Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not be possible without bringing Hamas onboard, plain and simple, writes Mohammed Herzallah* Hamas just offered Israel a 10-year long truce. This is an important opening that could allow Israel and the United States to start engaging Hamas in the political process, either directly or through Arab allies, because the isolation of Hamas undermines the policy objectives of all parties presently involved. Mahmoud Abbas is the elected president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, but he cannot be expected to reach a credible and lasting political settlement with the Israeli government unless and until he secures Hamas's consent and blessing. The Islamist movement maintains broad support in the occupied Palestinian territories and has demonstrated time and again that it has the necessary capacity to subvert negotiations with Israel. Discord in the Gaza Strip and the resultant security unrest in adjacent Israeli communities substantiate the claim that Palestinian national consensus is indispensable to the peace process. Regrettably, the task of cultivating this consensus is becoming progressively more difficult. In the past, disagreements between Fatah and Hamas, the two political pillars of Palestinian politics, had always subsisted on their ideological differences. Now, the competing preferences of intrusive external powers have distorted Palestinian politics and have rendered factional differences more irreconcilable. Fatah's decision to retract its official consent to the Yemeni accord -- a national reconciliation proposal for Palestinians sponsored by President Saleh of Yemen -- late March is just one example. Fatah and Hamas spent weeks negotiating the terms for reviving a Palestinian national unity government and restoring the PA's control over Gaza. Hours after the accord was signed by representatives from both parties, Fatah officials in Ramallah announced that there had been a "mix up" and subsequently withdrew their endorsement of the accord. Their announcement followed Vice-President Dick Cheney's brief visit to Ramallah, in the course of which he relayed the message that the United States will not support reconciliation with Hamas unless the Islamist movement fundamentally changes. Israel also expressed strong objections to the deal. Putting it in blunt terms, an Israeli official told Haaretz that Fatah can "have a peace process and dialogue with Israel or a coalition with Hamas. But it's clear that you can't have both." The experience of the past year has proven that military and economic pressure cannot compel Hamas to discontinue showering Israel with homemade rockets. Worse, these strains are pushing Hamas closer to Tehran, which in turn is helping crystallise Iranian influence in the Palestinian-Israeli realm. The fate of moderate Palestinian officials is also at stake. If truth were told, the very existence of a credible leadership, capable of advancing Palestinian interests through the political process, is in question. President Abbas is in a critical spot, and the United States and Israel expect him to continue negotiating with them regardless of Israel's actions against Gaza. Collective punishment policies, that include depriving Gaza's civilians of food and energy, are creating considerable popular resentment. The PA is commonly reproached by its people for not actively protesting against these violations and not doing enough to alleviate the suffering of Gazans. Some even wonder whether the PA is actually complicit in suffocating Gaza. Regardless of whether there is merit to such claims, the persistence of this perception in the Palestinian street is likely to have a long-term negative effect on the credibility of the PA among its own people. In all likelihood, this consequence will be particularly palpable when the PA is about to sign, presumably on behalf of the Palestinian people everywhere, a final peace deal with Israel. The current approach that dominates American and Israeli policies towards Hamas might be defensible if it made Israel more secure. But this approach is only creating desperate living conditions in Gaza, which in turn are facilitating the emergence of a fiercer brand of militants such as the Army of Islam and the Army of Believers, two rogue groups that have claimed connections to Al-Qaeda and have carried out various operations in Gaza in the past year. The launching of a credible peace process between Palestinians and Israelis -- one that could lead eventually to an enduring political settlement -- requires that all major players on both sides be brought to the negotiation table. Taking Hamas's 10-year truce offer seriously would be a step in the right direction. The current policy towards Hamas, which aims to extract concessions through the interposition of sanctions and use of military force, always had a high propensity to backfire, and it did. * The writer is a research fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former president of the Palestine Solidarity Committee at Harvard University.
