One mustn't jump to conclusions, or hastily draw inferences about secretive jihadist organizations such as the Al Qaeda affiliated ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Sham) as more often than not, they might prove to be off the mark entirely. In studying and following such groups, any analyst worth his salt must painstakingly put together the larger picture from smaller pieces, subtler clues and almost imperceptible hints. As these groups, by their very nature, are ruled by paranoia and a strong mistrust of any and all outsiders, most of all prying journalists, whom they especially dislike and despise for framing them in an ugly light, or for being "spies of the infidel West" as they would often word the accusation themselves. The ISIS makeup and hierarchy in Syria is quite unique and interesting. An offshoot of Al Qaeda in Iraq, they cut their teeth fighting Americans after the 2003 Iraq invasion in guerrilla style warfare, honing many essential military skills which they later put to good use fighting the Syrian regime and dominating other mainstream and homegrown rebels. The leadership is almost entirely non-Syrian, with the head supreme commander being AbuBaker el Baghdadi, a nom de guerre indicative of his being a native of Baghdad in Iraq. Indeed many of the ISIS top brass and core fighters are non-Syrian, something which would prove to be an asset as well as a liability in their campaign for dominance over the regions of Syria outside the central government's control.
While outward appearances and initial assessments may point to a coherent, disciplined fighting force with a strict hierarchy, a solid structure and secure financial backing and recruitment networks across the globe, closer scrutiny reveals chinks in the armour. For one, the ISIS itself recently split from the Al Nusra Front, a blanket Al Qaeda organization fighting alongside other Syrian rebels. The split was over a power struggle at the top as well as tactics and demography, with Golani being the head of Al Nusra, largely drawn from local Syrian recruits, preferring to put war ahead of power consolidation or civil administration on the ground, while Baghdadi of the ISIS, mainly manned by non-Syrian fighters, preferred consolidating his power and enforcing his vision of a strict puritanical Islamic state in the areas he controlled, even if it meant cannibalizing territory from other rebel forces. Eventually these differences would come to a head, and the ISIS would be formed earlier this year, and would stand out for acts of extreme brutality and oppression, both against civilians as well as other rebel units as it undertook a rapid campaign to spread and consolidate its power over large areas of Northern Syria, especially the north eastern Al Raqqa province where it successfully drove out all the other competing rebel forces, as well as opposition civil activists. Its campaign against the Kurdish majority areas in Hasakeh; however, was wholly unsuccessful, as it met with fierce resistance from newly invigorated and consolidated Kurdish rebels and was driven out from key strategic towns and border crossings.
Significantly, Ayman Al Zawahri, the recognized leader of Al Qaeda recently issued a statement where he called on the ISIS in Syria to disband and to limit their activities to Iraq, decreeing that Golani's Al Nusra was the only sanctioned Al Qaeda affiliate he approved of to operate inside Syria. That this order was so blatantly rejected and ignored by the ISIS raises some very interesting questions about the true nature of this organization and speculation as to who might be behind it, with regional and international intelligence agencies being touted as the most likely by conspiracy theorists. Speculation aside, the ideological recruits of the ISIS may indeed have been shaken and disturbed by their leadership's offhanded dismissal of the spiritual figurehead of their organization, leading many to perhaps think twice about their allegiances. The fact that the powerful head of the ISIS in Aleppo province, Omar al Shishani (Omar the Chechnyan) and his closest associates wear their explosive vests 24 hours a day maybe testament to their increased nervousness and heightened sense of danger from within their own ranks. As while the core of his fighters is made up of his Chechen countrymen, a couple of hundred at the best estimate, the bulk of the two thousand strong force is drawn locally or from other nationalities, making them less trustworthy in his eyes. It is rumored that many other ISIS commanders, or emirs as they are known, are adopting much the same tactics and paranoid state of mind, especially in the North East of Syria where the majority of their ranks are local Syrian fighters who might not see eye to eye with their leadership, especially since many of them are actually tribes men who pledged allegiance (Bay'a) to the Emir for various reasons, doctrine and ideology not being at the top of those. It is very interesting to note, however, that throughout all this, the ISIS has never directly clashed with Al Nusra, as their differences are not ideological, but rather of a tactical and leadership nature. Where they diverge in method, they reunite in essence. But will this truce hold for very long, especially if their interests collide? That remains to be seen. It is entirely unclear if we are indeed witnessing the beginning of a rift in the ISIS ranks, as such a fate has befallen many of the other rebel factions in Syria. With such a secretive and illusive organization it is hard to tell, but if signs are to be taken at face value, such a possibility is quite likely and may lead to significant changes and power shifts on the ground in northern Syria.
