It didn't take long, but according to the Korea Central News Agency, the North Koreans are underwhelmed by the Iran nuclear deal – and thus unlikely to follow suit. The North Korean announcement took pains to differentiate the Pyongyang regime's program from the Iranian one, and fell back on shopworn lines that nuclear weapons were necessary to counter the "hostile polices" of the United States. North Korea's leaders, not exactly known for fresh thinking, are likely to soldier on into a future that has little to offer their beleaguered people. Many critics of the Iranian nuclear agreement compare Iran's behavior to that of North Korea, and suggest that the deal will not hold because deals with North Korea never held. There are indeed some similarities. Iran has been challenged over the years to tell the truth about its nuclear program and, more fundamentally, to be clear about its goals and objectives. And Iran's behavior in the broader Middle East – particularly its support for terrorist groups in the region – seems to belie its claim to be seeking regional stability and economic development. While most countries in the world are disgusted with North Korea's behavior, Iran appears to consider the country a trading partner and a kindred spirit. In September 2005, North Korea agreed in a joint statement with its five partners in the so-called Six-Party Talks to support the goal of denuclearization, and specifically made a commitment to "abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards." In return, North Korea received affirmations from the United States and South Korea that no nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea, as well as assurances that there was no intent to attack North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons. Moreover, the North was informed that the United States and South Korea were willing to negotiate a permanent peace treaty, diplomatic recognition, financial help (including a South Korean government program in the field of energy), and an implicit acknowledgment of North Korea's right to developing a civilian nuclear program. Compared to the extraordinary detail of the Iran nuclear deal, the September 2005 joint statement was far less detailed. North Korea was not being asked to take specific actions in exchange for mere promises; nor would it receive everything that it asked for upfront, as many critics of the arrangement alleged. The agreement was to be a phased, "action for action" program; no party, including the North Koreans, would have fulfilled its obligations in the absence of corresponding actions by the other side. Many doubted that North Korea would keep its word on giving up its nuclear-weapons programs, and the North Koreans did not disappoint them. In the end, the regime in Pyongyang ultimately decided that it was not interested and walked away. And it has remained uninterested; its most significant diplomatic achievement since then was a visit by a former American basketball player, which displayed questionable judgment. Some argue that the recent agreement with Iran will go the same way, because it, too, is a triumph of hope and naiveté over realism and experience. But that claim says more about the critics of the Iran deal than it does about any objective comparison of the two countries. Iran is a country with a turbulent past, beset by ongoing political crisis, and lacking a broad consensus on the way forward at home and its regional and global role. To many, its behavior in the region suggests a continuing competition with the Sunni Arab world for the mantle of leadership, often defined by a misguided and hateful policy toward Israel. Internationally, "Death to America" (a phrase that sounds more artful in Persian) suggests a country that does not take itself seriously on the world stage. Yet the maturity of Iran's civilization suggests an enormous capacity to play a positive role in an increasingly complex world order. Unlike North Korea, it possesses a vibrant civil society, educated classes that are the envy of the region, an extensive diaspora, and one of the world's richest endowments of natural resources. The country's failure to realize its potential attests to the absence of a political consensus on modernization. But thoughtful Iranians (and there are many of them) understand that regional and global roles defined by hatred of Israel and antipathy for America are beneath the dignity of a 4,000-year-old state. For Iranians of all stations, the meaning of the nuclear deal is far more complex and profound than its text conveys. As we contemplate how the agreement will be received globally, in particular among competing politicians in the United States, or among restless and worried leaders in Israel and the Sunni Arab states, a key question will be whether Iranians understand that the agreement represents a defining moment in their long history. Iran's could be a civilization of the future, not of the past. The North Koreans never understood what they had in front of them. One hopes that the Iranians, with so much more at stake, will behave more wisely then the North Koreans have.
