While the drums of war between the US and Iran may have abated, at least for the time being, the Arabs have yet to take a position on Tehran's role in the region, writes Mustafa El-Feki* I recently had the opportunity to take part in a seminar organised by the up-and-coming Centre for Middle East Studies in Cairo on the Iranian question and its international and regional ramifications. The topic was timely in light of developments taking place as the Bush administration draws to a close, and I felt that the seminar presentations were, for the most part, objective and insightful, and contributed in particular to a clearer understanding of the military and strategic aspects of the issue. Naturally, opinion differed between those who still expect the US or Israel or both to launch a military strike on Iran and those who believe that international, regional and local considerations weigh too heavily against such a military adventure. Here, I will attempt to offer prognosis for the future of the region based on contributions to that seminar that brought together a collection of eminent specialists on political and military affairs and on nuclear affairs also. To begin with, Iran has reaped enormous advantages from the US invasion of Iraq. By toppling the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, against which it has been waging an eight-year long unjustified war, the US handed Tehran the gift of ridding it of an adversary to its regional ambitions and tipping strategic balance of power in its favour. The US further performed Iran the favour of overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, that extremist Sunni regime that had alarmed the world with its offence against human heritage in its destruction of eight ancient Buddhist statues. Much has changed in the world since then, but one of the constants has been Iran's growing regional influence with its successive and diverse repercussions. Indeed, it is impossible to envision a viable future for the Middle East as a whole if it is caught in the grips of explosive tensions between Iran and other countries of the world. I personally believe that the Persian state can be a positive addition to the Arab and Islamic worlds if its relationship with these worlds is founded on sincere and constructive intentions as opposed to a hidden agenda for dominating the Gulf and the Levant. It is not all that long ago that Iran, under the Shah, played the role of policeman of the Gulf, dominating that vital sphere that extends from the Indian Ocean to the borders of Turkey and the former Soviet Union. Does Iran of today entertain similar ambitions? More importantly, where are the Arabs and their interests, problems and aspirations in the current equation? It is inconceivable, for example, that US-Iranian confrontation could shape the future of the region as though the Arabs were no more than orphans to be fed scraps from the dinner table. At the same time, we must avoid the pitfall of exaggerating the Iranian threat to the Arab world to the extent of portraying it as a greater peril than Israel. The very suggestion flies beyond all bounds of reason. Whatever danger Iran poses pales next to that of Israel, which will remain the foremost threat to Arab peoples as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved and as long as Israel continues to perpetrate its crimes. While I am at it, I should add that we must also avoid the trap of Western double standards that regard the prospect of Iran's possession of nuclear arms with horror while turning a blind eye to Israel's already existing nuclear arsenal. We, as Arabs, aspire to a region free of all weapons of mass destruction, including the 200 or so nuclear warheads in Israel. As for those who maintain that the US is likely to undertake military action against Iran, delivering aerial strikes against Iranian nuclear installations and other strategic sites in the interior, they rest their argument on the well-known habit of outgoing US presidents seeking to score a last triumph that would crown their term in office and etch their memory in the annals of the White House. This tendency, they suggest, would fire the enthusiasm of the notoriously impetuous Bush administration for a military strike scenario come what may. There have been signs, some more obvious than others, of moves in this direction, among which are indications that Israel is pressing for this scenario because of its apprehensions about the Iranian nuclear programme. In the event this scenario comes to pass, the Iranian regime may be able to weather the shock. This would especially be the case if the aim of the attack is to obstruct the Iranian nuclear programme for several years during which time interventionist efforts would hone in on regime change, and if, in response, the Iranian regime mobilised its sleeping insurgency cells, along with Hizbullah and other organisations allied with Tehran, to strike US interests in the Gulf and create havoc for the US elsewhere. Also, before embarking on a military confrontation with Iran, the US must take into account the situation in Iraq and the nature of relations between Tehran and Baghdad. In particular, it must consider the effect of a strike on the Shia in Iraq, the Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world who would regard US aggression against Iran as an integral part of Israel's Middle East designs. On the other hand, there has recently appeared considerable testimony in favour of the opposite scenario: a US-Iranian deal. Proponents of this viewpoint hold that the US can not embark on a major military operation while its forces are bogged down in Iraq, tensions everywhere else in the region are rife, and many of the US's allies in the region are opposed to the military option. In addition, a military strike against Iran would wreak havoc on the already troublesome energy situation as Iran sits upon a huge oil reserve of its own and overlooks the world's most strategic transit routes for oil. They further argue that the domestic situations in both the US and Israel are currently against the military option and, also, that as tenacious and willing to go to the brink as Iranian leaders may appear, in the final analysis they are consummately pragmatic. In fact, some maintain that the Iranian leadership are extremely shrewd diplomats and that they therefore have back channels of communication with Washington and, perhaps, Tel Aviv. It would be foolish, they say, to take the revolutionary regime in Tehran for a bunch of crazed fanatics. The Islamic Republic is a modern institutionalised state, and while it has elements of a theocracy it is ultimately rational and capable of placing the welfare of the whole above all other considerations. Indeed, it is such features that lead this author to believe that relations between Tehran and Washington will improve over the coming years. Iran holds too many political and economic cards that Washington is interested in, and the people in Tehran know that Washington holds many of the keys to their ambitions. As Condoleezza Rice put it, the US doesn't have permanent enemies. Also in favour of at least a cooling down in tensions between the US and Iran is the fact that other international powers, most notably Moscow, are disinclined to the military strike scenario, even if they are not necessarily opposed to an escalation of international sanctions against Tehran. Moreover, while Arab Gulf countries have made no secret of their apprehensions regarding Iran's sometimes conflicting, occasionally hot-headed stances, they are also deeply disturbed by the possible repercussions of military action against Iran on themselves and on the rest of the region. Some Islamists are concerned that Iran may ultimately prove no more than a paper tiger that would fall apart at the first sign of military confrontation. I personally believe that before things reach that stage, the "rational camp" in Tehran would put the breaks on, halting the brinksmanship tendencies evinced by Iranian President Ahmadinejad. The negative repercussions for Iran, regionally and internationally, would be too great, especially considering how they would rebound through the network of Tehran's relations with Hizbullah, Damascus and, perhaps, Hamas. This, in turn, underscores just how complex and intertwined the problems of the region are, which brings us back once more to the pending question: Where do the Arabs stand and what should they do now before they find themselves faced with the question of what to do after either a military strike or a deal scenario is put into play? * The writer is chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the People's Assembly.
