The bipolar world of the Cold War has not returned, but that a multipolar world approaches is undeniable, writes Hassan Nafaa* In the current crisis between Russia and Georgia, the stakes are much higher than Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Hoping to gain leverage on the international scene, Moscow was waiting for an excuse to act. Georgia provided it. Differences between Moscow and Tbilisi didn't need to take such dramatic dimensions, but with the US embroiled in elections that may change its course, the moment was opportune. The Russians seized it. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has given Russia no or little say in international politics -- or any other major power for that matter. Washington intentionally sabotaged collective international forums, including any UN agency that the US couldn't control. At the same time, Washington went about boosting alternative agencies, especially those that have the potential of supplanting the UN. NATO was enlarged to include most former Warsaw Pact countries and even some former Soviet republics. Washington wanted NATO to become the world's policeman. Under the guise of fighting terror, the US sent its troops into Afghanistan and Iraq, and then contemplated invading other countries in the Middle East, especially those that seemed reluctant to condone US policies. For a long time, Russia played along. Desperate for financial and political help from the West, the Russians made one concession after another. But as soon as Moscow took its breath, it started putting its foot down. At first, it criticised the West for being insensitive to its interests, then it paid more respect to its national security. Western insistence on the independence of Kosovo proved too jarring to Moscow. And with NATO planning to bring Georgia and Ukraine into its fold, deploying a missile shield close to Russian territories, Moscow decided that it was time to act. It knew that things were not going well for Washington. Iraq and Afghanistan were falling apart. And Hizbullah gave Israel a bloody nose in a war that was essentially US-inspired. Moscow was also feeling rather confident, for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had a taste for domestic stability and -- thanks to the boom in the oil markets -- financial muscle. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili may have erred in judgement. But this was not the reason the crisis went out of hand. Russia was making a point. It would no longer tolerate perceived threats to its national security. And it was willing to use arms when necessary. This is what makes this crisis more of a taste of things to come than a passing blip on the screen. Now that Russia has flexed its muscles, its relations with the West are never going to be the same again. This doesn't mean a return to the Cold War. After all, Russia lacks the ability and the desire to step into the shoes of the Soviet Union. But it is determined to safeguard its national security in ways not seen since Soviet times. The Russian ruling elite, I believe, is eyeing the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. Anything that used to be part of the Soviet Union is now off limits to other powers. The Russians may not view the former Soviet republics as their satellites, but they don't want NATO to think that they are up for grabs either. This is more or less Moscow's stand, and the West is likely to challenge it every step of the way. The conflict between Russia and the West may eventually spill over into the Middle East. But we must keep in mind that today's Russia is not yesterday's Soviet Union. Russia doesn't have the resources of the Soviet Union, nor its global vision. For Moscow to help another nation, with weapons for example, its conditions are likely to differ from those once set by the Soviet Union. Russia may on occasion veto UN Security Council resolutions in support of its allies. But Russia would only do so after taking into account the reaction of the West. It is hard to foresee Moscow's actions, for now at least, simply because its strategy is still a matter of trial and error. Arab countries must understand the new game and learn how to play it. Where should we stand on the Georgian crisis? One answer would be to act in the light of how this crisis will affect the future of the world order. Questions such as minority rights, territorial integrity, and self-determination may need to be put aside for now. It is in our interest to see the world order move from being unilateral into being multilateral. Israel's best friend ran the unilateral world we've been living in. It didn't do much good for our region. This doesn't mean that the Arabs should support Russia's policy no matter what. We need to start thinking in terms of reforming and reinforcing the UN. It's not in our interest to encourage international polarisation and military pacts. What Arab countries need to do is get in touch with like-minded nations and try to reform the UN and its agencies. We need to bring law back to the heart of the international community. We also need to speak in one voice, which means that we have to overcome our differences. This is not an easy task, but unless we have a shared vision of the future we will not be able to affect it. The Georgian crisis has created opportunities just as it created complications. We need to benefit from these opportunities. We need to use the current situation to bolster momentum towards a multilateral world. * The writer is secretary-general of the Arab Thought Forum, Amman, Jordan.
