President Hosni Mubarak's US visit is about more than Egyptian-US bilateral ties. Improving Egyptian-US relations that were strained during George W Bush's tenure is vital for both nations, despite the inequality of the traditional balance of power in this partnership. Attempts by the previous US administration to resort to Riyadh, instead of Cairo, to influence regional policies -- or for that matter to replace Egypt's role -- have not been a success. The Obama administration is clearly taking a different course in its repeated assertions of the significance of Cairo's role and weight in the Middle East with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq and, of course, Iran, amongst a host of issues. Cairo, on the other hand, needs Washington's support and backing, be it political or economic. Thus, the Egyptian-US dynamic is back to mutual beneficial partnership, culminating in President Mubarak's visit -- the first in five years. The Egyptian president is in for a host of talks on the regional and domestic fronts, in public and closed-door meetings with his US counterpart, US diplomats, Israeli officials, and Zionist pressure groups, amongst others. But one issue rightly dominates this visit: the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is no secret that the two-state solution -- the core principle of the peace process since its onset in the 1991 Madrid Conference that witnessed the first Palestinian- Israeli meetings -- is no longer credible in offering anything resembling a state for the Palestinians. There was a time when it was theoretically possible for all the various parties to the conflict to espouse a two-state solution, but that was before illegal Israeli settlements expanded across the occupied Palestinian territories rendering a Palestinian state virtually impossible. President Obama took the right approach when he declared in June that further settlement expansion was unacceptable and would not be recognised by Washington. But many have watched Tel Aviv's defiance eventually influence decision- making in Washington, where policymakers are willing to accept a "temporary" six-month freeze of settlement expansion in return for major Palestinian and Arab concessions, before settlement construction continues after the freeze period. President Mubarak voiced caution towards this formula, arguing that demands to halt Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory for the past 10 years amounted to nothing but further Israeli land grabbing. Instead, he says the parties concerned should opt for a final solution, which Washington and Tel Aviv are happy to discuss. But herein lies the challenge of presenting a "final status" solution to a 61-year-old conflict that is far from resolved despite two decades of negotiations and piles of paper agreements. But what is a "final settlement" in the eyes of the Obama administration, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and, more importantly, the Palestinian people who are the primary victims of this bloody conflict? We have yet to hear Obama's promised vision for the conflict, but signs are that the Palestinians and Arabs will be expected to "normalise" with Israel, which on its part will offer nothing. Obama already addressed Arab states from Cairo in June when he said that the Arab peace initiative is not enough, while Israel needs only to stop settlements. It will be a complete surprise if the gist of Obama's awaited peace plan will be any different. Meanwhile, Mubarak has expressed reservation at this prescription for peace, arguing that a just and comprehensive peace must be reached before moving to the stage of full normalisation between Israel and the Arabs. While this is reassuring, there is plenty of cause for worry when all rhetoric emanating not only from Washington and Tel Aviv, but even the Arab League, puts the onus on a settlement freeze as the newest solution to the conflict that involves five million Palestinian refugees, borders and the ugliness of a brutal occupation. Shelving these issues in favour of settlement talk renders a two-state solution meaningless, but will eventually lead to demands for a bi-national state sooner or later.
