The US and its Iraqi clients are to sign a long-term security agreement, rejected by the Iraqi people. The Arabs must take a position and act, writes Sameh Rashed* As intense as the controversy over Iraqi-US negotiations on a security agreement has been and as diverse as the opinions have been on both sides, not a single Arab position on the issue has yet emerged. One cannot help but to wonder at the total Arab silence on a development that will affect the security and very future of an Arab country that serves as a gateway to the entire Arab region. Surely this seeming indifference conflicts with considerations of Arab national security and strategic regional interests. Even from the perspective of the interests and welfare of each individual Arab country one would think that Arab officials would show a little more concern for a possible contractual arrangement for perpetuating the US occupation of Iraq because such a precedent could be repeated in other Arab countries. Hiding behind the principles of non-intervention and respect for another country's sovereignty simply does not work in this context. For one, Iraq does not enjoy the sovereignty that other nations are presumed to have. Its domestic affairs are an open field for outside meddling, the Arabs being one of the least influential players on the board. Secondly, when the question is connected with the creation of a new situation that will have major repercussions on the region whose member states presumably form a single political entity, considerations of national sovereignty would presumably take a back seat to considerations of the collective welfare and security of the whole. But even from the Iraqi perspective, Arab silence on US-Iraqi negotiations could be more harmful to the cause of Iraqi independence and sovereignty than intervention. The fact is that the Iraqi people, not only with respect to the agreement but also more generally, are caught in a vice between Washington and Tehran. They have no space to breathe, nor room to move, wedged as they are between the two clamps. That the Arabs have continued to absent themselves from Iraq in spite of the fact that the Saddam era ended five years ago is no more than a perpetuation of an old mistake. The circumstances surrounding the former absence and the justifications in support of it may be open to debate, but for this practice to persist is both incomprehensible and unjustifiable, especially in view of the domestic opposition in Iraq to the agreement. In other words, an Arab return to Iraq would be consistent with the domestic mood there which, in turn, would lend legitimacy and impetus to the Arab role while the Arab role would add moral and political weight to the Iraqi rejection of the agreement. Since Iraqi opinion is generally opposed to the agreement, a chief thrust of Arab efforts must be devoted directly to the substance of the agreement, which will dispense with the need to persuade the Iraqis that Arab intervention will work in their favour. It is important to note, in this regard, that for the first time since the occupation the Shia in Iraq have taken a united stance against the occupation. But this position merits a closer look. Naturally, it is connected with Tehran's opposition to the proposed formula, but this only partially explains the current attitude amongst the Shia in Iraq. After all, the agreement has been on the table for months, with Iran looking on, especially after the joint declaration of principles between Al-Maliki and Bush last November, which indicates that a realm of difference had existed. What is new is that the Iraq-US agreement opened a previously non-existent window for dismantling the Iraqi-Iranian-US triangle, in which the latter two sides are literally rooted on an Iraqi base. Until recently, the possibility of breaking apart the alliance was virtually inconceivable, what with Iran having dug in its heels in Iraq and the US's army having established itself on Iraqi territory. However, Washington's determination to "institutionalise" its military presence and political intervention has incensed both the Iraqis and the Iranians. But this desire was neither unexpected nor sudden, which suggests that the current vehemence of opposition in Iraq has more to do with the small print in the agreement than with the general principle. Perhaps, too, one side or the other reneged on an earlier commitment. If this is the case, then the parties to the negotiations can overcome their differences over substance and procedure just as quickly, which means that if the Arabs want to have a say they must act quickly before the opportunity slips. A historic opportunity is at hand for the Arabs to play a part, or to revive their forfeited role, in Iraq. If there were times they were negligent and others in which circumstances, as well as other parties, conspired against them, the Iranian-Iraqi difference with the occupation authorities has cracked open a door that had remained shut for five years. Nevertheless, given that the Arab role has been akin to an expected duty never performed, the Arabs should not exactly expect the Iraqis to greet its revival with great enthusiasm, especially so late in the day. At the same time, the Arabs lack enthusiasm as well. The sentiment is understandable given the many restrictions and fears that encumber Arab decision-makers, individually and collectively, when it comes to Iraq. Arab calculations surrounding any development in Iraq are inevitably complex, confusing and fraught with apprehension over how the Americans will react. Therefore, the first essential step the Arabs must take is to take the proposed Iraqi-US security agreement and examine each of its articles very closely in terms of clearly defined criteria for what best serves collective Arab interests and Arab regional security. If they find that the agreement poses no real problem then they should congratulate the Iraqis on the American bases and reconcile themselves to an Iranian regional role in exchange for letting the agreement go through. If, on the other hand, the Arabs feel that a contractual arrangement establishing permanent US military bases in Iraq, US control over Iraqi airspace and everlasting immunity for American soldiers in Iraq is harmful, they not only have a right to intervene but a duty -- a duty to Iraq and the Iraqi people even before themselves. The idea behind this founding step for the Arab role is that it will be grounded on an objective perception of a threat, as opposed to casting about for some way to act or even just rushing in to help the Iraqi people. In addition, close and cooperative study of the position they should adopt helps fortify that position with legitimacy and a sense of collective resolve. For this reason, the Arabs should approach the matter in an institutionalised framework and, specifically, through the Arab League, the body that organisationally embodies the so-called Arab order. Another advantage of working through the Arab League is that it offers a form of protection. Naturally, the league cannot shield its members from Washington's wrath, but it can help deflect some of that anger and alleviate pressure on individual members. The next step in Arab involvement entails substance, which is to say the nature and form of the action they take. If the Arabs are to play an effective role, that role must be characterised by features that are customarily rather novel and seemingly difficult to produce for the Arabs, but absolutely necessary this time. Foremost among those features is concrete action, as opposed to mere words and rhetoric. In addition, the approach most be governed by a spirit of flexibility and open-mindedness. The Arabs need to avoid locking themselves into an absolutist opposition to the agreement since there may be some points that can be modified and accepted, even if some others need to be rejected. This means that the Arabs need to work out viable alternatives, for the very absence of alternatives furnishes American negotiators with sufficient excuse to push through the provisions they want. It is useful, here, to pause for a moment on the question of alternatives and, specifically, alternatives to the occupation. We need to recall that many Arab governments have expressed grave concern that a sudden departure of US forces at a time of continued security upheaval would plunge Iraq into total chaos and perhaps civil war. If any Arab position or course of action on this matter is to be credible and carry weight, it must be grounded upon truly feasible alternatives, which means that when they deliberate over such alternatives they must summon all the powers of objectivity and creativity at their disposal, as opposed to falling back on timeworn slogans and formulaic responses. In order to keep deliberations on course and prevent them from becoming bogged down in theoretical conjectures, the Arabs could develop specific proposals pertaining to the actual points of the Iraqi-US agreement and the "contractual" nature of the relationship between Iraq and the occupation. On the question of possible alternatives to the occupation, or an American force in Iraq, it is important to recall that maintaining security has never been the true purpose of the American military presence in Iraq, but only a pretext. By undermining the pretext it will be possible to resolve the issue of American bases, for which there will be no more practical need. At the very least, those bases can then be reduced in quantity and quality. The following are some possible alternatives: - Sending in a UN peacekeeping force and making the UN responsible for supervising conditions in the areas that are charged with sectarian tensions. - Creating an Arab, Islamic or regional (Iranian, Turkish and Arab) force to fulfil the peacekeeping and tension monitoring missions. - Keeping sufficient US forces in Iraq to undertake the tasks of restoring and maintaining security and stability while training Iraqi forces which would gradually take over these tasks from the Americans, with the provision that it is determined that they can perform them effectively before dispensing with US forces entirely. The advantage of this option is that it renders the American military presence in Iraq operationally accountable for Iraqi interests and not solely American strategic interests. It will also compel the American forces to take the question of training seriously. - Rehabilitating the Iraqi army and revising security policies and methods of recruitment, training and organisation on a national as opposed to sectarian basis. The same approach must be taken when addressing all remaining unjust provisions in the agreement. For example, on the question of immunity from prosecution granted to US soldiers regardless of their crimes or human rights abuses, the Arabs must press home the illegality and illegitimacy of this, if not within the framework of Iraqi law then within the framework of international law. As a practical step towards this end, the Arab group in the UN General Assembly can rally an international majority behind an international resolution guaranteeing Iraq's dignity and (presumed) independence. In fact, before this, the Arabs should appeal first to the Security Council, taking as their model that body's resolution regarding Lebanese domestic affairs adopted beneath the banner of the international community's desire to safeguard the sovereignty, stability and independence of Lebanon. Then, if this effort fails the Arabs can turn to the General Assembly. It is perhaps difficult for the Arabs to come up with an alternative to American insistence on unrestricted access to Iraqi airspace. Washington's access to the airspace of any Arab country is based on a bilateral agreement signed in advance. Here, then, the Arabs could support the Iraqi rejection of such an encroachment on the principle of Iraqi sovereignty while underscoring the potential risks of including such a provision in the agreement. The most immediately danger is that US forces could use Iraqi airspace to strike Iran. In the longer run, those forces could use that airspace for military operations targeting certain areas or groups inside Iraq itself. The US alliance with the Shia in Iraq is not a Catholic marriage; if the situation between the US and Iran worsens, the Shia in Iraq can never be certain how the Americans will react. The same applies to the rest of the communities in Iraq under other circumstances. As they deal with questions of this nature, the Arabs must keep direct and open lines of communication with Tehran, which perhaps has even more at stake in the short term. In view of the close relations between Iran and the Shia of Iraq, Arab-Iranian coordination over the question of the agreement is essential, especially given that the Arabs' direct influence inside Iraq at present is virtually negligible. Also, while Tehran has an immediate interest in altering some of the articles of the agreement and obtaining certain guarantees, the Arabs may well have no less of an interest in the long run in ensuring the emergence of an independent sovereign Iraq, or at least an Iraq that is not totally under American domination. The agreement that Iraq's leadership and the US are planning to sign poses no less a challenge to the Arab countries than it does to Iraq and the Iraqi people. The role that the Arabs must play in this regard will be multifaceted and multitasked. Pointing to the ills of the agreement and bewailing Iraq's lost sovereignty will serve little purpose. What is needed, very urgently, is a single collective Arab stance that is practical and feasible. Even if the role the Arabs need to play is governed more by the demands of Arab welfare than by Iraqi needs, and even if there is no guarantee that the Arabs will succeed here, the fact that they worked together seriously and in concert will not only help save face (a secondary concern in view of the severity of the situation) but it will also help re-establish the bridges of Arab-Iraqi communication. In the future this should contribute, at least partially, to the reformulation of relations that have long lacked stability and equilibrium. I am speaking here not only of the relationship between the Iraqis and Arabs but also of the relations between the Iraqis and the Iranians, between Iran and the Arabs, and between the Americans and all the above. * The writer is deputy managing editor of Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya published by Al-Ahram.
