In focus: The uncertainty principle Iran may be a paradox, but it is one that has displayed a very particular consistency, writes Galal Nassar I am no supporter of the Western campaign against Iran, a campaign that can only result in bloodshed and suffering, and what I am about to say must be taken as an attempt to examine both its motives and consequences rather than as an apology. Let me start with the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in 1979. The Iranian revolution was initially met with optimism in the Middle East. It had succeeded in removing a heavy-handed regime from power and promised a fresh start. Some even found it exhilarating when, in a total departure from international norms, the revolutionaries took over the US Embassy in Tehran, initiating a long-running ordeal for the hostages. Humiliating a superpower can't be that bad, they argued. The common view was that the Islamic Republic was embarked on a new era and would soon emerge as a normal member of the Gulf regional system. Such hopes were exaggerated. The mullahs turned out to be at least as heavy-handed as the shah and their revolution was a revolution only in name. They remained faithful to the strident nationalism that had long characterised Iran's relations with its neighbours. As religious edicts supplanted public debate, Iran threw itself with enthusiasm into the inferno of the Iraq-Iran war, sacrificing the lives of young Iranians and agreeing to peace only after it became obvious that victory was unobtainable. Iran had no qualms about occupying Abu Moussa island, wresting it from the United Arab Emirates by force, and continued to hold onto two other islands, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb. Until now it remains determined to impose a new status quo on the region, paying as little regard to the obligations of neighbourliness as it does to the UN charter. The mullahs devised a unique constitution which, in calling for the export of the revolution, attempted to justify interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Predictably enough, the mullahs are incensed by any attempts to interfere in what they consider their own internal affairs, yet Iran has actively interfered in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Bahrain, Sudan and Afghanistan. Tehran aspires to be recognised as a regional superpower. Its mullahs want everyone to recognise Iran's vital interests in the Middle East and allow it to expand -- militarily, strategically and doctrinally -- without restraint. Iran wants countries in the region to obey its dictates and stay on its good side and for the major powers to acknowledge it as a regional heavy- weight. Security is so central to the Iranian regime that it is possible to argue that all policy -- domestic as well as foreign -- is security-driven. For the moment Iran faces no direct threats to its national security: the Taliban and Saddam are gone, domestic insurgents have been weakened and Mujahideen-e Khalq is out of business, yet Iran's religious-political leadership continues to regard security as its raison d'être. Iran's rulers feel that the goals of their revolution are still under attack, and that the international community is singling out its nuclear programme unfairly. Believing that the US wants to restructure the "greater" Middle East so as to control oil resources and ensure Israel's enduring superiority Tehran has responded by seeking to control the region itself, attempting to bring Shias elsewhere under its wing, and generally throwing its weight about. Iran's revolutionary spirit propels it in a number of directions. It wants to create a pro-Iranian government in Iraq, and is helping the Shias amass as much political power as they can to that end. It aspires to have a major say in the distribution of Iraqi oil, and wants to see Iranian troops fill the vacuum once the US pulls out of Iraq. Tehran also wants to be part of any regional security arrangements while simultaneously seeking to exclude non-Gulf countries, both Arab and non-Arab, from those arrangements. Iran wants members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to abrogate security agreements with any country from outside the region, and is seeking to project an image of invincibility -- one that is presumably underwritten by the perceived infallibility of its mullahs. It wants to break Washington's blockade, revive its economy, increase trade with the Gulf states and be recognised as a nuclear power. And it wants all of these things now. In order to promote its interests Tehran is engaging in a variety of discourses simultaneously. When it talks to Gulf countries it uses a mixture of military, economic and doctrinal arguments. When it talks to countries around the Caspian Sea, it foregrounds foreign policy and security considerations. In domestic matters Tehran relies on the media, its intelligence services and the Revolutionary Guards. Similarly, in addressing the wider international community, it sends mixed signals. During the crisis surrounding its nuclear programme Tehran was pragmatic, having calculated that pragmatism would allow it to buy time. The crisis has never been about Tehran's need for peaceful nuclear energy but about its desire to acquire a nuclear deterrent that would dissuade major powers from attempting to force regime change. It is a lesson Iran learned from watching Iraq. Had Saddam, like North Korea, really possessed nuclear weapons the Americans would not have dared invade to overthrow his regime. Everyone knows that. Tehran also wants parity with other countries in its vicinity. When Israel, Pakistan and India all have nuclear weapons it is understandable that Tehran should want them too. With a nuclear arsenal at its disposal, Iran would be better placed to manipulate regional security arrangements. Nuclear warheads will not only satisfy Iran's strident nationalism, they would make it hard for the world to ignore its regional status. They would also serve as a counter to the mass stockpiling of conventional weapons by Iran's Gulf neighbours, something that has worried Tehran for a while. When it comes to nuclear weapons, though, Iran's theologians find themselves in a tricky position. Nuclear weapons, some of its mullahs have said on more than one occasion, contradict the tenets of Islam. Others, though, argue the acquisition of nuclear weapons will consolidate the regime and help in the task of exporting the revolution. Iran is a paradox, at home as much as abroad. As a member of the international community it deserves all the courtesy demanded under international law. Yet as long as it keeps pushing the envelope, the more uncertain the future becomes.
