Under domestic pressure, the Israeli government may sabotage the upcoming Washington meeting by authorising a show of force over Gaza, writes Samir Ghattas* Gaza has never been a friend of Israel. For four decades it was an occupied territory, a base of national resistance and a strategic burden, until Israel turned it into a huge Guantanamo camp. Behind its barred gateways are detained more than 1.25 million Palestinians. After 38 years of occupying Gaza directly, Israel decided for various reasons to unilaterally "disengage". In September 2005, it dismantled its settlements, which had occupied about a third of Gaza's 380 square kilometres, and withdrew its forces. But it still retained the keys to all ports of entry as well as the privilege of mounting military forays deep into Gazan territory. Such operations have claimed 251 Palestinian lives since the beginning of this year alone. The disengagement two years ago triggered widespread debate inside Israel over the legal status of Gaza. It led to no decisions at the time, but the subject has surfaced again as a priority concern on the Israeli government's agenda as a result of continued missile fire from Gaza into southern Israeli towns, notably Siderot, in which live several officials, including former Israeli minister of defence Amir Peretz and his family. According to Israeli sources, some 150 of these homemade missiles have been fired into Israel over the past two years. Although they have not wrought major human or material damage, they form a constant irritant to the nervous Israeli system and substantial fuel for tension between the Israeli government and opposition. Debate over the legal status of Gaza intensified further following the Hamas takeover of Gaza 14 June 2007. Hamas, for its part, put new rules into effect. On the one hand, it claims that it is still abiding by the truce with Israel and that its militias are not taking part in acts of direct resistance. On the other, it has not moved to prevent other resistance groups, such as the Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs and the Salaheddin Brigade, from shooting Qassam missiles into Israel from northern Gaza. Even so, it has begun to transmit a message to Israel via three channels: Qatar, businessmen from Gaza, and the American Jewish lobby. According to Ahmed Youssef, Ismail Haniyeh's political adviser, Hamas is prepared to restrain militant operations and restore complete calm in Gaza in exchange for an Israeli commitment to reopen Gaza's gateways and to lift the economic blockade. If the Israeli strategy since the Hamas takeover has essentially been to put the squeeze on Gaza, it has become apparent that it is not achieving the desired effect of toppling Hamas. But perhaps this is exactly what Israel wants; to solidify the wedge between the West Bank and Gaza and to keep Hamas isolated within its Gaza confines. Yet with the commencement of the school year and the resurgence of fears that a missile from Gaza might target an Israeli school, the Israeli public has begun to clamour for a solution to the situation. Suddenly, however, attention veered northwards towards Syria, which announced that Israeli aircraft had invaded its airspace overnight on 6 September. Although there has been no official Israeli response to this claim, political commentators and analysts expect Syria to retaliate. They predict, however, that Damascus will not do this directly, but rather spur Palestinian factions in Syria to mount attacks across the border. It is difficult to determine whether a subsequent event several days later was related. On the evening of 11 September, Islamic Jihad unleashed a barrage of Quds-2 missiles, three of which fell on the Zakim military training camp located approximately 10 kilometres northeast of Gaza. Some 69 recruits were wounded in the attack, some of who were reported to be in critical condition. In the ensuing outcry in Israel, right-wing parties called for the immediate reoccupation of Gaza. The ruling coalition is undoubtedly considering this option, among others. One can envision any number of scenarios. One appears to be unfolding at this moment in the form of an Israeli decision to declare Gaza a "hostile entity". Olmert had paved the way for such a move by lodging a complaint with the UN against what he described as continual missile bombardment from Gaza jeopardising the lives of civilians in Israeli towns. "The international community will understand the Israeli response," he said. Simultaneously, Minister of Defence Ehud Barak instructed Colonel Manina Sharbit of the military prosecutor's office to study the legalities of a decision to declare Gaza a hostile entity. Israeli officials rest their justification for such a decision on the argument that since Israel disengaged from Gaza two years ago it could no longer be considered an occupying power, responsible under international law for the welfare of the people under occupation. Gaza could be considered "hostile" on the grounds of continued missile bombardment since that time. Although Israel does not yet appear to have taken a firm fully-fledged decision in this regard, if it does it will probably: cut off electricity to Gaza, with the exception of enough wattage to supply hospitals; sharply reduce fuel supplies, again to a level sufficient only to power vital services; block the flow of monetary payments to unspecified recipients; keep entrances into Gaza shut apart from allowing in food supplies twice a week; and restrict visits to Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons. It probably will not cut off or even reduce water supplies in view of the violent reactions such a measure would spark. Hamas's first response to this possible set of eventualities was to urge resistance factions not to bombard crossing points so as not to give Israel an excuse to close them entirely. Indeed, there appears to have been a marked decline in missile fire from Gaza, even though the decision has yet to take full effect. News sources in Gaza have made mention of a Hamas offer to Israel to ensure a complete halt to missile attacks by resistance factions if Israel refrains from closing crossing points and implementing other draconian measures likely under consideration. Israeli sources, by contrast, leaked a proposal to the Israeli government by Israeli Assistant Military Chief-of-Staff Moshe Kablinsky calling for a total Israeli disengagement from Gaza. By this he meant that Israel should cease operating according to the procedures of the Customs Federation, close all crossing points between Israel and Gaza completely, and hand its responsibilities with regard to UNRWA, the World Bank and the Red Cross over to Egyptian authorities. Undoubtedly, the leak explains Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit's statement of 27 September declaring that Egypt would not assume responsibility for the management of Gaza or any other responsibilities deriving from Israeli decisions. Some Israeli commentators questioned the value of a decision of the nature suggested by Kablinsky. Tightening the blockade of Gaza will only cause needless suffering without affecting Hamas, they argue. Indeed, it may work to strengthen Hamas's position. A second possible scenario would be for Israel to resume its assassination drive targeting top level Hamas and Jihad officials, a policy that in the past claimed the lives of such prominent Hamas leaders as Sheikh Yassin, Salah Shahata, Ismail Abu Shanab and Ibrahim Al-Muqadma. It is noteworthy that, for the past two years, Israel has refrained from interfering with Hamas officials and turned a blind eye to their repeated comings and goings from Gaza and, specifically, their visits to Iran and Syria from which they would return with suitcases stuffed with millions of dollars. The Israeli public could not help but pick up on the discrepancy between their government's treatment of Yasser Arafat during the two and a half year siege on the late Palestinian president's compound in Ramallah and the relative freedom it has accorded to Hamas leaders Haniyeh, Mahmoud Al-Zahar and Said Siam. Under pressure from the Israeli public and for other reasons, the Israeli government may again resort to murderous force, especially if economic sanctions continue failing to halt missile fire from Gaza. For the same reasons, Israel may pursue a third option, which is to expand the scope of its limited land offences into Gaza. Such operations entail thrusts deep into Gaza to accomplish specific tactical missions and then to withdraw. On the other hand, it could also resort to a massive incursion into Gaza to a depth of five to eight kilometres. Under this scenario, it would also declare the areas of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahya "no man's land" and erect barriers and fortifications to keep missile launchers out of range of Israeli towns on the other side of the Gazan border. Scenario five -- "resurrection day" -- is the most extreme. It would entail a full-scale invasion of Gaza, from Rafah in the south to Beit Lahya in the north, with the purpose of sweeping the area clear of resistance factions and destroying their infrastructure. In spite of the fact that Israeli officials have received powerful cautions against resorting to such a course in view of the high civilian toll it would exact, it cannot be discarded as a possibility, especially if a missile hits a public school, or other such civil structures in Siderot and other towns, and claims numerous civilian casualties. Indeed, Barak refused to rule out the option and former minister of defence General Mofaz went on the record as saying that recourse to a full-scale invasion was only a matter of time. These opinions reflect the general view of the Israeli security establishment, which is fully in favour of a military offensive in order to forestall the prospect of Hamas developing sufficient military power to withstand an Israeli offensive, causing a military and political debacle as embarrassing as that which Israeli forces met in their confrontation against Hizbullah in Lebanon. Probably with the Lebanese debacle in mind, Chief of Staff General Ashkenazy said recently that Israel had to regain its deterrent power and to demonstrate this power on the Gaza front. Obviously, recourse to any of the foregoing options involves more than merely military/logistic calculations. Undoubtedly, Israeli decision- makers are currently computing the current political situation and the likely political fallout from the various scenarios. Much, too, will depend on how Hamas comports itself between now and the forthcoming summit meeting in Washington this autumn. For example, will it or the other resistance factions risk sabotaging that meeting in advance by triggering a confrontation in Gaza, or will they back down in the face of Israel's tightening stranglehold on the Strip? Not that we should rule out the possibility of Israel, itself, making the first move to forestall the autumn meeting by pushing the situation in Gaza to its breaking point. Barak's recent objections to reaching an agreement with Mahmoud Abbas on a joint declaration of principles hinted at such a prospect. Over coming weeks we must keep one eye on Gaza and the other on Washington in order to predict what will unfold. What is certain is that the political horizon appears very bleak. * The writer is director of the Maqdis Centre for Political Studies.
