The death of 17 Turkish soldiers prompt Turks to question their government's policy towards the PKK, Gareth Jenkins reports Last Friday, an attack by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on a Turkish military outpost in southeast Turkey left 17 soldiers dead and dealt a devastating blow to Ankara's claims that the organisation is on the point of collapse. The attack occurred at Aktutun (Bezele in Kurdish), a village of around 75 houses about four kilometres inside Turkey on the country's border with Iraq. The military outpost had been attacked numerous times in the past, mostly by PKK units infiltrating from their forward bases in the valleys and ravines of northern Iraq. The last attack was in May this year, when six Turkish soldiers were killed as around 200 PKK militants poured mortar, heavy machine gun and anti-aircraft gunfire into the base from positions on the mountains that surround the village. Last Friday, Aktutun was attacked again, this time by around 350 PKK militants who had spent several days moving into position and transporting heavy weaponry by mule up onto the mountain peaks overlooking the village. The Turkish military later announced that their thermal imaging equipment had picked up the militants moving into position and that they had been able to bring in reinforcements and air support in the form of F-16 fighter bombers and Cobra helicopter gunships. Nevertheless, the subsequent battle lasted for over nine hours, until the PKK attackers finally withdrew under cover of darkness. In addition to the 17 Turkish soldiers who were killed, another 21 were wounded, making the casualties the highest suffered by the Turkish military in a single incident in more than a decade. The Turkish General Staff later issued a statement claiming to have killed 23 of the attackers, although by Tuesday only nine bodies had been recovered. The attack on Aktutun came a few days before parliament was due to vote to renew the one-year authorisation it granted the Turkish military in October 2007 to stage cross-border operations against the PKK camps and bases in northern Iraq. Since December 2007, armed with actionable intelligence provided by the US, the Turkish military has regularly conducted air raids against the PKK in northern Iraq. In February 2008, it even staged a nine-day ground operation in which 1,400 Turkish commandos trained in winter warfare raided PKK forward bases in the Zap region of northern Iraq. There is evidence to suggest that the Turkish air raids have forced the PKK onto the defensive both militarily and psychologically, while also damaging -- though far from eradicating -- the organisation's ability to stage operations inside Turkey; not least by disrupting its supply lines. But the PKK has been less badly damaged than the Turkish authorities have led the public to believe. Since it resumed violence in June 2004 after a five-year lull, most PKK operations have been conducted by units of 8-10 militants. One of the main reasons for the PKK launching such a massive attack against Aktutun appears to have been to demonstrate to both its enemies and supporters that it is far from a spent force; and, in the longer term, to try to persuade the Turkish government that it is futile to continue its military operations and that it should finally lift its longstanding refusal to sit down at the negotiating table with the organisation. There is little doubt that the PKK succeeded in the first of its aims. After months when nearly all of the casualties in PKK attacks in Turkey seemed to come in ones and twos as the result of sniper fire or remote-controlled mines, many Turks had begun to believe the government's assurances that the organisation was in irreversible decline. As a result, the high death toll -- and the subsequent emotional trauma of the media coverage of the funerals of those killed, with mothers and little children desperately clinging to the coffins holding their loved ones -- has come as a severe shock. Although Turks often have an ambivalent attitude towards their military, particularly given the latter's proclivity for intervening in politics, few have ever questioned their operational prowess. But the doubts triggered by the high death toll and the length of the battle quickly turned to anger when it emerged that in 2007 the Turkish General Staff (TGS) had decided that the outpost in Aktutun was too vulnerable to attack and should be relocated to a more easily defendable position. Nothing was done. It was only on Sunday, as grieving relatives were burying the dead soldiers, that the TGS finally announced that it was pushing ahead with its plans to relocate the base at Aktutun and those in four other locations along the border with Iraq to safer positions. On Monday, the inhabitants of Aktutun announced that they were all abandoning the village as they no longer felt safe. "There isn't a house which hasn't been hit by a bullet, not one which hasn't had at least one window broken. We've had enough," said a villager who asked not to be named. On Sunday, the deputy chief of the TGS, General Hassan Igsiz, held a press briefing at which he claimed that the battle at Aktutun had been a victory for the Turkish military as it had prevented the PKK from entirely overrunning the military outpost. Even if true, it would be a victory most Turks could have done without. For many, the battle of Aktutun has also raised questions about the efficacy of the policies pursued by the military and the Justice and Development Party government. On Tuesday, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan defiantly told his parliamentary party that he was determined to eradicate the PKK and would not hesitate even to order another ground operation into northern Iraq if necessary. But, after the battle of Aktutun, many Turks will need a lot of convincing that more of the same is likely to produce better results.
