In mid-July, the UK reviewer of terrorism laws, David Anderson, issued a report that received some media attention. The key finding that generated the chatter was that domestically there was a clear movement toward "less-organised plots" involving "lone actors" and/or "low tech" operations. Undoubtedly, fresh in his mind when he wrote these words were two notable attacks that occurred in consecutive months in first the United States and then in the United Kingdom. In April, it was the bombings near the finish line of the Boston Marathon that left three dead and hundreds injured. Then in May, there was the murder of a British soldier in Woolwich, a suburb of London. In making this observation, Anderson can hardly be given marks for originality as this is a trend that has been evident for a considerable period of time and that seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The trend is important to recognize but how to respond is equally crucial for the future. There are several reasons for this evolution of the terrorism threat to the West. Everything that occurs in relation to terrorism is measured in relation to the attacks of 11 September 2001. But by their very nature, these attacks were unique and unlikely to be repeated. The response 9-11 generated in terms of new laws, greater resources for domestic counter-terrorism, a more secure domestic environment through tightened border controls, and a more security consciousness public meant that it would be difficult for al-Qaeda to ever carry out anything on a similar scale. Indeed, to this day, al-Qaeda has found itself focusing on trying to survive the American onslaught unleashed after the attacks. Inevitably then there would be a movement toward smaller scale operations such as the London Underground attacks of 7 July 2005 that killed 52 people. Carried out by British citizens, 7-7 generated much greater awareness around the radicalization of domestic populations, including over issues such as foreign policy in the Middle East. It also led to an increased recognition by intelligence agencies about the potential of citizens to attack their own country through terrorism, albeit with the potential assistance of overseas training, particularly in Pakistan. The escalation of drone attacks against al-Qaeda in Pakistan has further fractured it as a coherent entity capable of carrying out a professional attack in the West on any major scale. In response, al-Qaeda through publications such as Inspire and other forums has encouraged small-scale attacks, often very amateurish in nature, of the type we are now seeing. Some may have a direct AQ or AQ affiliated link; others are merely inspired by AQ or by a general anger over American and/or UK foreign policy. It is "do it yourself," "low intensity" terrorism of a doable variety, assisted with readily available advice across the Internet. In an accurate but typically British understatement, Anderson describes the current terrorism situation as "more complicated." Although as Boston and Woolwich demonstrated, attacks can still be deadly, because of the absence of professionalism, scale, and, arguably, ambition and imagination, they lack the capacity to kill or cause destruction on anything approaching a 9-11 level. That's the positive aspect of the current trend if a reduced death toll can ever be described in encouraging terms. Conversely, the involvement of a small number of people, or even just one, without necessarily a connection to extremists, let alone prior involvement in terrorism, makes it much more difficult for security forces to discover, let alone penetrate, than a larger plot containing many actors. It is this difficulty in detecting and preventing in the environment that Anderson has identified which requires some new thinking on the part of politicians. The danger comes from an overreaction to both the threat and to actual attacks. After Boston, some U.S. politicians advocated increased surveillance of "Muslims," or for the removal of the legal protections provided to terrorism suspects. In the U.K., far-right elements have exploited the Woolwich attack to carry out prejudice driven protests against innocent communities and attacks on Mosques have been on the rise without these brutalities receiving the attention from senior politicians that they deserve. The psychological power of terrorism makes the nature of the response from the public and politicians all important. An overreaction can provide much greater impact to the original act of terrorism. A restrained response to the type of terrorism represented by Boston and Woolwich is crucial because no matter how much governments seek to reassure the public, the reality is that its scale and the nature of those involved makes it difficult to prevent. A better approach, although one that would require considerable political courage to enact, would be to prepare the public for the possibility, even the inevitability of such attacks occurring, in order to reduce fear, the danger of a backlash against innocents, and ultimately to diminish the impact of the original act of terrorism. To put it simply, politicians and others need to stop doing the work of terrorists for them.
