Placing the spotlight on the nuclear ambitions of states in the Middle East serves to distract attention from the real threat posed by Israel's nuclear arsenal, writes Mustafa El-Feki* As a permanent representative at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna for four years I was in a position to observe at close hand nuclear development programmes in the Middle East, a repository of extremely volatile political gunpowder. I tried to remain as objective and neutral as possible, and to view the question in terms of the region as a whole, without favouring one party over another or focussing on some powers to the exclusion of others. After all, the security of the region is indivisible. It is pointless to home in on one country in this matter without considering how all the rest fit in. Looking back at the annual negotiations on the sidelines of the IAEA conference over a resolution for the Middle East, I recall how the Americans and others would attempt to intervene in order to arrive at a formula that satisfied all parties. The presence of Israel, which refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) while maintaining 200-plus nuclear warheads, puts paid to any attempt to lay down regional rules for peace and security. Israel's regional monopoly of nuclear weapons cannot be regarded solely as a deterrent. It must also be regarded as an instrument of intimidation by means of which Israel seeks to terrorise its neighbours and abuse their rights. Yet in the negotiations between Arab ambassadors and US and Israeli delegates in the IAEA the latter invariably spoke of the risks of Arab nuclear arms, as though there actually were such things, as opposed to the peril Israeli nuclear weapons, which really do exist, represent. On one occasion I threw out a hypothetical question: if the Arabs and Israel reached a peace agreement that provided for permanent collective or unilateral security arrangements would Israel then officially acknowledge its nuclear arms, sign the NPT and agree to IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities? The answer was both surprising and provocative. Of course not, they said, because there would still be the danger from other non-Arab countries in the region. They were alluding to Iran, of course. I laughed and said: "Yes, and Pakistan, too, and maybe other countries. Israel will never run out of excuses for holding on to its exclusive advantage." Western double standards are glaringly obvious when it comes to nuclear power. Iraq was invaded -- ostensibly at least -- on the merest hint of a suspicion it possessed weapons of mass destruction, an allegation that was later shown to have been concocted by Israel and its supporters whose ultimate objective was to destroy Iraq, eliminate it from the equations of the Arab-Israeli conflict and secure Israel's backyard. We are currently seeing a replay of this scenario with respect to Iran. In spite of the differences in the particulars and in spite of my personal objections to Iran's possession of nuclear arms as opposed to nuclear power for peaceful purposes -- I believe the Middle East should become a WMD-free zone -- the people who are driving the entire region towards conflagration in order to stop the Iranian nuclear programme are the very people who turn a blind eye to the Israeli nuclear programme. This programme has been in progress since the 1950s, initially with French support, and it continued to develop steadily and stealthily until Golda Meir "let it slip" that the Israelis had contemplated using a nuclear bomb during the 1973 war. In other words, the Israeli nuclear weapon is not just for intimidating its neighbours. In the back of the minds of Israeli strategists the bomb is there to be used. There is a concerted attempt to stir alarm against a purported Iranian nuclear threat. Its purpose is to divert attention away from the very real threat posed by Israel. The attempt, and the confusion it causes, is extremely dangerous. As much as one might disapprove of Iran asserting itself as a dominant regional power, and regardless of one's suspicions as to Iran's nuclear intentions, it should be borne in mind that Israel is the primary existing danger, whereas Iran presents no more than a potential secondary one. We must also be on guard against the tendency to reduce the concept of Arab national security to the Gulf region. The threats from Israel and Iran, as different in nature and magnitude as they are, endanger the entire region, not just the Gulf. Apart from the nuclear safety risks -- Chernobyl should never by far from our minds -- there is the greater danger of any possible deployment of nuclear weapons in this strategically sensitive, politically charged and long unstable region. This is why the Arab League takes a comprehensive view of nuclear threats and why it is campaigning for international guarantees to rid the Middle East of such weapons. Arab countries have naturally sought to develop nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes. In France 80 per cent of energy consumed is generated by nuclear power plants. We, too, may have to go in that direction. Petroleum reserves will run out sooner or later and we must begin, now, the search for alternative energy resources. Egypt, in fact, inaugurated a nuclear energy programme in the 1950s under Gamal Abdel-Nasser, although the project eventually fell by the wayside. Then when Hosni Mubarak contemplated reviving the programme in the 1980s, the Chernobyl disaster put paid to the scheme. Now, though, the Arabs must seriously pursue nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes so that they, too, can tap this cheap source of energy. In the coming decades they may well have no other choice. Yet Israel and the West are keeping close tabs on the Arabs, monitoring every statement and every study published on the subject, and they draw no distinction -- probably intentionally -- between governments that seek to develop nuclear energy and those that already had programmes up and running decades ago. In short, the Arabs have no choice but to enter the nuclear age, though in doing so they can expect an uphill political battle. In this regard we might take our cue from Iran. Although we cannot declare Tehran completely innocent, we can certainly praise its diplomatic acumen and the tenacity with which it adheres to its legitimate rights. Tehran is playing a clever game in which it assigns different roles to various leaders in order to accomplish its objectives. Certainly, it aims to break the Israeli nuclear monopoly in the region and strengthen its own position, in order to resume the status it had under the Shah, when it was the policeman of the Gulf and the protector of US interests in that area. Surprising as a revival of this latter role might be it should not be discounted. There is no such thing as permanent enmity or friendship in international relations. They are governed by the pursuit of national interests, which explains recent developments between Tehran and Washington and their unspoken occasional courtship. I have not the slightest doubt that there are secret channels of communication between the two. Arab-Iranian relations, meanwhile, have seen better days. The situations in Iraq and in Lebanon have weighed heavily on the region and have disseminated a climate of mutual suspicion among the various players. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that the region should be gripped by an air of suspense as surface tensions escalate and mutual accommodations take place beneath. The nuclear dimension has played a leading role in these manoeuvrings as apprehensions grow over Iran's growing influence and regional penetration. Egyptian-Iranian relations epitomise the magnitude of Arab apprehensions towards the ideological, political, strategic and nuclear aspects of the Iranian regional project. The region is in a state of turmoil the outcome of which is impossible to predict. It is a powder keg that could explode at any moment. * The writer is chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the People's Assembly.
