Eighteen months after the June 30th correction of the path of the Egyptian revolution and after the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood faction in Egypt, an important question must be pondered: "Did political Islam in Egypt merely receive a painful blow, or was what happened capable of removing it from the Arab and Muslim world for a long period of time, if not permanently, from the political scene in the 21st century? We need to ask ourselves about the essence of political Islam, the appearance, requirements and the underlying motives of Islamist movements. The late Dr. Jamal Hamdan, a great thinker, produced one of the best analyses. He considered that "Islamic extremist movements in general are a perilous pestilence that infects the Muslim world in periods of political vulnerability to an external enemy, a kind of natural cramping because of the inability of the body to resist. " Political Islam is a phenomenon that embodies a civilisational backwardness in face of a colonial danger. It is politically reactionary in addition to being ignorant in both the civil and religious spheres. Has the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi in Egypt proved that? Certainly these groups have shown an obvious fact about the stream of political Islam, which is to hide behind religious slogans while seeking to achieve two goals. The first of these is to serve Western agendas, particularly the American one. The second is to impose a dictatorship by building up a Supreme State. We can definitely state that the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt was a decisive defeat for political Islam and the slogan "Islam is the solution" is of no credibility anymore. Why was the rule of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood opposed? This was the question I asked of several Egyptians in Tahrir Square on the eve of the June 30th Revolution and the general consensus was: "Yes, we are Muslims, but administering a state based on religion could harm Islam." There are those who would ascribe the failure of political Islam in Egypt and Tunisia to the idea of the hostility of a ‘deep state' inherent in the regulatory structure of the state. But this can be refuted. The Brotherhood cannot evade the deadly mistakes it made in the transitional phase, particularly as it accepted the responsibility without preparing for it. In addition to excluded and isolated others and claimed its infallibility. That claim to absolute rightness became clear in the defective constitutional declaration of Mohamed Morsi, whereby he immunised his decisions, as though by the mediaeval divine right of kings. The real dilemma facing political Islam is that in claiming infallibility the Islamists refuse to open the door to diligence and reflection. They believe they are the only candle whereas they are part of the wind that extinguishes all candles. As for the political and economic ideologies of the Islamists, they have emerged as pro- the economic policies of Western capitalism. They serve large banks and financial institutions, which are dominated by the IMF and the International Bank. They reject any radical reforms to national economies; and promote the neoliberal privatisation policies, which had a catastrophic effect on the majority of Egyptian working people. It has, moreover, become obvious that today's Brotherhood resembles the former Ottoman Empire in its propagation of slogans ostensibly to defend Islam, but in reality with the aim of gaining power and wealth. Much can be said about Washington's manipulation of political Islam around the world since the end of World War II. The inevitable conclusion, however, is that the June 30th Revolution and its aftermath was a major defeat for Washington's strategy based on the exploitation of political Islam in order to spread anarchy from China via Russia to the energy-rich Middle East. Is there any sign of a crack in the skull of political Islam? In this context must come the shock waves hitting at Erdogan and his party, especially after the brutal suppression of protests in Turkey. Then, in Tunisia, demonstrators in the streets have placed the Egyptian experience before their eyes. To end with, the revolutions of the so-called Arab Spring, whether we agree with the title "Arab Spring" or not, provided a golden opportunity for the stream of political Islam to make good, but the managers of Islamist groups failed to get the best benefit from it. Instead they brought themselves to a historic impasse. For they had to prove to the majority of the people that power and authority were not their end goals, but that they sought, instead, the establishment of a political party and a healthy political life, in which respect for democratic pluralism, the rights of citizenship, respect for minorities and the dissemination of social justice were paramount. Absolutely to the contrary, however, "Brotherhood self" was manifested as an excessive worship of self and the Islamist community, which make popular ratification of a similar experience again in any other country almost an impossible project. The Brotherhood shares the failure of the Salafi expiatory Islam model, both basal and Jihadi and the future may hold. More surprises indicating dissolution rather than sustainable survival.
