At an extraordinary Arab foreign ministers' meeting on recent developments in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, Dina Ezzat interviews acting Lebanese foreign minister, Tarek Metri, and assesses efforts to promote Lebanese political stability, Syria's Arab reconciliation and Palestinians' right to statehood Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa arrived yesterday in Beirut for a new round of mediation talks between the two conflicting Lebanese political camps: the opposition, led by Hizbullah which opposes the association of its country with US allies in the region, and the majority, led by the government of Prime Minister Fouad Al-Siniora who wishes to end the traditional association of his country's political choices with Syria and for that matter anti-US regional players, especially Iran. This time round, Moussa's mediation will be based on a new communiqué that Arab foreign ministers adopted on Saturday evening which calls for the prompt election of Lebanese Army Chief Michel Suleiman as a reconciliatory president to end a presidential vacancy that started on 25 November with the end of the term of former Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, a pro-Syrian actor. The Arab foreign ministers' communiqué also calls for the consequent -- some argue parallel -- composition of a new government in line with the Lebanese constitution. Moreover, it calls for the amendment of the electoral rules in line with the demands of Lebanese political forces. Moussa's mission in Lebanon will, many observers predict, fail in helping Suleiman be elected by parliament in a session scheduled for 12 January. Even the most optimistic diplomat argues that it would take a miracle, even with the help of other concerned regional and international players, to secure the election of Suleiman so soon. Another delay, Lebanese and Arab League sources say, is expected. By 27 January when the Arab foreign ministers extraordinary council reconvenes, probably at the Cairo headquarters of the Arab League, Moussa hopes to report considerable progress in his mediation which was originally launched in late 2006 and was supported by, and at times interspliced, with other regional and international mediations. However, as Moussa himself acknowledged in several press statements that followed the Saturday deal, the mission could hit another impasse. "There are no guarantees for success but there is a positive spirit that we can build on," he said. The communiqué issued by the Arab foreign ministers on Lebanon was drafted Saturday evening at the residence of Moussa, on the outskirts of Cairo, following a four-hour session in which the secretary-general hosted the key players in Lebanon: Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moellim, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal whose country has been a solid supporter of the majority, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad Ben Jassim who keeps close ties with the US while maintaining open channels with Syria, along with Egyptian and Omani foreign ministers Ahmed Abul-Gheit and Youssef Ben Alwai who have offered their good offices to resolve the Lebanese crisis with obvious affinity towards the Al-Siniora camp. The original draft of the three-point communiqué was provided by Ben Jassim who arrived at Moussa's residence straight from the presidential palace in Damascus where he held extensive talks with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. It was amended by all participants and was left to the one-on- one discretion of Al-Moellim and Al-Faisal before it was finalised and went before the wider ministerial meeting at the headquarters of the Arab league. One informed source said, "the positive stance that Al-Moellim showed during the discussions was impressive. It did indicate a change of attitude on the part of Syria that has for over a year insisted that the Lebanese opposition is entitled to insist on securing one-third of the cabinet seats to make sure that no political decision is passed contrary to their will." Moreover, the opposition insisted that the election of a president, even one who has their approval like Suleiman, is conditional on an agreement on the composition of the government and their share within. The communiqué bypasses the one- third share demanded by the opposition by calling for the president to have control over a share in the government which would take neither the side of the opposition nor the government. Arab foreign ministers participating in the meeting admitted it would have been impossible for the communiqué to have been secured without, one said, the "unexpected" and rather "surprising" cooperation that the Syrian foreign minister demonstrated. No clear explanation is provided by any of the sources close to the meeting about the real reasons behind the change of heart, or at least change in political posture, on the part of the Syrian delegation. Different interpretations are given, however. Some suggest that the harsh statements made by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Cairo last week, during which he declared the suspension of talks between Paris and Damascus on the Lebanese file, sent a clear message to the Syrians that they will again be painted into a corner of isolation from which they were rescued by French intervention which was given the US green light. Others say that a clearly-worded message was relayed from Cairo to Damascus suggesting a growing Arab concern over Syria's "unhelpful and exaggerated support" of the Lebanese opposition. Moreover, sources suggest that many a senior Arab official confided in Al-Assad a genuine concern over the chances of his country chairing and hosting the annual Arab summit in March as scheduled if the vacancy at the Lebanese presidency -- for which many an Arab capital hold Damascus responsible -- persists all the way to the eve of the summit. Warnings over the absence of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Saudi King Abdullah were not implicit. "There are so many interpretations as to why Syria wanted to offer a different standing but there is also the possibility that Syria has not really changed its position and is simply maneuvering," suggested an Arab source closely associated with the Lebanese issue. He added, "It could well be that Syria decided to play a different game: tell the Arabs and for matter the entire world that it is not preventing an end to the Lebanese crisis, then leave it to its allies in Lebanon to insist on their demands." In the analysis of this source, such a scenario would do more than clear Syria of the public blame for hijacking Lebanon; it would, "in a way", clear the Lebanese opposition in the eyes of their own countrymen from the firm association with Syrian decisions. And it would force Arab and other concerned players to return to Syria which might desire more political gains, especially since Al-Assad hopes to secure a firm reconciliation between Damascus and Riyadh beyond the symbolic rapprochement shown when the Syrian president attended the Arab summit last year in the Saudi capital. "Whatever happens in the coming few days Syria will have to secure at least the election of Michel Suleiman, otherwise it will not have the summit in Damascus with the participation of either of the most crucial Arab leaders, Mubarak and Abdullah," commented a senior Arab diplomat. He added that a decision by these two leaders to boycott the Damascus summit could threaten the participation of other Arab leaders and as such undermine the summit, if not its convocation. Informed sources say that judging by the telephone conversations that Moussa and Ben Jassim had with Al-Assad from Moussa's Cairo residence on Saturday evening, it seems that the Syrian president is not willing to shoot himself in the foot. "Rather the opposite. He seems open to exercise a new style of policy based on engaging key Arab and international players," said one source. He added, "Al-Assad will not want his country to suffer further isolation especially on the Arab scene." Moussa's mission in Lebanon during the coming days will reveal Syria's true intentions. So far, it seems that the Lebanese opposition is much more forthcoming with the Arab League secretary- general. The opposition, for the most part, has demonstrated a cautious, at times sceptical, welcome of the initiative but was certain to make demands in relation to power-sharing and concerns over the full interpretation of the communiqué. One Syrian source who spoke briefly to Al-Ahram Weekly on the fringe of the ministerial meeting said that his country's position should encourage the Lebanese opposition to take whichever stances they might find necessary but was not designed to pressure Syria's allies in Lebanon into taking a path that contradicts with their solid political agenda. It is Syria's wish to carefully tailor its message, one that perhaps prompted Al-Moellim to insist that the paper adopted by Arab foreign ministers should be coined as a communiqué and not a resolution. In addition to its flexibility on Lebanon, Syria also demonstrated considerable cooperation on resolutions in relation to the developments on the Palestinian front. The basic intervention on the part of the Syrian delegation demanding a clearly-worded reference to the "Israeli aggression on Gaza" was too difficult to turn down -- even by an obviously reluctant Palestinian delegation headed by Riyad Al-Maliki, minister of information, who like the rest of the Salam Fayyad government, seems to put the full blame for Gaza's misery at the doorstep of their political rivals Hamas, currently controlling the Gaza Strip. Sources say that in many ways Syria's participation was constructive whether on the Lebanon file or Palestinian resolutions. Syria, they say, did not attempt to block any of the language in relation to the need to advance the peace process on the basis of the Annapolis meeting and did not demand any reference to the support of the Palestinian resistance as it would have normally done. On Sunday, at a press conference held at the end of the two-day ministerial meeting, Moussa expressed appreciation of the "new positive spirit" that Syria and other Arab delegations demonstrated. "This spirit is certainly of help as we walk to the next Arab summit in Damascus," Moussa said. A similar confidence on the convocation of the Arab summit in the Syrian capital was expressed by Al-Moellim as he left the ministerial meeting on Sunday afternoon. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 'We don't know what will happen' Heading his country's delegation to an Arab foreign ministers meeting which convened in Cairo earlier this week to discuss the Lebanese political crisis, Tarek Metri, the minister of culture and acting foreign minister, was not replacing Lebanon's Foreign Minister Fawzi Saloukh for the first time. Since the suspension of the participation of all opposition ministers in the government of Prime Minister Fouad Al-Siniora a little over a year ago, Metri has been heading his country's delegation at every Arab ministerial meeting. However, this time was different. The presence of Metri, with his obvious association with the majority Lebanese camp, in a meeting mainly designed to discuss the conflict and hopefully reconciliation between the majority and opposition, was a little odd for some. They believe that such participation amounts to the inevitable support of the entire Arab ministerial meeting to the point of view of the majority camp. For Metri, his presence in Cairo this week was no sign of an attempt by the Lebanese majority camp to isolate the opposition. Nor, he said, was it a sign of any bias on the part of Arab countries towards the majority camp. "Fawzi Saloukh was asked by Prime Minister Al-Siniora and later by Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa to come to the meeting but he hesitated and then declined. His absence is his decision, not mine," Metri said. Speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly in Cairo at the conclusion of the foreign ministers meeting on Sunday, Metri seemed surprisingly for him, tense, tired and restless. He also sounded impatient and worried. The mood contradicted significantly with the enthusiasm he and other majority figures demonstrated towards the communiqué Arab ministers adopted on Lebanon to allow for the prompt election of Michel Suleiman, the Lebanese army chief, as president and the subsequent formulation of a new coalition government in which the new president would hold enough seats to allow him to be the arbitrator between the majority and opposition and to supervise the adequate amendment of the electoral law in line with the Lebanese constitution. For Metri, the communiqué, which was admittedly produced as a result of the consent of Syria and Iran, the strongest allies of the Lebanese opposition, especially Hizbullah, was a document to celebrate. "But the real test is not in the drafting and adoption of the communiqué. It is in the implementation of this document on the ground in Lebanon, and sooner rather than later," said Metri. He added fatalistically that later might prove to be somewhat too late. "For over a year the Lebanese have been stuck with their political crisis and had hoped for an end through this or that mediation. But the crisis persisted. And for months we have been without a president and we do not know, with this communiqué, whether the wait for the election of a president will last much longer." The political crisis in Lebanon between the majority and opposition started in the wake of the Israeli military aggression on Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Then, the opposition, especially the Islamist group Hizbullah, accused the majority, especially the government of Al-Siniora, of having failed to reach out to support the resistance when Beirut was bombarded by Israeli jet fighters. The real conflict went beyond the administration of national unity during war time. It was more on the future political choices of Lebanon: whether it would continue to be a close ally of Syria and in a way with Iran as the opposition wanted, or whether it would part ways with this camp, end the support for the Palestinian resistance and move into the venue of US Middle East allies as the majority seemed to favour. By demanding a one-third share of the cabinet seats, the opposition hoped it would be in a position to block any government decision that would bring their country closer to US allies. And by declining to grant the opposition its wish, the majority seemed determined to take Lebanon further away from the dominance of Syria that was effectively and firmly interrupted with the pullout of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005. The withdrawal ended a 30-year military presence that was essentially designed by Arab consent to contain a brutal civil war prompted by a similar political conflict amongst Lebanese. Today, Metri fears, "there are not enough guarantees" that Moussa's new mediation, which started yesterday in Beirut, would bypass the long-standing impasse that has proved resilient to previous attempts by Moussa and much more influential direct and indirect mediators including French President Nicolas Sarkozy. "We do not know what will happen. The communiqué issued here in Cairo is a good sign but how it will be interpreted by all concerned parties is another issue," Metri argued. While Metri was speaking to the Weekly, the reaction of the majority and opposition camp indicated the early signs of the hazardous mission that Moussa is now conducting in Beirut trying to reconcile the different readings of those opposed to the communiqué. Metri predicted three mines that, if not removed, would blow up the mission of the secretary-general and may be the chances of reconciliation in Lebanon for a very long time. An agreement on the amendment of the Lebanese constitution prior to the election of the head of state to secure a newly defined balancing status and prerogatives of the president as stipulated in the Arab ministers communiqué is one major task that Moussa has to deal with. This is especially so in view of the opposition to a permanent amendment under exceptional circumstances as Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri, of the opposition, has often indicated. The second problem that Metri foresaw relates to the number of government seats that would constitute the president's share and which would supposedly help the president balance the positions of both majority and opposition. Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun has already highlighted this concern. The third problem as feared by Metri is whether there will be agreement between majority and opposition on the choice of the prime minister and the ability of the new president to reconcile the major differences between the two parties on the list of contenders. Metri does not have much confidence to share in the seriousness of all parties concerned in living up to the wish and will of Arab countries to help Lebanon find an end to its political crisis. The acting Lebanese foreign minister seemed more skeptical than confident. "There is now an opportunity; it is a new ball game that all Lebanese can cooperate to turn into a [win-win] situation," he said. However, he hastened to add that the new round of mediation started by Moussa yesterday "should not be allowed to turn into an endless exercise. "By 27 January, when the Arab foreign ministers re-convene to listen to the report of the Arab League secretary-general, Moussa should be able to either tell the ministerial council that progress is in the making and the election of the [Lebanese] president is round the corner, or he should be able to name and shame those who obstructed the reconciliation process," Metri stated. Metri was not willing to dwell much on the true motives of the change of position on the part of Syria that had for long insisted that the opposition's demand for a one-third share in any government is simply not negotiable. "It is not for me and I am not really interested in the reasons that produced the communiqué. What counts for me and for every other Lebanese is that an end is put to the current [intolerable] situation whereby the country has no president." According to Metri, the Lebanese government was not asked by any of the mediators to grant Syria anything in return for the openness that the Syrian delegation showed in Cairo this week. "Nor do we have anything to offer." Metri's meeting with Moussa's envoy to Lebanon Ambassador Hesham Youssef, convened as Moussa was hosting the foreign ministers of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Oman to produce the draft of the communiqué, was not subject to any trade-offs although it was an opportunity for the head of the Lebanese delegation to be briefed about the development of the meeting that convened at Moussa's house. "What are we supposed to trade-off. We have the right to have a president and get out of the current impasse that if left unresolved could take the country towards the abyss of some very serious developments," Metri said. He declined to use the Lebanese taboo words "a new civil war" but he did not hesitate to confirm that the failure of Moussa's mission could open the door to a "new shape" in the current political conflict. "We follow the speeches and interviews every day and if only 10 per cent of the threats aired in such statements is carried out then it would be quite catastrophic for Lebanon... This kind of verbal violence is very serious especially for a country like Lebanon. Any decent Arab would want to help Lebanon steer clear from such a fate." To spare his country from apocalyptic scenarios, Metri argued, Arabs and concerned international forces have to keep working and to "keep up the pressure and diplomacy" that produced the communiqué of this week. "I am confident that nobody wants Lebanon to explode... We need to go back to political normalcy," he said. For Metri, the first step on the road back to normalcy is to end the war of words between the two political camps. The second is to secure Suleiman's candidature and prompt election.
