Throughout the year, the US and Israel tried to collapse the Hamas government, an objective sure to survive on the policy agenda of 2008, writes Saleh Al-Naami One November night in 2006 in his fourth floor office in the western wing of the Israeli Ministry of Defence, General Amos Gilad, head of the ministry's department of political security, met with Elliot Abrams, American deputy national security adviser. On the agenda of this meeting that Abrams had come specially to Tel Aviv for was only one item: how to ensure the fall of Hamas after it had grown clear that the siege on the West Bank and Gaza Strip had not only failed to cause its collapse but had actually increased support for Hamas among Palestinians. As a Hebrew-language documentary shown recently on Israeli television made clear, Gilad and Abrams agreed during the meeting that 2007 would see the fall of the Hamas government and prepare the ground of Palestinian domestic political conditions to prevent the movement's re- election. Thus the main goal of Israel and the US administration in 2007 was securing the fall of Hamas. During the abovementioned meeting, Abrams stressed that mechanisms not previously used must be employed to reach this goal, in coordination with Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. In its 29 March 2007 issue, the Israeli Haaretz newspaper made note of this meeting and affirmed that Abrams held that the PA's leadership had a fundamental role to play in achieving this goal. It referenced Abrams as saying that this leadership must take political and military steps towards toppling Hamas, in particular through employing Palestinian security agencies against it. Looking back, it is clear that all the events in the Palestinian arena in 2007 revolved around this stated aim. On 16 December 2006, Abbas suddenly announced in a speech he gave in Ramallah that he had issued an order for the holding of early legislative and presidential elections without coordinating with Hamas and after he had waged a sweeping attack against it. This edict was surprising because it came after Hamas expressed its approval of the "national concord" document that Abbas was so enthusiastic about. This document outlined mechanisms for solving domestic differences, and all Palestinian factions accepted it. In the Hamas movement, Abbas's speech was considered the first stage of a plan to bring down Ismail Haniyeh's government. The movement's leadership connected the speech to the attempted assassination of Haniyeh at the Rafah Crossing on his return from Egypt two days prior, and to the attempted assassination of his minister of interior, Said Siyyam, on 10 December 2006. In response to Abbas's presidential edict, Hamas organised protest demonstrations, and these led to clashes between members of the PA security agencies and activists in the armed militias of Fatah on the one hand, and the forces of the Interior Ministry and the armed wing of Hamas on the other. These confrontations formed the first stage of internecine fighting that continued for 53 days and resulted in 117 dead, including 10 children, and 655 injured, including 44 children. In this wave of violence, 39 institutions were targeted, including 15 government institutions, six NGOs, and one international institution. During this period, tension between Fatah and Hamas spread to the West Bank while PA agencies received large quantities of arms and ammunition from Arab countries. The American administration offered major financial support to Abbas, including $86.4 million to security forces loyal to the PA president. The administration justified this move by saying it aimed to help Abbas's agencies fulfil the obligations of the PA -- particularly dismantling the infrastructure of terror in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was clear from the confrontation unfolded that Hamas would overcome Abbas's security agencies. Yet Hamas took Abbas by surprise when it took control of the northern Gaza Strip in record time. During this period, differences arose within the ranks of Fatah, particularly between the current led by Ahmed Halas, former secretary of Fatah in Gaza, and Mohamed Dahlan, Abbas's security adviser. Halas warned from the beginning that Fatah was rushing into an Israeli-American plan, a stance that led to his dismissal. After seven ceasefire agreements collapsed, the Saudi government succeeded in convincing the two sides to meet in Mecca to discuss reconciliation. They reached an agreement coined the "Mecca Accord", in which Hamas offered a major political concession -- endorsing the Arab Peace Initiative. It was also agreed that a national unity government would be formed, and understandings were reached on political partnership between Fatah and Hamas and the restructuring of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Yet matters on the ground were much more grave than recognised in the accord's text. With the exception of the formation of a national unity government, no discussion was held on the issue of political partnership, and Abbas refused to discuss restructuring the PLO. Moreover, partnership within the unity government was to a large degree superficial, with ministers from Fatah and Hamas sticking to different and contradicting authoritative references. Meanwhile, America continued to urge Abbas and his agencies to disregard the Mecca Accord. In its 19 June 2007 issue, Haaretz newspaper printed a document prepared by Alvaro De Soto, UN representative to the International Quartet and its deputy secretary, accusing the US administration of encouraging a Palestinian civil war in order to collapse the Hamas government. On the role of Abbas and his close associates, Soto noted that, "advisers close to Abbas have privately revealed to us that they have formulated an initiative for dissolving the Hamas government." In mid-March, the American security adviser overseeing coordination between the security agencies of Abbas and Israel revealed a plan aiming to bring down the national unity government. This plan tied the survival of this government to its acceptance of the stipulations of the International Quartet. From this point, preparations for clashes had been laid out. What was expected took place, and confrontations broke out between Hamas and Abbas's security agencies and armed groups affiliated with Fatah. This was the second stage of internecine fighting, and resulted in 84 dead, including 22 civilians and five women and children, and 600 wounded. As the sun set on 15 June, Hamas had taken control of all vital institutions at the security headquarters in Gaza. Most of the security agencies' leaders fled, though Hamas issued a general amnesty covering them. Abbas's position on this development was decisive. He dismissed the Haniyeh government, considering it illegitimate, and prohibited Hamas activities in the West Bank at the same time that he formed a new government led by Salam Fayyad. The world responded to Hamas's move by recognising the Fayyad government and resuming financial aid to it. This aid helped limit the hold of Hamas on the Gaza Strip and created two different economic environments in the West Bank and Gaza, so as to encourage Palestinians in Gaza to rebel against the rule of Hamas. Yet Abbas did not suffice with these measures. He issued strict instructions for the Hamas movement to be pursued in the West Bank and for its activists to be arrested and its institutions closed. Palestinian human rights institutions have confirmed that hundreds of Hamas activists have been arrested and that many of them have been severely tortured. This new reality led the Fayyad government to approve positions it had not dared approve in the past. Its interior minister, Abdul-Razeq Al-Yehia, announced that the PA had promised to Israel to dismantle the military arms of all Palestinian resistance movements. Moreover, ever since Hamas took control of Gaza, Israel and the US have made it clear to Abbas that should he return to dialogue with Hamas they would cut off relations with him. The Annapolis meeting held at the invitation of President Bush served to deepen the rift between Hamas and Abbas. During the meeting, Tel Aviv and Washington succeeded in securing a clear and direct promise from Abbas to cement the split between him and Hamas and the other resistance factions. Abbas's agreement to implement the first stage of the roadmap, which obliges Abbas to dissemble the "infrastructure of terror" of legal resistance movements, disarm them, and halt incitement against Israel, means that opportunities for dialogue with Hamas are less than zero. Yet despite US-Israeli successes in driving wedges between Palestinian movements, 2007 has near ended without Tel Aviv or Washington achieving their goal of bringing down the Hamas government. It is thus expected that in 2008, Israel will undertake a wide scale military campaign in the Gaza Strip to strike at Hamas's military and organisational infrastructure and push towards the collapse of its government. Indeed, Israel has undertaken preparations for this, although Israeli leaders fear the possibility that their army will fail to achieve the goal. It is still expected, nonetheless, that Israel will undertake this campaign during the first third of 2008, attempting to destroy the organisational and military infrastructure of Hamas and occupying Gaza before handing it over to NATO or the EU, and later the PA of President Abbas. The success of this scenario is difficult to guarantee, however, for while Israel can take control of Gaza, it would be difficult for it to halt all resistance operations. Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and its army was present in its streets and alleys for more than 38 years, yet resistance was not stopped. Hamas will certainly benefit from an Israeli campaign, for Israeli military control of Gaza would transfer responsibility for services and humanitarian needs from Hamas to Israel. Further, if Abbas returned to the Strip following Israeli reoccupation of it, Palestinians would view him as a collaborator. Moreover, Israel doubts the ability of Abbas to run the Strip's affairs once Israeli forces leave. Making matters more complicated is the fact that 2008 will likely see new legislative elections in Israel that will result in gains for the extreme right. This in itself will narrow the margin of manoeuvre for Abbas and supporting Arab states. Hamas's successful survival through these upcoming developments will strengthen its legitimacy, and bets will no longer be placed on negotiations with Israel. It is expected that Hamas will have learned from the lesson, and that following the military campaign against the Strip, it will work to put an end to the PA in its present form and make the world shoulder its responsibilities towards the Palestinians. In extremely complicated circumstances, and particularly in a region like ours, it is difficult to anticipate events exactly as they will take shape. Yet all indicators suggest that 2008 will entail major and dramatic changes.
