice their dissent. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera reutilized its revolutionary discourse for the purpose of effecting change. This time, however, the Egyptian political scene was already in shambles, and the crowds did not need the broadcasting of rumors for their mobilization. A partially biased media outlet that merely highlighted the failures of the current regime was sufficient. As such, today's emphasis on the fuel crisis in Egypt contrasts with Al-Jazeera negligence of highlighting the economic problems appearing in Egypt following the election of Morsi. Several conclusions follow from this. The emergence of the active Islamist in the wake of the Arab uprisings required the development of a popular discourse that evoked the credulous nature of the masses. Under these conditions, naïve conceptions of legitimacy were formed, and the politics of victimization was epitomized. The success of Islamism in the aftermath of the revolts, however, remained trapped within a network of unripe political concepts. Here, Al-Jazeera's shift in strategy was insufficient to allow for the formation of a mature political consciousness. In this sense, popular Islamism became exceedingly dependent on the passive reception of overly simplistic news dictating a specific direction. The combination erupted in a readiness for conflict, but an underdeveloped political consciousness coupled with a powerful media institution tells only one part of the narrative of a troubled Egypt.
