Hamas provoked Israel and received the response it wished for, argues Emad Gad When the six-month period of calming down with Israel neared expiration, Hamas leaders said they wouldn't renew the ceasefire unless Israel lifted the siege and opened Gaza's crossing points. Their remarks contrasted sharply with those of Israeli officials, who said they preferred to renew the calming period and avoid bloodshed. The whole thing was bizarre. While Israel professed a desire to spare lives, Hamas foamed at the mouth, threatening fire and brimstone. Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah all came to the rescue of Hamas, revving up their rhetoric and telling Egypt to open the Rafah crossing without delay. In front of the Egyptian embassies in Lebanon and Syria and the Egyptian mission office in Tehran, protesters called Egypt names, accusing its leaders of collaborating with Israel in the blockade of Gaza. Once the calming down expired, Hamas and other Palestinian groups in Gaza started lobbing rockets at cities in southern Israel. Again, Israel feigned self- restraint, knowing how ineffective the rockets were in a physical sense, while thinking out the best response. It is not that Israel doesn't want Hamas to hold on to Gaza. On the contrary, the more Hamas challenges the Palestinian Authority, the better reason the Israelis have for discontinuing negotiations. Who to talk to, they would say. But Israel couldn't afford to ignore the rockets for long. With Israeli elections approaching, all parties have an implicit need to talk tough. Netanyahu's Likud wants to portray the government coalition of Kadima and Labour as too soft or weak. With the failure of the current coalition in the Lebanon war of 2006 in mind, the Likud have no difficulty attacking the government on that count. So Prime Minister Olmert (former Kadima leader), Foreign Minister Livni (Kadima leader) and Defence Minister Barak (Labour leader) had ample incentive to send the army against Hamas, if not for election reasons then to erase some of the painful memory of the 2006 war in Lebanon. Newly appointed Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi also needed the opportunity to restore some of the lost pride of the army through a wide-scale offensive in Gaza. With Iran, Syria and Hizbullah busy antagonising Egypt and Hamas working extra time to undermine the Palestinian Authority, Israel saw its chance. Right after the Israeli mini-cabinet made up its mind, Foreign Minister Livni came to Cairo to announce that Israel's patience was running out. The timing was just as right on the international front, where the Americans were busy changing administrations and the new team of Obama unlikely to change course on the Middle East for some time to come. None of this seemed to matter for Hamas. Its militiamen continued to rain rockets on south Israel while its leaders boasted of their ability to confront any Israeli offensive. Hamas said it would turn Israel into hell; perhaps even resume suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. Just as Israel's mini-cabinet promised to launch a strike against Gaza, Hamas got together its policemen and security officials in one spot to celebrate the graduation of police cadets. This gave Israel a perfect opportunity to strike. Israel proceeded to bombard Hamas security centres, welding workshops, and the centres of the Qassam Brigades, killing over 150 within hours. The fact that Hamas assembled its security officials in one spot, as Israel was getting ready to attack, beggars the mind. Was it sheer brazenness? Or did Hamas wish for Israel to attack in the hope of a battle that may shift power within the Palestinian scene, which -- by the way --is exactly what Hizbullah did when it abducted two Israeli soldiers? Hamas didn't need to do that. It could have tried to close ranks within the Palestinian scene. It could have tried to get Egypt and Arab countries on its side. But that's not what it wanted. It preferred to bet on the Iranian-Syrian axis. It opted for being a part of a defamation campaign against Egypt, sending demonstrators to try to break across the Rafah crossing and whipping up feelings of hostility against Egypt. The remarks made by Hamas leaders -- and the vitriolic attack by Hassan Nasrallah on Egypt -- suggest that these groups imagine that the Arab masses are waiting to rise in revolt in Egypt, Jordan and other Arab countries. Give them a bit of encouragement, a hint from Tehran or Damascus, and the Arab masses would overthrow their regimes, Hamas seems to think. This type of thinking is not only pitiful; it is also tragic. Hamas has harmed its cause, alienated Egypt, and bet on the wrong axis. It has also given Israel the chance to strike at Gaza with impunity.
