Below are extracts of published memoirs of eight Egyptian and Israeli politicians who were deeply involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and negotiations. Al-Ahram Weekly translated these extracts to reflect on the unfortunate turn of events that rendered a just, comprehensive and durable Middle East peace evasive as ever Ismail Fahmi, Egyptian foreign minister from 1973 to 1977 "[Israeli Prime Minister Menachem] Begin sent signals suggesting his willingness to sign peace treaties with the Arab countries on the basis of [an Arab] acknowledgment of recognised and safe borders [of Israel]... Israel was proposing [the establishment of] a small Palestinian entity in return for the permanent annexation of Gaza and the West Bank to Israel. The proposed Palestinian entity was supposed to be the size of Gaza, located at the Lebanese border running to the south parallel to the Mediterranean... President Anwar El-Sadat realised that Begin had either gone mad or that he was [simply] not serious... I told the president that we do not need to discuss the offer of Begin with the Palestinians since we knew that they would certainly turn it down... It was clear that Begin was not sincere and that what he really meant was [to convey] his disapproval of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state under any condition... President Sadat agreed with my assessment of Begin's true intentions, especially that the offer made by Begin was poor and un-composed. However, at the same time Sadat unexpectedly announced to me his new idea about going to Jerusalem. We were there at a guest-house in Sinai not flying over Turkey on the way to Iran as he indicated later more than once... It was there that Sadat told me: I would like to know your opinion regarding [the idea of] a special trip to Jerusalem and a speech before the Knesset... I must admit that I was taken aback. I asked Sadat: What is the purpose of such a trip?... He answered: Nothing beyond a trip to Jerusalem, a speech [before the Knesset] and then come back... Despite my inquisitiveness, he failed to provide any specific information of any credible Israeli offer that would justify such an initiative... I told President Sadat that I am not opposed to peace but the question was what kind of peace and how and when we could reach it... I reminded Sadat that we have only two [bargaining] cards, one of them was to recognise Israel and the second was to end the state of war. If we boarded a plane to Jerusalem we would be effectively recognising Israel and ending the state of war. We would be giving up our two main political cards without getting anything in return and as such Israel would be the sole winner. I told the president: Please believe me Mr President. I am not opposed to a meeting between you and Begin. I am most willing to arrange this meeting in Washington, Geneva or even to invite him to Cairo. Going to Jerusalem is a different matter... I told Sadat: Mr President you should not take a single unilateral step that will ultimately be in Israel's favour. Don't give [the Israelis] a chance to isolate Egypt [from the rest of] the Arab world. If this happens Israel would be in a position to dictate its conditions on you..." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Egyptian foreign minister from 1977 to 1978 "Sadat was trying everything to ensure that the American role in the [Egyptian-Israeli] negotiations is active and productive -- not just a role of an indifferent mediator... He wanted the US to be a full partner in all the talks. He thought that once the true Israeli intentions are revealed, through Israel's insistence to maintain the settlements in Sinai and the Israeli demand of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, it would be then the responsibility of the US to pressure Israel to change its attitude... I appreciated the importance of the American role and participation in the negotiations. However, I felt that Sadat was really exaggerating what the US would do. I was concerned that putting such a [firm] accent on the US would [immediately] de-energise the international momentum to pressure Israel, especially since we have worked hard for years to secure such a momentum and that it was clear to us that the US was trying to monopolise the situation in order to produce an American settlement for the struggle... I thought that there was a serious danger in somehow dragging the Middle East cause from the circle of international attention and participation to be narrowly handled by the US that would be the sole arbitrator between the Arabs and Israel... [With the passing of time] I started to get impatient with the attitude of Sadat. He would confront me with [final decisions] that he had not consulted or even informed me about. Sadat had made repeated statements to the effect that he would suspend negotiations with Israel until it had [softened its intransigence]. He agreed with Saudi Arabia that he would keep the negotiations suspended [until Israel responds positively]... It was on such a basis that the Saudis were, meanwhile, making contacts with the Arab countries to [pave the way towards] an Arab reconciliation and an Arab summit in time... At the same time, Israel had [stalled] for two weeks on the question presented by the US administration regarding the future of the West Bank and Gaza... [Against such a backdrop] Sadat said that [US President Jimmy] Carter had called him to ask for a three-way meeting to bring together the foreign ministers of Egypt, Israel and the US and that he had agreed in principle to grant [Carter] his request on the condition that the meeting should convene in Egypt... Sadat told me: Carter pressed upon me to accept and you know my keenness on the American intervention between us and the Israelis and to have the US play the role of the full partner in the negotiations. I do not want to upset Carter... The US submission to the Israeli demand of an implementation of the commitment it received in 1975 from [US Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger that mandated [Washington's] consultations [with Israel] prior to any proposals that the US might make for the settlement of the Arab- Israeli struggle dealt a serious blow to the Egyptian negotiating stance in Camp David and served directly Israel's interests... Indeed, when we received the proposed US "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" it was very remote from our [positions and expectations]. It did not include or reflect the stable and declared US positions on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli struggle. The fingerprints of the "prior consultations" with Israel were unmistakable on the entire draft, its underlining concept, text, language and terms of reference... The reference to the Palestinians' right to self- determination was surrounded with much ambiguity; it did not stipulate the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, the West Bank, and [East] Jerusalem; and it did not include any reference to the fate of the settlements in Sinai, the West Bank or Gaza..." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Minister of state for foreign affairs from 1977 to 1991 -- acting foreign minister in 1977 and from 1978 to 1979 "[As preparations were underway for the Camp David negotiations] it seemed that a unilateral deal with Israel for Sinai was not in the works. Egypt is the leader of the Arab world. We could not have forgone Arab unity just to retain our territories when other Arab territories would still be under the Israeli occupation... Sadat had firmly re-stated this position. However, I was not sure that he [firmly] held this opinion. For him Egypt came first. And as he was condemned in the Arab world for his initiative he was in the habit of ridiculing the entire Arab world for being a mere swamp next to the river... The [staff] of the Foreign Ministry was not confident [of the chances of success] of Sadat's strategy to regain Sinai first in order to gain the necessary strength to later regain all the [occupied] Arab territories... The [staff] firmly supported the Arab cause but it had no mandate to consult with the rest of the Arabs... [Meanwhile] the US draft proposal [Framework for Peace in the Middle East] was presented in two sections -- one dedicated to Egyptian-Israeli peace and the second to the Palestinian cause and a comprehensive peace. The first part offered a basis for a peace agreement. The second was clearly lacking on details in a way that would make it easy for Israel to evade an agreement on the Palestinian cause... Sadat criticised this proposal, not for its lack of clarity on the [rights] of the Palestinians but because it stipulated that Sinai will be regained by Egypt through several phases... We were pleased to see Sadat upset [with this proposal] irrespective of his reasons. Sadat called Begin intransigent and impossible to work with... Sadat was really shocked with the American proposal... [In a meeting later in the evening with foreign minister] Mohamed [Ibrahim] Kamel spoke extensively about Sadat, the negotiations and the future of Egypt. He was clearly very pessimistic I explained to him that our role is marginal and that the political decision will be taken [by Sadat] whether we like it or not... Kamel argued: But the president is too eager..." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Kamal Hassan Ali, Foreign minister of Egypt from 1980 to 1984 "[As we were negotiating the peace agreement with Israel] our main problems were focussed on some crucial matters related to the priority of [mutual] commitments, the link between the peace agreement and a comprehensive settlement, the [military] assessment for the proposed safe lines, the issue of the Sinai settlements and the oil of Sinai... Throughout the negotiations, Israel was being very evasive and always bargaining in different ways [to the extent that] at times [US president Jimmy] Carter was infuriated [with the Israeli delegation]... And as negotiations were underway [Israeli foreign minister Moshe] Dayan came to a meeting with a very strange statement [at the time]. He reminded us that the Israeli commitment to put settlement activities on a freeze [for the duration of a few months that should be used for the negotiations] was nearing its expiry. [Dayan] said that he was just reminding us so that we would not be surprised [when Israel] resumes the construction of new settlements [in the occupied territories while negotiations were still underway]... That seemed to be such a paradox!! As we were talking [with Israel] about ending the military rule in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel was [at the same breath] talking and [making public statements] about the construction of new settlements... In 1979, [Egypt's] Foreign Ministry established a new department under the name of 'the normalisation of relations'. Ambassador Taha Al-Magdoub headed this department... On 18 February 1980, a presidential decree was issued to annul the boycott of Israel [after] Egypt had already nominated Saad Mortada in January 1980 as its first ambassador to Israel... On 26 February 1980, Egypt's [first] ambassador to Israel Saad Mortada and Israeli [first] ambassador to Egypt Eliahu Ben Elissar presented their respective accreditations..." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Golda Meir, Israeli foreign minister from 1956 to 1966 -- prime minister from 1969 to 1974 "[We believed that] by inflicting an almost complete defeat on the Arab armies that were rallying against us [ in the Six Day War] then our neighbours might forgo their holy war against us and they might realise that peace was as necessary for them as it was for us. This was the wrong assumption on our side... [From that day on, however,] the price of our withdrawal [from territories captured during the war] had to be dear to the Arabs. It had to be a permanent peace on the basis of agreements that acknowledge safe and recognised borders [for Israel]... I have to mention the day when the barbed wires separating the two parts of Jerusalem since 1948 fell [after the June 1967 War]. That was a sign of the beginning of a new era... [At the time] I told my grandchildren that very soon the soldiers would be able to go back to their homes, there would be peace and that we would be able to travel to any Arab country..." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Moshe Dayan, Israeli minister of defence from 1967 to 1974 -- foreign minister from 1977 to 1979 "[After Sadat had publicly announced his willingness to come to Jerusalem, Prime Minister Menachem] Begin was informed [of this wish through a visiting American delegation]. Israel did not haste to offer an official reaction. It was not clear for the government whether Sadat's declaration was just an expression of a practical intention that entails his acceptance of the Israeli principle of direct negotiations or it was just an exercise of public relations... Begin's [initial] reaction was to call upon the Egyptian people to initiate a peace process. He said that Sadat could go to [an already scheduled] Geneva [peace] conference to present his views there as we were about to do in no more than four days. [A few days later] the invitation was formally forwarded through diplomatic channels... It was after a few days of carefully examining Sadat's offer that Begin expressed a clear interest in having the visit as he realised the importance of such a first step towards the peace process and its value as a historic event... There were, however, no [special] preparations for the visit since Begin was firmly holding to his unequivocal and very specific positions on all issues between us and the Arabs... I was [even] more reserved. Like Begin, I thought that we needed to carefully dissect and examine the objectives of Sadat's visit... For us [then] the question remained: what did Sadat want in return [for peace]?... I was not at all at ease with the signals coming from Cairo suggesting that the Egyptians are expected extended generosity on our part: the return to the pre-5 June 1967 lines... [During my drive with Boutros Boutros-Ghali on the way from the Ben Gurion Airport after the reception of Sadat] I told him... that Egypt had to be ready to sign an agreement with us even if the other [concerned Arab states] did not take part in the negotiations... Boutros-Ghali was clearly very upset. He [must have] thought that this visit would breach or even break down the psychological barrier and that Israel [as a result] would be very nice to the extent that it would withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines... It was very clear [from the beginning] that [there was] a gap in relation to what would constitute the price that Israel would pay for peace. [The Egyptians thought] it was going to be the full withdrawal [from the territories seized in 1967] and the establishment of a Palestinian state... Sadat's speech, just like his visit, would not be easily forgotten but when history is written and when [one day] the text of this speech would be [dug] from the archives to compare it to what really happened on the ground, it would be clear that some parts of this speech remained mere ink on paper and that it [would be soon] forgotten..." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli prime minister from 1974 to 1977 and from 1992 to 1995 "The 1967 War ended and the problems started... The first problem is that we were suddenly in possession of wide territories that are almost triple the territories of Israel before the war... The second problem is that it was not enough to achieve victory. There has to be readiness for the next war... The third problem is that [Arabs] were not going to let Israel keep its gains. The political struggle had already started before the canons of war were actually silenced. This struggle was going to continue every day and every hour. The US indeed [made sure that UN Security Council Resolution 242] skipped the language of "withdrawal from the territories"... According to the Arab/Soviet interpretation [of the text of 242] there was no need for negotiations among the parties. They thought that the resolution simply applied in and by itself... However, with the support of the Americans we claimed that the interpretation of the resolution language on the [need] to "promote agreement" necessitated the conduct of negotiations among the parties to reach an agreement... [When I was later asked by the US about Israel's vision for peace] I said, with an unmistakable firmness, that we want peace based on reciprocal agreements with each Arab state. I also said that we would need to know what kind of peace the Arabs have in mind... In 1977 [Jimmy] Carter entered the White House and decided to give momentum to the Middle East political [process]... In a meeting with Carter I agreed on the need to undertake an effort for a comprehensive peace in 1977. However, I said that we should try to realise the full meaning of the word peace, which is one of the most ambiguous words in the English dictionary... For us peace meant two things: an end to the state of war and the creation of a new peaceful reality that could [have a practical side]. President [Carter] said that the only objective of US policy [on] the Middle East is to achieve a comprehensive peace... He said that a comprehensive peace requires negotiations to settle three main problems: the core of peace, the borders of peace and a settlement to the Palestinian cause. President [Carter] made it clear that when he talks about the core of peace he is thinking of full peace including the normalisation of relations between Israel and its neighbours to allow, among other things, for open borders and economic, cultural and tourism relations among the countries and the peoples... That was the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle that an American president adopted precisely the Israeli concept of peace and its core. I was whole-heartedly pleased to hear him say that... [In November 1977] I had no doubt in mind that [with this visit] Sadat has turned a new page in the relations between Arab states, especially Egypt, and Israel. Sadat's move, in my view, was both daring and desperate at the same time... It was daring because nobody would have thought that Sadat would take such a move. And it was desperate because it indicated Sadat's realisation that if the US policy [on the Middle East] was to pursue the line that Carter proposed [then Egypt's interests for a political solution could be challenged]... I must admit that when I was standing in line [at the airport to receive] Sadat I had a very strange feeling. I grew up to believe that Egypt was the enemy. I never thought that we [will roll out the red carpet] for an Egyptian president..." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli foreign minister from 1980 to 1983 -- prime minister from 1983 to 1984 and from 1986 to 1992 "I entered the Foreign Ministry after the signing of the peace agreement with Egypt. The other fronts were still closed to us. Across the Arab world there were no signs of any progress towards peace or even the recognition of Israel... Israel's popularity around the world was on the decrease in the wake of the air attack the Israeli air forces carried out against the Iraqi nuclear [reactor] and the decision of the Knesset to apply Israeli laws on the Golan Heights in 1981. In 1989 [there was an American message to the effect] that the US would not let things keep going the way they were going so far... [In a meeting with] US Secretary of State James Baker [in the same year], I said in a very firm and straightforward tone that I stick to the [firm] principles [that Israel holds on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli struggle]... I told him that... the establishment of a Palestinian state which would [sow] the seeds of Israel's [destruction] and this we will always fight with all our strength... Israel's right to build settlements in the territories west of the Jordan River were clearly stipulated in 1922 by Winston Churchill in his capacity at the time as secretary of state for the colonies..."
