From Qatar to Lebanon, Israel and Syria, the entire region is involved in an unpredictable dance. Only one thing is clear, writes Hassan Nafaa*, and that is that it is no longer being choreographed by Washington The sense of uncertainty and trepidation looming over the Middle East has been amplified in recent weeks by the eruption of violence in Lebanon in a manner that took the country to the brink of a civil war; the regional tour of President George Bush during which he made remarks that embarrassed even his closest allies; the success of Qatar, in cooperation with the Arab League, in bringing Lebanese parties to Doha for talks that defused the crisis; the success of Turkey in arranging and hosting a round of indirect talks between Syria and Israel that has broken the stalemate and paved the way for direct negotiations and the escalation of Egyptian efforts to defuse the situation on the Palestinian-Israeli front, lift the siege on Gaza, and hopefully bring about a truce. Searching for a common thread linking such seemingly disconnected events seems like a daunting task. But a common thread exists, and it is influencing the course of events in the region both directly and indirectly. This thread is the arrogance of the US administration. As Washington finds it increasingly harder to control the course of events in the region it has begun to act erratically, making life much harder for everyone else. It is now clear that George Bush is in a mood to do something spectacular before leaving office, even as foolish and risky a thing as bombing Iran. That's why many in the region and outside, including some of Washington's closest allies, fearing the worst are now trying to distance themselves from US policies. There are those, of course, who are pleased with what Bush is doing and egging him on. The majority, though, are now engaged in trying to slow things down. They are unwilling to hitch their wagons to the outgoing US administration. Take, for example, events in Lebanon. A bout of violence drove the country to the brink of civil war only to end in an agreement that Washington has conspicuously failed to endorse. The escalation began with a sudden decision by the Lebanese government to dismantle Hizbullah's internal communication network, a decision many now admit was misguided. It is hard to tell whether the Lebanese "majority" consulted its international and regional allies before reaching its decisions or went ahead on its own. Few expected the "minority's" reaction to be as fast and fierce as it was. The Lebanese majority had bet on two things. One was that Hizbullah would keep its earlier promise not to use its weapons in domestic squabbles, the second that the majority's regional and international allies would help out if things went wrong. It was a double miscalculation. Hizbullah, finding it impossible to live with decisions that would cripple its capabilities, reacted to the decisions as a declaration of war. The situation on the ground made any foreign intervention unbearably risky. In addition, Hizbullah took every precaution to avoid inflaming sectarian feelings in the country, and its wide- range of political allies remained on the whole sympathetic. One thing Hizbullah did, paving the way for an even-handed settlement, was to immediately turn over the areas it had seized to the Lebanese army. An even-handed settlement is what Qatar sought to put together. It succeeded because of three factors. First, the majority understood that it had lost the political and military struggle that it had provoked with its provocative measures and that international and regional powers could not remedy the imbalance that has emerged in Lebanon's domestic political equation. Second, the opposition understood that the crisis could not be resolved through military means alone since there can be no winners and losers in a conflict of this nature. Third, the inability of international and regional powers to intervene in Lebanon's internal struggle left a political vacuum into which Qatar was able to step. Not everyone was enthusiastic about Qatar's mediation. Yet recognising their impotence domestic, regional and international powers had no option but to sit back and watch. One needed only to note the reaction of American officials and of the Egyptian and Saudi media to get an idea of what the Qataris were up against. While it was an open secret that Turkey was seeking to revive stalled Syrian-Israeli talks its success in hosting a round of indirect talks between Syria and Israel, and the fact that another round of talks is on the way, has surprised many. Again, the US response is at best lackadaisical. The fact that the Americans failed to show any enthusiasm means one of two things. Either they weren't consulted or, as was the case in Lebanon, the US couldn't do anything to change the course of events. It couldn't stand in the way and it couldn't tell others what to do. Washington's major allies in the region, including Israel, Turkey and Qatar, appear at best to be only half listening to the outgoing US administration. Olmert has many reasons of his own to resume talks with Syria, not least to divert attention from the scandals that now threaten to end his career. Turkey wants part of the diplomatic action, if just to counteract Iran's rising role. But what about Syria? Here things get muddled. Damascus must be aware that Israel is not prepared to give up the Golan and return to the 1967 borders, not with its domestic scene as turbulent as it is now. Israel wants full control of the waters of Lake Tiberias, whereas the 1967 borders give Syria a claim on the lake and its water. The Syrians are unlikely to give up their rights, so how far are the Israelis really willing to go? Had Israel been prepared for a settlement of that kind it could have done it a long time ago, certainly when Yitzhaq Rabin was in power. The Syrians, for their part, must be aware that Olmert, now politically threatened, will do anything to create the illusion of progress on the peace front. And for Olmert the Syrian peace track must seem less intricate than the Palestinian one. And even if Israel was willing to give back the Golan it would not do so unless it received something in return. Most likely it would demand the severance of Syrian ties to Tehran, Hizbullah and the Palestinian resistance. The Syrians know that Israel is at best in two minds, at worst simply playing for time. If Israel really sees Iran as the main threat to its security, why is it still refusing to reach a comprehensive solution to the Arab- Israeli conflict? A comprehensive peace would deprive Tehran of any excuse to get involved in Arab politics. And if Israel truly believes militant Islamist organisations are holding back prospects for peace in the region why did it fail to sign an agreement with Arafat in the past, or with Abbas today? Indeed, why has it failed to sign an agreement with Syria given that the latter has been willing to sign such an agreement since Hafez Al-Assad's time? Syria knows that Israel is playing for time, but for reasons of its own it is willing to play along. Damascus is not going to distance itself from Iran, Hizbullah or the Palestinian resistance just because Israel gives "its word" or even signs a document promising to pull out from the Golan to the 1967 borders. It is far more likely that Syria will insist that the withdrawal takes place first and that full control over the Golan, including Lake Tiberia's shores, is restored before getting into the modalities of scaling down its international and regional alliances. An Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, if it ever takes place, is likely to take a long time. There is no way it can happen before Bush leaves the White House. If the aim of Israel is to distance Syria from Iran in preparation for a military strike against the latter, it would only make sense for this strike to take place while Bush is still in office. The timetabling is all wrong. It is naïve to assume that the Syrian- Iranian alliance will fall apart simply because the Syrians and Israelis are holding indirect, or even direct, talks. Iranian-Syrian relations have survived such a test in the past. What must be clear by now is that US policies in the region are at an impasse. Recent developments in Lebanon have been a blow not only to the US administration but to its allies. And now the destiny of the entire region is hanging in the balance. If Bush, with typical foolishness, attacks Iran -- still a real possibility -- the whole region will be thrown into chaos and no one will be able to do anything about it. If the strike doesn't take place the entire situation in the region will have to be re-evaluated. * The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
