It's almost one year since the Hizbullah campaign officially started in Syria. It's a mixture of ideologically- and politically-driven battle that has seen the 33-year-old Islamist Lebanese group fighting their very first war on the attacking rather than the defensive. A costly war for Hizbollah, no doubt, with respect to the number of casualties, though a worrying war for Israel as it sees its arch enemy acquiring battlefield skills, getting more sophisticated weaponry, and gaining access to areas that can help them impose new equations in the region. An emphatic case in point was the March 18 border attack on Israeli troops that left 4 soldiers wounded, one seriously. Days before the attack a senior Israeli military officer said that Hizbollah's personnel in Syria were estimated at 4,000 to 5,000; he added, "this is a major burden for Hizbollah but also a major advantage, I have no doubt that Hizbollah gained much more self-confidence because of the Syrian experience." The Israeli military official was also quoted in the Israeli media as saying, "Hizbollah's invaluable combat experience in Syria certainly a matter that very much concerns us, coupled with its decision to move its arsenal into populated areas, often sandwiched between residential floors of buildings, means that the IDF will have to operate forcefully in Lebanese towns and cities in the next conflict. It's going to be ugly." Indeed Hezbollah's Syrian adventure has been a case of concern to many in the region, and mainly those studying the party's evolvement during the past years from a guerrilla group with few thousands, to an army of tens of thousands of well-trained soldiers. So what is being said in this regard? "It's too early to tell quite what Hizbollah will get out of the war in Syria," said Andrew Exum, a former US officer who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq and the man in charge of Lebanon at the Pentagon till 2013. Exum told me "the combat experience Hizbollah is gaining will be immense", but "some of the men Hizbollah has lost were experienced commanders who will not be easy to replace." According to the UK-based based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Hizbollah's casualties till March 12, 2014 stood at 332 (one -third of them were killed at the first large-scale operation to recapture the strategic town of Qusair). "In Qusair, I think Hizballah did what a lot of counterinsurgents are tempted to do, and which we Americans were certainly tempted to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is to fight the battle themselves," explained Exumو who wrote his doctoral dissertation on Hizbollah in the 1990s, he added, "Hizballah, in Qusair, fought in lieu of the Syrian Army rather than by, with and through the Syrians. They succeeded, but with heavy losses. Now I think Hizballah is trying to fight more indirectly: fighting by, with, and through the Syrians." A Source close to Hizbollah told me that today the movement fighting in Syria was not the one it used to be. "It's true that some good old guys were martyred in the battle, hence the resistance's new generation is getting much experienced, they are fighting fierce battles in different situations using different tactics," the source, who asked anonymity, said. "The fighters are getting used to different terrains, and beside experiencing some classical war expertise, Hizbollah's exceptional talents in guerilla war is also used in special operations, and this was clear in the last battle for Yabroud, several high ranking terrorists were killed in special operations." He continued: "Hezbollah today isn't the one in 2006, back then they were only thousands today it's a group of tens of thousands, not less than 40 thousand but probably more, most of them are in Lebanon, only few thousands went to Syria." Jean-Loup Semaan, a researcher in the Middle East department of the NATO Defense College, sees no substantial innovation in Hizbollah's way of fighting following its involvement in Syria. But he thinks that Hizbollah didn't lower down its assertiveness in South Lebanon. "The Israelis are less concerned by Hizbollah's manpower than by its arsenal of rockets and short-mid range missiles that are still deployed in the south. As long as this arsenal is there and as long as we don't have clear evidence that the Hizbollah fighters with the know-how to operate them left for Syria, I would say that the current deterrence balance between Hizbollah and IDF prevails." A study by Jeffrey White for the "Combating Terrorism Centre" back in January came to a conclusion that Hizbollah was gaining command and control experience at the operational and tactical levels and raising a new crop of fighters and leaders with combat experience. According to White the group "is hardening its personnel and units for the rigors of combat, likely increasing their cohesion and resilience. It is improving individual and small unit weapons and tactical skills. It is gaining experience in the collection and use of tactical and operational intelligence." Hizbollah in Syria and after Syria is another Hizbollah, a new blend that brings together the mentality of a guerrilla group along with capabilities of an army.
