No sooner signed than ignored, reactions to the Sanaa Declaration are indicative of deep rifts that persist in the Palestinian Fatah movement, writes Khaled Amayreh in Ramallah Representatives of Fatah and Hamas this week signed a generally worded agreement in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, with both sides hoping it would end the present national rift between the two largest Palestinian political factions. The Sanaa Declaration, drafted under the auspices of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, called for ending the internal struggle between Fatah and Hamas and returning the Gaza Strip to the "status quo preceding the events of June 2007", an allusion to Hamas's counter- coup that ousted forces answerable to Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. "We, the representatives of Fatah and Hamas, agree to the Yemeni initiative as a framework for resuming dialogue between the two movements to return the Palestinian situation to what it was before the [June 2007] Gaza events," the document reads. The agreement was signed by Fatah representative Azzam Al-Ahmed, head of Fatah's parliamentary bloc, and Moussa Abu Maraouk, deputy-chief of Hamas's politburo based in Damascus. Initially, the agreement was touted, at least by Yemeni officials, as a breakthrough that would end the most painful intra-Palestinian crisis ever. However, no sooner had the two Palestinian delegations left Sanaa, than did PA officials in Ramallah begin raising doubts about the adequacy of the agreement, with some, like Yasser Abd Rabbo, deeming it "stillborn". Notwithstanding the fact that the agreement was signed by one of Fatah's highest-ranking leaders, a number of other Fatah and Palestine Liberation Organisation leaders, unenthusiastic about rapprochement with Hamas, gave it the cold shoulder. Nimr Hammad, head of Abbas's office, pointed out that Al-Ahmed didn't really conduct sufficient consultations with PA President Abbas before signing the agreement, which he described as "incomplete and suffering from serious flaws". Hammad castigated Al-Ahmed for "negotiating a compromise with Hamas" which he said was inconsistent with the PA's longstanding position which states that Hamas must first "end its coup" before any talks with it can start. "Al-Ahmed committed a mistake by signing the deal without consulting Abbas about it. We [do not accept] the Yemeni initiative... as a framework for further dialogue with Hamas." Hammad added that the agreement would invite US pressure on the PA leadership and as such "was not in the interests of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation." Responding to the criticism, Al-Ahmed accused Hammad of "not knowing what [he is] talking about". He pointed out that he had called Abbas prior to the signing ceremony and briefed him on all pertinent details. "It seems Hammad knows nothing. I was in continuous contact with President Abbas today, yesterday, and before. I know the limitations of my authority and know the protocol of negotiations." Al-Ahmed accused certain parties within the PA of attempting to sabotage the agreement. "There are people here and there who dislike the deal, yet we should block them and not let them succeed." Hammad insisted that Abbas was not sufficiently consulted and that he didn't have time to thoroughly review the agreement given that he was busy meeting visiting US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in Ramallah. So far, Abbas himself has not spoken on the issue. The acrimonious exchange between the two Fatah officials, which took place on Al-Jazeera TV on 22 March, was clearly embarrassing for the Fatah movement and the PA as a whole, revealing striking differences within them. On the one hand there is the Ramallah- based PA officials -- often dubbed by critics as the "American lobby" -- represented by people like Hammad, Nabil Amr, Yasser Abd Rabbo and Mohamed Dahlan (the latter has virtually disappeared from the political arena following the publication last month of an article in Vanity Fair accusing him and other PA leaders of conspiring with Israel and the US to bring down the Hamas-led government and trigger civil war in the occupied territories). This camp is against dialogue with Hamas as a matter of principle and is eager to see Fatah, even in collaboration with Israel, eradicate Hamas completely. On the other hand, the vast bulk of intermediate Fatah leaders favour a speedy agreement with Hamas on the grounds that any national rift allows Israel and the United States to bully and blackmail Fatah to surrender to Israeli hegemony, which in turn weakens Fatah and would eventually expedite its downfall as a national liberation movement. Representatives of this current include imprisoned Fatah leader Marwan Al-Barghouti, Hatem Abdul-Qader, Jebril Rajoub, Qaddura Fares, Hani Al-Hassan and Farouk Al-Qaddumi, the Tunis-based veteran Fatah leader. Where does Abbas stand? So far, the Palestinian leader seems reluctant to pick a side. The reasons for this vacillation are complex and inextricably linked with fruitless peace talks with Israel. According to those within his immediate circle, Abbas is now at a loss as to whether he should stick with a peace process that has so far failed to yield any genuine results, or re-establish Palestinian national unity and thus risk the collapse of the peace process and be blamed for that. So Abbas is holding a stick in the middle, to quote the metaphor of one of his aides. But this can't continue indefinitely. On the one hand, Israel, taking full advantage of a US presidential elections year and enjoying exceptionally good relations with major European powers such as France and Germany, continues to indulge in the usual verbal juggling about modalities and procedural issues of secondary importance while Jewish settlement expansion goes on unabated. On the other, Hamas is regaining its pre-election popularity and could very well defeat Fatah anew in any prospective elections, assuming that Abbas would call for new general elections and not rule by decree. Moreover, the present relative calm in Gaza, which could evolve into a formal ceasefire with Israel, probably through Egyptian mediation, more or less isolates Abbas, especially if the current deadlock in peace talks with Israel persists as expected. This week, PA negotiator Saeb Erekat warned that Fatah was "rapidly losing popularity" because of Israel's refusal to advance the peace process. "If the current deadlock continues, and if a final-status agreement is not reached before the end of 2008, I am afraid the PA will collapse," Erekat told reporters. Although his remarks were likely meant to prompt the US and the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia and UN) to pressure Israel, Erekat's prophecy may very well be realised. Indeed, in addition to the effectively moribund peace process that has become an object of ridicule among most Palestinians, the PA itself is beset by a host of problems, including corruption, nepotism, cronyism and embezzlement of public funds. Last week, as many as 3,000 cellular phones were found smuggled in the limousine of Rawhi Fattouh, as he crossed from Jordan to the West Bank via the Allenby Bridge. Fattouh is a former speaker of the Palestinian parliament who also briefly served as acting PA chairman following the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. Fattouh denied any wrongdoing, insisting that his driver was solely responsible for the scandal. Critics, however, have argued that it is difficult to imagine that 3,000 cellular phones could be smuggled in Fattouh's official car without his knowledge. This week, a Palestinian columnist who is close to Abbas, urged the Palestinian leader to "adopt a genuine strategy that would meet Palestinian aspirations and expectations." "Allow me, Mr President, to tell you that you lack a clear and genuine strategy to attain our national goals. This is clear from the failure of the peace process, especially since the Annapolis conference. This fate of peace talks with Israel was ineluctable since the talks themselves were resumed without a clear and binding legal reference and without real and effective international participation or guarantees," wrote Hani Al-Masri. Al-Masri further argued that, "with no agreement on the goals of the negotiations, and with Israel continuing its aggression and expansion of settlements as well as building of the apartheid wall, how can we possibly hope for a successful outcome of talks with Israel." Concluding his article, Al-Masri said: "We expect you to take serious and immediate steps to restore national unity and end internal divisions, because with all due respect, a few lines contained in the Sanaa Declaration cannot possibly resolve a chronic and complicated crisis. The problem is one of national choices, national will, national interests, not merely an initiative to overcome the rift with Hamas. What is needed is a broad national initiative, and the closed-door policy with Hamas is useless." Predictably, Israel has warned Abbas against any rapprochement with Hamas, saying that reconciliation between Fatah and the Islamic movement would mean an end to peace talks with the Fatah- dominated PA regime. "The Fatah leadership has to make a choice," one Israeli official was quoted as saying by the Haaretz newspaper. "They can have a peace process and dialogue with Israel or a coalition with Hamas. But it is clear that [they] can't have them both." The US has more or less adopted the same position, with Cheney accusing Hamas of hindering the peace process and impeding the "realisation of Palestinian statehood". Rightly or wrongly, very few Palestinians took Cheney's remarks seriously. One Palestinian journalist remarked: "I am not sure that Cheney himself believed what he was saying."
