Conflict has lately emerged in the Turkish political arena between Prime Minister RecepTayyipErdogan – who heads the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and represents "political Islam" in the country – and the Islamic preacher and intellectual FethullahGulen, who leads the Hizmet (Service) movement and represents a unique trend that may be labeled the Islamic social movement, or social Islam.The AKP-Hizmet dispute has stirred up questions as to its causes and repercussions, as well as its implications for the relations between the two movements, given that they both have clear Islamic orientations. It is safe to say that the conflict between Hizmet and AKP will go beyond Turkey's borders and extend to other countries in the region, giventhat Islamists in general are facing serious pressures and a credibility crisis among wide segments of the region's peoples, which could lead to the imminent rise of "social Islam". Soft Power The Islamic social movement, represented by Hizmet, constitutes a unique model among Islamist entities. Hizmet's founder FethullahGulen was largely influenced by the ideas of the Islamic scholar Said Nursi who attempted to promote a tolerant image of Islam, opposed all forms of violence, and focused on the importance of providing proper teachings to Muslim individuals in the religious and scientific fields – apart from politics. Nursi was keen on reaching out to all factions and opening up to different sides. He initiated a pioneering effort in the field of interfaith dialogue, which was clearly reflected in the 1998 meeting held in the Vatican between Gulen and Pope John Paul II. Hizmet established hundreds of schools inside and outside Turkey – in the Central Asian republics, Russia, the Balkans and Caucasus, a number of North African states, Kenya and Uganda. The movement also owns newspapers, magazines, TV channels, private enterprises, businesses and charity organizations. Hizmet's entities are distinct in that they provide services to all factions, with no discrimination based on religion, gender, color or race. They have no political goals or a political agenda. The Islamic social movement neither seeks to rise to power nor is it involved in politics, unlike Islamist groups, which provide services and social work to specific strata and expect the recipients of these services to support them, in return, so they rise to power, because reaching power is their ultimate goal. Sensitive Relationship The relationship between political Islam and social Islam is particularly delicate: At the ideological level, social Islam generally belongs to Sufism whereas political Islamis broadly based on Salafism. At the practical level, Islamists provide,especially in marginalized areas that are ignored by the state, as a key means to help them reach power. On the other hand, the scope of beneficiaries from services provided by the social Islamic movement is much wider, because social Islam focuses on extending services apart from political orientations, because proponents of political Islam believe that politics corrupts charity, missionary and social work. Thus, relations between the two Turkish camps have been marked by animosity and rivalry –except for certain periods that saw relative calm and coexistence between Hizmet and the AKP, whenErdogan and his party needed Hizmet's support in the beginning. But with time, each of the two sides returned back to normal. The recent dispute between Hizmet and AKP is a manifestation of differences that had been dormant for a while. Direct Repercussions Lately, Islamists in the region have been facing a crisis, which will play into the hands of the Islamic social movement one way or another, especially after the failure of Islamists' experience in governance, including in Egypt where the June 30 Revolution ousted the Muslim Brotherhood's rule. Additionally, violence attributed to Jihadi organizations – which are considered to be Islamists too – has escalated, further ruining the image of political Islam. Islamists' popularity has declined, and wide segments among the region's population are starting to question political Islam and raise concerns that Islamists were using charity and social work as a means to reach power. Ironically, while Islamists' interest in social work has declined because they have been preoccupied with reaching power, the Islamic social movement has not been affected by the changes that occurred in the country's political arena because those who adhere to social Islam do not take part in the political process or seek power; rather, they provide their services with no ceiling or agenda. This has increased the popularity of social Islam. The conflict between political Islam and social Islam is likely to continue to rise in the coming period because the current circumstances play into the hands of the Islamic social movement. The movement is starting to become more popular due to its ability to contribute to development and confront deteriorating economic, education and health conditions in several countries in the region. This article was originally published on February 12, 2014, by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS). It was translated into English by Islamist Gate. For the original, Arabic text: http://rcssmideast.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A9.html
