The formula of Jerusalem as a divided capital is even less likely to succeed now as when it failed 10 years ago, writes Wahid Abdel-Maguid* There is a long way between "East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state" and "Jerusalem as the capital for both Israel and Palestine". The distance is as great as that between the ideal and reality, or between the principles of justice and the workings of international balances of power. It was therefore only natural that the article by President Hosni Mubarak, which was timed to appear in The New York Times as direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations opened in Washington this month, stirred considerable controversy over the extent to which Egypt has shifted its position on the question of Jerusalem. Mubarak used the second of the two formulas above in his article. Even some official quarters in Egypt were stunned, to the extent that the state-run Middle East News Agency omitted the phrase referring to Jerusalem as a capital of two states from its translation of the Mubarak article. For decades the official Egyptian line has been consistent with the general Arab position that calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. However, the rubric was pretty much confined to official statements and formal occasions. Therefore, it had no impact on the sole occasion in which there were detailed talks over the status of Jerusalem, this being the Camp David negotiations in July 2000 and its subsequent sessions that were held in Taba, Eilat and Washington later that year and in January 2001. These talks opened from a point very close to the formula, "Jerusalem as a capital for both states," most likely because President Clinton, who brokered these negotiations, believed that Israel had rights in East Jerusalem, in general, and in the historic quarter of the city in particular. That quarter is the Gordian knot of the question of Jerusalem. Barely a square kilometre in size, it is heavily laden with points of such historical, cultural and religious significance as to render Jerusalem the most sensitive and most broadly emotive aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. If the historical rule is that the more that religion and sacred places are involved in a conflict the harder it is to find compromises, Jerusalem, with its unique and powerful symbolic value, has to be the most intractable obstacle to a negotiated solution. By contrast, the question of Israeli-Palestinian boundaries, which is not charged with such religious valences, is a relative breeze to resolve. This factor also explains why the Palestinians and Arabs in general will always have trouble with, "East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state," in negotiations. To the Israelis and the American "mediator" the formula is a "non-starter", as they say over there, whereas "Jerusalem as the capital of both states" is, for them, the right starting point. Yet this formula poses a fundamental dilemma because of the difficulty in reaching an agreement on the basis of it. That is unless the Palestinian negotiator hoists the white flag and operates on the assumption that any solution is better than no solution, and that it is better to obtain something in Jerusalem than nothing at all. The core problem with "Jerusalem as the capital of both states" is the extreme complexity of the situation in the small historical quarter of the town, which was the whole of Jerusalem until the mid-19th century. Contrary to the formula of "East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state," "Jerusalem as the capital of both states" opens the hornets' nest of how to divide sovereignty and control over the city. It requires little imagination to picture the difficulties of this task when coming to that minuscule area crowded with holy sites where there are so many rival Palestinian and Israeli claims, in the vicinity of Al-Aqsa Mosque in particular. It is, perhaps, little wonder that Bill Clinton's efforts in 2000- 2001 failed to produce an agreement, in spite of the relative progress he and his team made during those negotiations. An agreement had, in fact, been reached in accordance with which the Palestinians would have full sovereignty over the Arab quarters located to the north of the old city, the most important being Beit Hanina and Shufat, and that the Israelis would have full sovereignty over the Jewish and Armenian quarters. However, the stumbling block was, precisely, that tiny but hugely valuable area of Haram Al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary). The Palestinians could not have possibly accepted the preliminary American proposal that the Palestinian state would have "effective control" over that part of the Old City but without sovereignty. That would have meant that Israel would have had sovereignty over this sacred site. Nor could the Palestinians have accepted the second proposal that called for Palestinian sovereignty over the famous sanctuary in exchange for Israeli sovereignty over Al-Buraq Wall, which Jews refer to as the Wailing Wall and regard as one of their holy sites, a major part of which lies in the heart of the holy sanctuary area. At the same time, the Israeli negotiator rejected sole Palestinian sovereignty over Haram Al-Sherif on the grounds that Solomon's Temple was located there. Although the Israelis have been unable to produce a single peace of evidence to prove this, in spite of all the archaeological excavations they have undertaken since their occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, they adhered adamantly to this claim. The intractability of the question of Jerusalem must have driven mediators to their wits' end. There were even reports, albeit unsubstantiated, of a proposal for dividing sovereignty vertically whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty above ground and Israel sovereignty below ground! Not only does the idea defy three centuries of practice since the emergence of the nation state, which is presumed to exercise sovereignty over all its territory from below ground level to the skies overhead, it flies in the face of logic: states are located next to each other horizontally, not on top of one another! The difficulty of the formula of "Jerusalem as the capital of both states" extends beyond the old quarters of the city. If the Israeli vision for this solution, generally supported by the US, were applied it would place more than half of the whole of East Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. In fact, this is what Israeli Minister of Defence Ehud Barak was driving at when, only a few hours before direct negotiations began, he said that West Jerusalem and 12 Jewish neighbourhoods with a total population of 200,000 would belong to Israel. If "East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state" strikes some as idealistic "Jerusalem as the capital of both states" is no more realistic, not even if all the Arabs accepted the principle and Palestinian negotiators displayed boundless flexibility. The formula, which met a dead end 10 years ago, is even less likely to succeed now. It would require a climate in Jerusalem and the rest of the region completely opposite to that which prevails today. It is pointless to hope for a formula for peaceful coexistence and mutual trust in a climate shaped by Israeli policies that are based on domination, the imposition of de facto realities, racial discrimination, incitement and the inflammation of hatred. Under such a climate we would be wiser to hold to our basic positions and only consider revising them when the other side is prepared to reciprocate with some moderation and flexibility. * The writer is a political analyst.
