While some saw Israel's war on Gaza as an attempt to restore Israel's military cache, it was Israeli deterrence that was the final victim of Israel's failed offensive, writes Amin Howeidi* If there is anything to learn from Operation Cast Lead, the codename for Israel's latest onslaught on Gaza, it is that Israel is not as invincible as it likes to think. I am not talking here about who won and who lost. In conflicts such as this a few points won here or there is not what matters. What matters is deterrence; something Israel used to have and is now losing. By dictionary definition, deterrence is the ability to make political gains with the mere threat of force. In other words, one must have enough power and a willingness to use it, to force the enemy to make concessions. In Gaza's case, none of this worked. Israel threatened force and the resistance stood its ground. Then Israel attacked and the resistance still stood its ground. This must be scary for Israel, for it makes the future rather uncertain. Israel used to have it easy. It maintained overwhelming force, which means that it didn't have to attack. Then, if it attacked, it had the ability to score fast victories, or retaliate with a convincing second strike. Israel likes its wars short. First, this means that it doesn't need to call in the reserves. And it obviates the need to confront angry world public opinion. In Gaza, the war went too far. Israel had to call in the reserves. And when many countries intervened with their own initiative for a truce, Israel had to call a ceasefire -- and did so unilaterally. Meanwhile, the Egyptians were mediating full time. Unfortunately, as Cairo was trying to stop the bloodshed, small-minded people around the region started calling it names, and there was nothing anyone could do about it. Israel is rather systematic about its military post-mortems. The Agranat Commission looked into the 1973 war. And the Winograd Commission looked into the 2006 Lebanon war. A commission is bound to look into the 2008-9 Gaza war, and it will be shocked by Israel's inability to achieve much political gain. Israel knows how to kill civilians, destroy homes and commit war crimes. That's what it did in Gaza, and little more. Just after the battle ended, a former Israeli chief of staff said that Israel went back to square one. What does this all mean? Either Israel's military power is waning, or the resistance is getting stronger, or both. If you ask me, I believe that the gap between Israel's fighting capabilities and those of the resistance is narrowing with time. The ability of Hizbullah and Hamas to launch a retaliatory rocket strike is not insignificant. In a nutshell, Israel's deterrence strategy is falling apart. Israel may be able to exact a terrible price in terms of life and property, but even this price can be reduced if the resistance pays more attention to the building of bomb shelters and bunkers. The Arabs need to take the recent shift in power into account when discussing politics. The Obama administration is said to be less biased to Israel than the Bush administration was, which may further undermine Israel's deterrence capabilities. But nothing is sure yet. When it comes to US foreign policy, we'll have to wait and see. * The writer is former defence minister and chief of General In telligence.
