Rasha Saad tries to determine whether some Arab states have reached the point of post-sectarianism In "Post-sectarianism?" Hazem Saghieh wrote in the pan-Arab, London-based daily Al-Hayat that "post-modernist" intellectuals describe their movement as being modern, reconciles with the old and does not follow the purely temporal sense of "after". In this sense, Saghieh argues, there are some indications that many Arab states may have reached a stage of "post- sectarianism". Citing Lebanon as an example, Saghieh wrote that places like Kahhala, Rashaya and Batroun saw fights with fists, sticks and light arms. The feuding parties were, however, not from opposing sects; rather, they were either all Christians or all Druze. This, according to Saghieh, does not mean they have overcome sectarianism. "The Sunni- Shia standoff in the vicinity of the Arab University in Beirut is still fresh in our memories. But while emotions, statements, and home as well as street conversations in Lebanon abound with sectarianism, its practice is taking on a new aspect that transcends sects." In Palestine, Saghieh points out, the disputing Palestinians are all Muslim Sunnis, but are waging a sectarian war that combines territorial and politico-ideological divisions, with possible internal eruptions inside Fatah and Hamas or between the citizens of Gaza and the West Bank. In Iraq, Saghieh continues, while it may be true that the Shia-Sunni rift is the greatest problem in Iraqi politics today, it does not hide the increasing contradictions inside these camps. According to Saghieh, "the co-existence of all these types of conflicts is one of the main reasons why there is a perpetual question as to whether Iraq is living a civil war or not." But Arabs have not developed any theory on political legitimacy that can be used as reference in cases of conflict. "So the 'referee' in all struggles is violence alone. "We may be losing our ability to fight 'unified' sectarian wars, waiting, in the meantime, for the regional situation to decide to turn it into such a war by involving a major sect. Only then will foreign parties 'unify' us in the negative sense of the word," Saghieh concludes. In the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat Tareq Al-Homayed advises Hizbullah to fight sectarianism in Lebanon. Al-Homayed was commenting on news published this week that Hizbullah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah had moved out of his rented home to an undisclosed location in preparation for the rebuilding slated for the Dahiya neighbourhood destroyed by Israel's attacks on Lebanon during last summer's 36-day war. For Al-Homayed the story of the Dahiya quarter, or rather the "security compound", is much greater than that of a mere leased home "for it is a sealed security area limited to Hizbullah." In "If only Nasrallah would" Al-Homayed advises that before celebrating an extensive renovation project, Nasrallah should also restore the rest of Lebanon to its people. "What is meant here is that Lebanon, the nation, would serve the agenda of the Lebanese citizen and not that of Iran or Syria," he wrote. "Today, the number of migrating Lebanese citizens is increasing. This is not out of fear of the Israeli occupation but rather fleeing from the domestic absurdity which is tampering with the lives of the Lebanese people who are victims in this case." Al-Homayed wrote that only when Nasrallah is able to steer clear of subordination to any party will Lebanon become a healthy state that breathes correct democracy, not the democracy of exclusion and the disruption of constitutional institutions. "Restoring Lebanon to its people means reopening the doors of parliament, trying those accused of murder, respecting Lebanon's constitution and keeping Beirut free of foreign greed," Al-Homayed wrote. In Al-Hayat, Ghassan Charbel wrote on what he described as the "neo-chemists" in Iraq. Commenting on the trial of Ali Hassan Al-Majid, dubbed "Chemical Ali" for his role in gas attacks on Kurds in 1987, Charbel wondered why Al-Majid's trial "failed to arouse the interest that it deserved, being a merciless killing machine and a senior gladiator in the republic of terror." While Charbel suggests the disinterest may have been caused by the feeling that Chemical Ali deserves capital punishment and that everyone sees it coming, he believes that some of the indifference has more to do with the realities of the post-Saddam era. Charbel argues that many so-called chemists have been revealed even if they have not used chemical weapons. He writes that anyone following Iraq's daily affairs can create a list of "chemical" practices: suicide bombings targeting weddings and funerals, the targeting of religious sites and shrines to instigate civil war; sectarian murders; changing Baghdad's demography and confessional cleansing; dressing up as police officers to hunt passersby, then scattering unidentified bodies all over the streets of Baghdad; the penetration of state security agencies by insurgents; widely practising torture to extract confessions and manipulate facts to justify murders; and raising the banner of national unity to cover up racial and sectarian policies that aim at dividing Iraq and turning it into a battlefield for regional and international conflicts. In the daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Abdul-Bari Atwan calls on Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki to resign and call for elections. "The isolation of Al-Maliki's government and its many failures reflect the tragedy of this country and its vague future." Radwan explains that Iraqis with their various sects and political currents, are unified in their demand that Al-Maliki should resign. The only exception to this unified stance, Atwan argues, is US President George Bush, "not because he trusts Al-Maliki's efficiency but because he fears a political void and a constitutional crisis."
