Dialogue between Egypt and Turkey got a boost with a recent conference, says Mustafa El-Labbad Approaching Istanbul by air you gasp at one of the most breathtaking skylines you have ever seen. As the plane approaches the runway you gasp again, because for a moment, you think that you're going to land on water. Ataturk airport is only a stone's throw away from the Sea of Marmara. The now sprawling city was initially founded on the peninsula located at the intersection of three bodies of water: the Sea of Marmara, the Golden Horn and the Bosporus Straits. Straddling the strategic juncture between Europe and Asia, it has been the centre of the world since the fourth century as the capital of the eastern Roman Empire or Byzantium and then of the Ottoman Empire. Over this 1,600 year period it saw a procession of 120 kings and sultans. Like ancient Rome, it too was originally built on seven hills. These are densely forested while their shores are graced with elegant palaces, some of which belonged to the khedives of Egypt for whom Istanbul was a favourite summer resort. Today, a third of Istanbul's residents inhabit the modern Asian side of the city, which is connected to the historical European side by a long bridge. Nothing, it seems, could more concretely symbolise the geographical, historical, cultural and political significance of "Turkey: a bridge between two civilisations", which seems an apt choice for the Egyptian-Turkish dialogue that was held in Istanbul last week. Organised by the Turkish Apand Forum and Cairo University's Centre for Civilisation Dialogue, the conference, which I had the good fortune to attend, brought together prominent political scientists and intellectuals from both countries. Dialogues between countries of this region have been surprisingly few, in spite of the obvious need, in these times of profound change in regional and international balances of power, for closer communication between them and more intensive exchanges of ideas and expertise between their intellectual communities. The Egyptian-Turkish dialogue was timely and it was perhaps only natural that it focussed on an issue that is just as much an issue of the hour in the rest of the region as it is in Turkey. The recent electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party, which has been hailed by some as a victory for the Islamist agenda, is being exploited by politicians of diverse political trends and ambitions throughout the Arab world. This "historical turning point" for Turkey and the rest of the region was reflected in the first sessions of the Egyptian-Turkish dialogue which revolved around "the veil" versus "secularism". On this critically symbolic topic for secularist Turkey, speakers were keen to stress that women had the right not to be forced to wear the veil but that they also had the right not to be forced not to wear the veil. Such emphasis on women's liberty with regard to dress suggests that secularism in Turkey is not as fragile as some would like to suggest. In all events, to reduce the political life of a society to a single dimension, such as the controversy over the veil, can be grossly misleading. Politics is about the rivalries between political movements or parties to attain power and to promote their political and economic programmes, and it is about the interplay between the diverse sectors of society and interests that the rival parties or movements represent. In terms of classical political science, the Justice and Development Party, regardless of its stance on the veil, can be classified as a right-wing conservative party which allies itself domestically with big business and the interests of the Turkish upper class, while preserving a strong grassroots base, particularly among the disaffected and more traditionally minded urban poor. In a strong sense, therefore, one could say that the real loser from the rise of the Justice and Development Party is not the principle of secularism, but rather other right-wing parties, such as the Motherland Party and the True Path Party. Turkey's bid to join the European Union was another natural choice of topic for the conference. On this subject, Mustafa Alawi presented an excellent paper on the alternative scenarios deriving from the European Union's acceptance or rejection of Ankara's application to join the EU. On a related subject, Manar Al-Shorbagui delivered an equally interesting analysis of Turkey's regional problems and horizons. But the same session turned to another domestic issue that has bearings on the welfare of democracy in Turkey: minorities. Niazy Oktim offered an insightful overview of the history of Armenians and Orthodox Christians in Turkey. However, as interesting as his presentation was, one could not help but be struck by his failure to mention the Kurds among Turkish minorities. When this omission was pointed out, it was brought to our attention that the Turkish constitution only recognises minorities on the basis of religious affiliation. From a political science standpoint this is particularly curious in view of this discipline's definition of minority as "a demographic group within a particular nation or society that distinguishes itself from the dominant group or groups of that society on the basis of such characteristics as race, ethnic origin or religious affiliation." Over the past half century, some Western societies have even extended the definition of the term to cover other groups that are set apart from the dominant culture by characteristics that render them vulnerable or disadvantaged. Surely then, to categorise the Kurds as a minority in Turkey is not necessarily to take ideological sides on a sensitive political issue but rather to take a stance in favour of rights and, hence, in favour of a healthier democracy. The same approach should be taken towards other demographic groups in other countries in the region. Turkey has all the historical, geo-strategic, political and economic qualifications to succeed as a bridge between the civilisations of East and West. It has by far the most robust economy in the Middle East, ranking 17th among the world's largest economies. Indeed, since 2002, under the Justice and Development Party government, Turkey has attained unprecedented rates of economic growth, and the regular visitor from Egypt cannot help but see evidence of the steady rise in the standard of living of the Turkish people and to remark upon the growing gap between this country and his own. Turkey is also vigorously asserting itself as a major player in the new Middle East, a national objective that the Justice and Development Party shares with other Turkish political parties. In short, Turkey is determined to make its presence felt, and it has achieved considerable inroads here, not least of which are its success in improving the conditions of its alliance under the American umbrella and the considerable transparency and general harmony of objectives that characterise the manner in which it has steered its economic recovery. Egypt and other countries of the Arab world would do well to study at least these two facettes of Turkey's rising star. Istanbul is not just a bridge between cultures but also between political outlooks.
