Does Al-Qaeda exist in Lebanon? In Beirut, Omayma Abdel-Latif seeks answers The recent statements of Al-Qaeda's second in command, , calling for the expulsion from Lebanon of UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon), sent shockwaves across the country and not least among UN forces. A UNIFIL spokesperson said that the international force was taking El-Zawahri's threats seriously. This, however, is not the first time El-Zawahri has made threats against UNIFIL, which comprises approximately 14,000 soldiers from 30 countries. On 24 June 2007, when a UNIFIL military patrol was hit by a roadside bomb, killing three Spanish and three Colombian soldiers, El-Zawahri hailed the attack but without declaring responsibility. This time around, El-Zawahri made no secret about his future plans against UNIFIL. He called on "the jihadi generation" in Lebanon to get ready to expel the UNIFIL "crusader forces" that he perceives as an obstacle "to reaching Palestine". El-Zawahri's statements raised fresh questions regarding Al-Qaeda's presence in Lebanon. The statements also confirm fears that radical groups now see Lebanon as a failed state and attractive terrain upon which to establish a foothold. In light of the ever deteriorating political and security situation, the paralysis of state institutions and sectarian and political polarisation unseen since the end of the civil war in 1990, El-Zawahri's threats should not be taken lightly. The political and security void that has gripped the country since the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri indeed paves the way for Al-Qaeda-inspired groups to operate freely. Such groups have been given a helping hand -- if indirect -- by the dominant political force in the Sunni street, namely Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal headed by Saad Al-Hariri, majority leader in the Lebanese parliament. Equally important is what El-Zawahri meant by the "jihadi generation" in Lebanon -- who they are and to what extent they have free reign to act against UNIFIL, on the one hand, and how Hizbullah will react on the other, given that South Lebanon, where UNIFIL is based, is the movement's hinterland. Hizbullah has not reacted to El-Zawahri's statements. According to one senior-ranking Hizbullah official, the reason is that the resistance movement does not want to engage in a war of words with Al-Qaeda or any other Salafist movement. Such a war of words could only exacerbate the already volatile sectarian situation in Lebanon. So is Al-Qaeda in Lebanon? It is commonly viewed that armed Islamist groups in Lebanon have been acting independently of Al-Qaeda in terms of logistics and finances. They are, however, inspired by its ideology. Some groups predate Al-Qaeda, existing on the political scene during the past 14 years in the form of small groups located mainly in the north or in Palestinian refugee camps in Sidon. One such group, Usbat Al-Ansar (Band of Partisans), is typical, having doctrinal and religious links with Al-Qaeda but no organisational links as such. Growing evidence suggests that Al-Qaeda has long regarded Lebanon as a passageway for recruits and logistical support. The year 2005 proved a turning point for the organisation. A number of developments shed light on Al-Qaeda - inspired groups, including the Hariri killing, which revealed the depth of the security vacuum in Lebanon, the pressure put on Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Lebanon emerging as an alternative venue for retreating Al-Qaeda fighters), and the ever-increasing tide of sectarian tension across the region resulting from the US occupation of Iraq. In 2005, statements signed by "Al-Qaeda in the Levant" threatening to kill Shia figures were found in different parts of Lebanon. Their authenticity, however, has not been verified. Recent Lebanese security and intelligence investigations, however, have established a link between some Salafist groups based in Ain El-Helweh refugee camp in Sidon and Al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq such as Abu Omar Al-Bughdadi, Abu Hamza Al-Muhajer and even the late Abu Musaab Al-Zarqawi himself. At least 20 such small to medium groups have been identified as based in Lebanon between 2006-2007. The identified groups have been allegedly composed of a mix of Arab, Lebanese as well as Palestinian recruits. Both military and technical training were on offer for the recruits. The first Al-Qaeda cell arrested in Lebanon in December 2003 included some 20 people from Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Palestine. The charges brought against them included creating sleeping cells in Ain Al-Helweh camp. In September 2004, authorities aborted attempts to attack the Ukrainian and Italian embassies in Beirut. In autumn of 2005, press reports said that Al-Qaeda had decided to use Lebanon as a passageway for meetings, training and recruiting. Fedaa Etani, a journalist who has extensively covered jihadi group activities in Lebanon described Ain Al-Helweh camp as "the operation room for Al-Qaeda in Lebanon, at least on the level of conducting foreign communication". Jund Al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant) is an Al-Qaeda-inspired jihadi group that, according to Etani, kept up a level of communication with Al-Qaeda. It is no surprise that Palestinian camps in Lebanon are fertile ground for Al-Qaeda-inspired groups. The camps are not supervised by the Lebanese state, according to prior agreements between the state and Palestinian factions. It is not true, however, that the Lebanese state does not have a presence in the camps. Besides, most jihadi groups, if not all of them, have contacts with Lebanese political forces, as was the case with MP Bahia Al-Hariri and Jund Al-Sham in Ain Al-Helweh camp. Yet despite such links, there are now over 250 detainees in Lebanon's Roumieh Prison who belong to Al-Qaeda-inspired Salafist groups. Nonetheless, security officials, including Internal Security Forces Chief Ashraf Reifi, regard what has existed in Lebanon as a "fake Al-Qaeda". Following on, for some experts, Salafist movements in Lebanon are little more than a "security tool" in the service of external forces, namely Saudi Arabia and Syria. One incident that took place in November 2006, shortly after Shaker Al-Absi, leader of Fatah Al-Islam, arrived in Nahr Al-Bared camp near Tripoli, illustrated how mainstream Lebanese political forces have attempted to manipulate such groups. An MP from Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal visited Al-Absi, asking him to stand in support of "Sunnis" and defend them. Al-Absi's response was reportedly, "I do not fight Hizbullah as long as it resists Israel." To this day many questions remain unanswered regarding the funding and purpose of arming Salafist groups in Nahr Al-Bared, particularly Fatah Al-Islam. What is more clear is that "Al-Qaeda in Lebanon" will remain a bugbear of Lebanese politics so long as sectarian tensions in the country run high and Lebanon remains open to the manipulation of regional and foreign powers. In addition, El-Zawahri's "jihadi generation" will surely grow so long as the US occupation in Iraq and Israel's occupation of Arab lands continue, along with their divide and rule tactics.
