Israel is founded on and lives by force, and this is the main problem, writes Amin Howeidi Operation Cast Lead, it was called. A silly codename for what turned out to be a massacre. Israel says it attacked Gaza to stop Hamas from firing rockets. I know what Hamas is firing, and it is not fire crackers as some people think. And yet Israel is going about it all wrong. Israel doesn't want to win on points; it dreams of a knockout. Israel's leaders want to settle everything through force, no matter what the alternatives are. Nothing is good enough for Israel, not the calming down period, and not even peace. Israel wants absolute security, not mutual security. It wants peace and land, not peace for land. It wants to tip the balance of power, not to seek a balance of interests. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni says that Israel went into Gaza to alter the reality on the ground. Yigal Allon used to think so. He didn't believe in peace deals. He didn't believe in agreements, international guarantees, or even the deployment of international forces. What he believed in was having control over land, canals (the Suez Canal), rivers (the River Jordan) and mountains (the Golan Heights). War has changed, and politics has too. But Israel doesn't see but what it chooses to. Rockets are now effective over great distances. And political agreements are effective too. Take, for example, the deals Israel signed with Egypt and Jordan. Haven't these deals held for decades? And yet Israel is worried, and it wants a knockout to ease its mind. Israel must understand that its intransigence will increase the hatred in an already volatile region. Israel's conduct encourages resistance, hence the rockets. In fact, by destabilising the region, Israel is losing immigrants, which is a threat to its national security. But Israel prefers to think otherwise. The Gaza operation was planned by Defence Minister Barak six months ago. At the time, Israel was still negotiating with Hamas on a ceasefire. Israel compiled data on the infrastructure of resistance groups in Gaza -- the arms depots, training camps, tunnels, rocket launchers, and the homes of senior officials. The Gaza operation was submitted by Chief of the General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi to Barak, who signed it on 19 November 2008. Olmert signed it on 18 December 2008. Israel drew up war plans way ahead of time, and kept altering its political message to suit military developments. Its assault on Gaza started with aerial and artillery shelling, with little regard for international law. Israel then sent its troops into Gaza, where they met stiff resistance by the Palestinians. As the fighting continued, it became clear that the Palestinians are deeply divided, and the Arab world is angry but indecisive. Eventually, the UN Security Council issued a decision calling for a ceasefire. Israel ignored the decision, and the resistance retaliated by firing rockets at Bir Sheba, Ashdod and Ashkelon. As the number of casualties mounted, world opinion became incensed. In Israel, the ultra-right started calling for "transfer", or the forced deportation of Palestinians. These were tense times for Egypt, what with Rafah Crossing on its border. We need to listen carefully to what was said then, for I heard people suggesting that Sinai be part of a land exchange plan. What can we learn? Our leaders need to discuss the creation of an Arab deterrent force, for otherwise Israel will go on picking up fights. As for Israel, it will go on holding commissions, such as Winograd, to see what went wrong in battle. What Israeli leaders tend to forget is that it is not the battle that went wrong, but the politics. Israel should have a commission to look into its foreign policy, not its military performance. * The writer is former defence minister and chief of General Intelligence.
